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ABSTRACT 
 
Efficient Detection on Stochastic Faults in PLC Based Automated Assembly Systems 
with Novel Sensor Deployment and Diagnoser Design. 
(May 2012) 
Zhenhua Wu, B.S., M.S., Hefei University of Technology; 
M.S., The University of Texas-Pan American 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Sheng-jen Hsieh 
 
In this dissertation, we proposed solutions on novel sensor deployment and 
diagnoser design to efficiently detect stochastic faults in PLC based automated systems.  
First, a fuzzy quantitative graph based sensor deployment was called upon to 
model cause-effect relationship between faults and sensors. Analytic hierarchy process 
(AHP) was used to aggregate the heterogeneous properties between sensors and faults 
into single edge values in fuzzy graph, thus quantitatively determining the fault 
detectability. An appropriate multiple objective model was set up to minimize fault 
unobservability and cost while achieving required detectability performance. 
Lexicographical mixed integer linear programming and greedy search were respectively 
used to optimize the model, thus assigning the sensors to faults.  
Second, a diagnoser based on real time fuzzy Petri net (RTFPN) was proposed to 
detect faults in discrete manufacturing systems. It used the real time PN to model the 
manufacturing plant while using fuzzy PN to isolate the faults. It has the capability of 
handling uncertainties and including industry knowledge to diagnose faults. The 
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proposed approach was implemented using Visual Basic, and tested as well as validated 
on a dual robot arm. 
Finally, the proposed sensor deployment approach and diagnoser were 
comprehensively evaluated based on design of experiment techniques. Two-stage 
statistical analysis including analysis of variance (ANOVA) and least significance 
difference (LSD) were conducted to evaluate the diagnosis performance including 
positive detection rate, false alarm, accuracy and detect delay. It illustrated the proposed 
approaches have better performance on those evaluation metrics. 
The major contributions of this research include the following aspects: (1) a 
novel fuzzy quantitative graph based sensor deployment approach handling sensor 
heterogeneity, and optimizing multiple objectives based on lexicographical integer linear 
programming and greedy algorithm, respectively. A case study on a five tank system 
showed that system detectability was improved from the approach of signed directed 
graph’s 0.62 to the proposed approach’s 0.70. The other case study on a dual robot arm 
also show improvement on system’s detectability improved from the approach of signed 
directed graph’s 0.61 to the proposed approach’s 0.65. (2) A novel real time fuzzy Petri 
net diagnoser was used to remedy nonsynchronization and integrate useful but 
incomplete knowledge for diagnosis purpose. The third case study on a dual robot arm 
shows that the diagnoser can achieve a high detection accuracy of 93% and maximum 
detection delay of eight steps. (3) The comprehensive evaluation approach can be 
referenced by other diagnosis systems’ design, optimization and evaluation. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Motive 
Programmable logic controller (PLC) based automated assembly systems are 
widely used in manufacturing lines, semiconductor fabrication facilities etc. The success 
of PLC automated assembly systems critically depends on fault-free operations and low 
machine down time. The faults involved in assembly systems can be induced by 
underlying causes such as hardware/software failures, design errors, manufacturing 
defects, improper application of parts, or users programs not following the protocols etc. 
[1]. Fault diagnosis is the action to identify whether a system is deviating from the 
normal behavior, and determine the fault types, locations and potential root causes for 
the abnormal behaviors. Traditionally, fault diagnosis on assembly systems was 
performed by humans. It was time-consuming and mainly depended on the technicians’ 
experience and skills. When systems get more complex, the causality mapping between 
fault symptoms and root causes becomes highly nonlinear.  
Besides this, for stochastically faulty systems, the exact fault time and modes are 
not completely known due to the insufficient input/output that can be observed from the 
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system. These stochastic faults may not be observed directly but “hiding” under the 
observed signals. This challenges the technicians’ expertise and hinders the efficiency 
and accuracy of human-based machine maintenance. Design of a computer-aided 
diagnosis system on stochastic faults is desired for the purpose of improving accuracy, 
enhancing time-effectiveness and lowering the diagnosis cost.  
1.2 Research question 
When designing a computer based diagnosis system with excellent accuracy and 
efficiency, researchers and engineers need to consider many factors. In literature [2], 
authors summarized the main obstacles for the designers of diagnosis systems. They are 
listed as below: 
1. Design an architecture that can integrate technologies including sensor, signal 
processing, communication etc to resolve the diagnosis work; 
2. Select the types, numbers and locations of sensors. 
3. Design the effective diagnoser along with the selected sensors; 
4. Design an effective fusion algorithm to combine sensors and signal processing 
methods to improve performance; 
5. Reduce the cost of the diagnosis system without losing the performance merits; 
6. Automate the design process of a diagnosis system. 
To address the difficulties proposed in [2] in diagnosing PLC based automated 
assembly system, we have investigated system architectures’ effects on the diagnosis 
performance [3, 4].What remain incomplete are sensor deployment and diagnoser’s 
effects on diagnosing PLC based automated systems. Sensors and diagnosers work in 
 3 
tandem to affect diagnosing performances, instead of individually affecting the diagnosis 
work, so the study of them together can help researchers to understand how they 
facilitate the diagnosis on systems. PLC based automated systems are typical discrete 
event systems (DES). A Discrete Event System (DES) is a discrete-state, event-driven 
system, that is, its state evolution depends entirely on the occurrence of asynchronous 
discrete events over time [5]. Major systems’ classification is shown as below Figure 1. 
The conventional differential or difference equation based diagnostics are not effective 
in analyzing discrete event systems. Therefore this problem calls for a unique 
methodology on deploying sensor and designing diagnoser on DES.  
 
 
Figure 1 Major system classifications 
[5] 
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Firstly, sensors and sensing technology constitute the fundamental basis for the 
fault diagnosis. Diagnosis systems’ performance critically depends on whether sensor 
measurements can monitor faulty symptoms accurately and efficiently. Sometimes one 
sensor can monitor several symptoms; sometimes one symptom needs to be detected by 
several sensors. Due to the budgetary or physical constraints, it is impossible to install 
every necessary sensor to monitor the fault signature. Insufficient or inaccurate 
measurements resulting from improper sensor deployment will significantly deteriorate 
fault diagnosis system’s performance. Although redundantly sensing every physical 
system parameter can minimize information loss, the redundant sensor network may be 
cursed with overburden on data amount as well as analysis cost. A good sensor 
deployment strategy can result in a network configuration at the minimum cost while 
observing pre-specified performance criteria. Currently, the sensor deployment strategies 
in diagnosis are mainly based on ad hoc or heuristics method, it is mostly an “artistic” 
procedure, instead of a scientific technique [6]. Although analytical techniques on sensor 
deployment optimization have been suggested in recent years through qualitative 
methods such as directed graph [7] or signed directed graph [8]; or quantitative methods 
such as mathematic programming [9-10] or quantitative graph [11-12], literature survey 
[13] also noted that current research reported in the area of sensor deployment for fault 
diagnosis lacks a methodology to handle heterogeneous sensors-fault information and 
distribute sensors. Besides this, Sensor deployment for fault diagnosis is a delicate work 
which tackles multiple objectives including observability, reliability, accuracy and 
efficiency under the constraints of cost, resources and environment etc. Most sensor 
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deployments only tackle a single objective such as either cost or reliability. Multiple-
objective decision-making to optimize cost, reliability, accuracy and efficiency under the 
constraints of available resources and environment, is a prominent issue in sensor 
deployment. 
Secondly, when PLC automated systems get more sophisticated and complex, the 
identification of fault root cause also becomes more complicated. This case is even 
worse for the stochastic faults, because it is hard to get the detailed fault modes [14]. 
Finite state automaton (FSA) and Petei net (PN) are the most popular approaches to 
model and diagnose DES systems. Diagnoser designers have worked on diagnosing 
deterministic faults with FSA [15-22] or PN [23-39], some researchers also tried to 
detect undetermined stochastic faults with stochastic timed automaton [40-41], 
stochastic automaton [42-43] or stochastic timed Petri net [39]. Both FSA and PN based 
diagnosis are both model based approaches. An important issue to the success of these 
diagnosers is whether they can incorporate the knowledge about the faultless and faulty 
system behavior [41]. For stochastic faults, it often has incomplete fault messages and 
data rendering analysis or diagnose automated system faults ineffective. In order to 
improve the efficiency of diagnosis, how can we integrate the useful but incomplete 
knowledge about the fault into the diagnoser design? 
Initiated by these, we get our research question: can we propose a methodology 
including the selection of crucial sensors and the design of effective diagnosers to 
diagnose stochastic faults in PLC based automated assembly systems? 
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1.3 Research objective and methodology 
1.3.1 Research objective 
Based on the challenges identified in the section 1.2, the objective of this 
research includes four aspects: 
1) Understand the effects of sensors and diagnosers on diagnosing stochastic faults in 
PLC based automated systems; 
2) Develop a novel sensor deployment approach that can handle sensor heterogeneity 
and multiple-objective optimization in sensor allocation;   
3) Design a capable diagnoser that can integrate knowledge from industrial experience 
to accurately diagnose stochastic faults on PLC based automated assembly systems; 
4) Develop a comprehensive methodology to analyze performance parameters, thus 
evaluating how the sensor deployment and diagnoser design facilitate diagnosis 
work. 
This goal is deemed complex, because the diagnosis work requires the 
integration of many disparate applications including sensors, signal processing, 
information fusion, and decision making, etc. However, if successful, the outcome of 
this research will provide designers with a tool that can aid the design process of 
diagnosis systems by arranging all the resources with high efficiency, short development 
time, and cost-effective numbers of sensors. 
1.3.2 Research methodology 
Before describing methodologies to reach the objective, we would like to 
propose the assumptions of this work: 
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1) We focus on the PLC based automated assembly system with discrete event systems 
(DES) characteristics which are event-driven and discrete input/output state spaces. 
2) We assume that the faults in the system are stochastic. According to literature [14], 
the faults in the system can be classified as either deterministic or stochastic. The 
occurrence of deterministic failure is nonrandom. The deterministic failures can be 
observed instantaneously. For stochastic failure, it is hard to get the stochastic 
failure mode about the system due to the insufficient output that can be observed 
from the system; only part is available instead of complete failure mode about the 
system.  
3) We focus on the system or equipment faults, rather than the product faults. The 
difference lies in that products are manufactured by systems; good products can be 
manufactured if and only if the manufacturing system behaves normal, but a good 
system can manufacture bad products as well due to improper process planning. The 
fault detection on products is usually solved with statistical process control (SPC) or 
defect analysis, which is not the emphasis of this dissertation. 
4) In this dissertation, we use failures and faults interchangeably. In the literature [44], 
the researchers defined the difference between faults and failures. Failures occur 
when a resource--which is a collection of entities such as controllers, machine, tools 
and software program--ceases to deliver the expected task. An error occurs when 
some part of the resource reaches an undesired state. A fault is the cause of an error, 
a sequence of errors, or a failure.  
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5) The failure modes about the system including the failure rates, severities, priority 
and fault effects, are known or partially known to the researchers. 
6) We focus on the single fault situation. The investigation on the simultaneous 
multiple faults scenario is the future research. 
7) The proposed approach is for guiding sensor placement for a new designed system, 
not for improving the existed system. 
8) The life time cost for sensors is not a factor considered as affect sensor deployment. 
How to include the sensor’s life time cost into sensor deployment optimization is a 
future direction. 
To target aforementioned objectives identified in section 1.3.1, we would like to 
propose solutions in three major stages: 1) optimize sensor deployment strategy that can 
handle heterogeneous sensor-fault information and target multiple objectives; 2) design a 
Petri net (PN) diagnoser for detecting stochastic faults in realtime; and 3) evaluate the 
proposed sensor deployment and diagnoser in a PLC controlled manufacturing system.  
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Figure 2 Architecture of proposed methods 
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As the research architecture shown in Figure 2, the detailed tasks for the 
dissertation have four aspects. 
Task1) Propose sensor deployment based on fuzzy quantitative graph to handle 
heterogeneous properties for different sensors and multiple-objective optimization on 
distributing sensors to detect faults. This deployment strategy will optimize the cost and 
reliability of the sensor system under the constraints of detectability, limited resources 
etc. 
Task2) Propose and implement fault diagnosis methodology based on real-time 
Petri net and fuzzy Petri net to detect faults in the discrete manufacturing system. This 
diagnosis approach should overcome the shortcoming initiated by partial information, 
computation complexity and knowledge integration etc. 
Task3) Implement fault diagnoser based on finite state automaton and sequential 
function chart to detect faults in automated assembly systems. This is a benchmark 
diagnoser that is going to be compared with the proposed diagnoser in Task 2). 
Task4) Design and analyze experiments based on the factors involved--sensors, 
diagnosers, and faults--to comprehensively evaluate the factors on detecting the faults 
with a dual robot system in the System Integration Laboratory at Texas A&M 
University.  
1.4 Organization of the dissertation 
The organization of the rest of the dissertation is as follows: Chapter II presents 
the state of arts in the area of: 1) faults with automated assembly systems, 2) sensor 
deployment, and 3) DES diagnoser design. Existing gaps were summarized in this 
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chapter. Chapter III presents the sensor deployment design considering heterogeneity 
and multiple objectives for diagnosing manufacturing systems. The result of this chapter 
has been submitted to “Robotics and Computer Integrated Manufacturing”, and is in the 
second round review. Chapter IV presents the realtime fuzzy Petri net diagnoser design. 
The result of this chapter has been published in “International Journal of Advanced 
Manufacturing Technology”. Chapter V describes the diagnoser design based on finite 
state automaton model and sequential function chart. The result of this chapter has been 
published and presented in “International Symposium of Flexible Automation” 2010 and 
2012. Chapter VI presents the comprehensive performance evaluation of sensor 
deployment and diagnoser for fault diagnosis in a discrete manufacturing system. 
Chapter VII highlights the contributions and suggests the directions for future work. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this section, a literature review of the studies on faults in automated systems, 
sensor deployments for diagnosis purpose, and diagnoser on discrete event systems, is 
presented. It also summarizes the existing gap identified in literature and formulates the 
problems to be addressed. 
2.1 Faults in automated assembly systems 
The faults in automated assembly systems can be classified either according to 
the occurrence rate or root cause types. 
2.1.1 Faults classification according to the occurrence rate 
In literature [14], it classified the faults in systems into either deterministic or 
stochastic type with different occurrence rate. 
1. Deterministic faults: The deterministic faults are new and can be observed 
instantaneously, its occurrence is nonrandom, and the aging faults (tearing or 
wearing) are clock time failure, not necessarily operational. 
2. Undeterministic faults: This kind of fault is also referred to as the stochastic fault. 
It can be further classified as faults under risk or faults under uncertainty. For 
stochastically failing equipment under risk, it is impossible to predict the exact time 
of faults; but the distributions of the time to faults of each component of the system 
are known [14]. Typical fault rate can be constant, such as exponential distribution, 
or increasing such as Weilbull distribution, gamma distribution, etc. For 
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stochastically failing equipment under uncertainty, the exact time of failure and the 
distribution of the time to failure are not known [14]. It is hard to get the stochastic 
failure mode about the system due to the insufficient output that can be observed 
from the system. Thus stochastic fault diagnosis can give only an assessment of the 
likelihood about the faults. Sherif classified them into three situations: [14] 
a) The system is new, so the information and failure data are not known. 
b) Limited information about the system’s failure characteristics is known. 
c) Some subjective information (judgment, belief) about the system failure 
characteristics is known. 
 
2.1.2 Faults classification according to the root cause type 
The faults in assembly systems can also be classified as follows according to 
fault root causes:  
1. Hardware faults [45]: The hardware faults are classified as input sensor faults and 
output actuator faults. Input sensor faults occur when a sensor is defective. Output 
actuator faults happen when an actuator is dysfunctional in some way from acting at 
all, or does not work within a prescribed period of time. They are also known as 
equipment faults [46].  
2. Software faults [45]: They are caused by improper software design or 
implementation. They manifest in the form of a system or component fault. For 
example, an actuator’s mis-timed action or system miss-initialization.  
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3. Product faults [45]: They are in the form of products manufactured not conforming 
to a specific standard. These are also known as quality faults [46] and refer to 
deterioration in product quality that is not normally detectable by the system sensors, 
which are conventionally used for control purposes. They could be caused by low 
quality in materials or components, or by a hardware fault in the manufacturing 
system, such as arrival of a faulty component or a component being dropped. As 
mentioned in Chapter I, product faults are not the main focus of this dissertation. 
4. Task faults [46]: A task fault is defined as a deviation from the expected operation 
of the process due to unpredictability and lack of constraint (for example, failure of 
inserting a screw in a hole assembly). They can be detected if they are expressed at 
the sensor outputs as deviations from the normal operation. These can also be 
referred to as operational errors [47]. 
5. Tolerance faults [47]: These faults are caused due to defective parts, or parts that do 
not meet the specifications. These are errors attributed to the properties of parts.  
The faults and their occurrence rate in a video tape recorder assembly line were 
presented in [48]. The assembly line considered in their study was made up of 
components such as conveyors, robots and part feeders. The faulty data of 89 such 
assembly cells showed that the part feeder system, robot grasp and insertion system and 
fixture location system were most susceptible to faults, followed by unqualified parts.  
Data regarding the distribution of faults in robotic assembly [49] were acquired 
from three robotic assembly cells grouped under set A, set B and set C with 98, 392, and 
368 samples of assembly actions, respectively. It was observed that the faulty cases 
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registered were 31.6% for set A, 30.6% for set B and 13.3% for set C. All these faults 
except one in set A were attributed to failure of insertion or seating (insertion where 
gravity is intended to assist). Presentation faults were caused by the deviation in the part 
configuration as expected by the work cell. For sets B and C, faults were distributed as 
shown in Table 1 Fault distribution for robotic assembly cells. 
 
 
Table 1 Fault distribution for robotic assembly cells 
Fault (A) Fault (B) Percent Fault (C) Percent 
Insertion or  
Seating (an 
gravity 
assisting 
insertion) 
Insertion 51.3%  Insertion  71.4% 
Grasping 17.5%  Dropping  16.3% 
Sensing 16.7%  Grasping  6.1% 
Presentation 8.3%  Others  6.1% 
Flawed parts 5.8%    
 
 
The screw insertion process [50] was considered in detail wherein the causes for 
insertion failure of the screw were identified as a mismatch in the diameter of the hole in 
the base plate with the screw, which is inserted. Another type of insertion failure is 
jamming, which could occur due to several reasons, including manufacturing errors 
where the main body of the screw widens close to the head, a hole diameter reduction at 
the end of the insertion, or the presence of burrs in the hole etc.  
The possible faults in robotic assembly [51] were identified as eccentric gripping 
of the peg due to loss of tolerance of the position of the gripper or fixture or impacts 
damaging the peg or fixture during extraction of the peg and presence of burrs on the 
edge of the base part or dirt on the chamfer of the bore, resulting in a fault. The causes 
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for insertion failure were identified as dimensional errors of the peg or the hole (height 
and diameter), including the angular misalignment of the peg; presence of extraneous 
matter at the contact point resulting in high friction; and improper peg parts having ruts 
and burrs.  
From these observations, we can conclude that inserting and grasping a part and 
keeping hold of it are among the most susceptible to faults. This is followed by sensor 
failures and bad parts. These failures would ideally represent typical situations that need 
to be addressed in the implementation of diagnosis system for automated assembly 
systems. 
 
2.2 Literature review on sensor deployment 
Sensor deployment problems usually involve four phases sequentially: 1) model 
the faults’ cause-effect on sensor data variations; 2) set up the objective functions for 
sensor deployment based on the variation effects; 3) find approaches to optimize sensor 
deployment strategy; and 4) evaluate the optimized strategy. Among them, step 1) and 3) 
are the most important. Thus we also searched literature from aspects of: 1) modeling 
cause-effect relation between system faults and monitoring sensors, and 2) optimizing 
the cause-effect model.  
Ding et al. [13] presented a comprehensive survey of inspection strategy and 
sensor distribution in discrete-part manufacturing processes. In his survey, he noted that 
diagnosis-oriented sensor distribution strategy is a relatively new problem with lots of 
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research opportunities; especially no report has been found on how to systematically 
deploy the heterogeneous sensors.  
Graph theory has been applied on optimal sensor deployment strategies from 
qualitative [7-8, 52-54] or quantitative [9-10] perspectives for sensor deployment’s 
effects on assessing complex system status. Ali et al. used the spanning tree to model 
and optimize the sensor deployment for fault observability and detection reliability [52]. 
They defined the sensor deployment’s process reliability as the smallest reliability 
among all of the process variables. Mass-flow and energy distribution balances in 
chemical plants are the basis for generating the spanning tree. Later this spanning tree 
procedure was extended for optimal design of a redundant sensor network for linear 
processes [53], as well as a nonredundant sensor network for bilinear processes [54]. 
Raghuraj and Bhushan et al. had qualitatively investigated the sensor deployment 
problem with directed graph (DG) [7] or signed directed graph (SDG) [8] for the 
chemical plant. The authors assumed that all faults had to be defined clearly along with 
their tolerances using a priori knowledge; then DG/SDG can be SDG/DG were applied 
to represent the cause-effect relation between faults and sensors and guide sensor 
placement. The only difference between DG and SDG is that signs are placed on the arcs 
of DG to get an SDG. However, the structures are exactly the same. In [7], fault 
observability or resolution was the single objective to be maximized through greedy 
search, so fault nodes would be covered under the constraints of sensor numbers or cost. 
In [8], various unique issue in SDG cause-effect model including presence of multiple 
paths, multiple faults occurrence, control loop were discussed and then optimization 
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issue were extended from DG’s approach. The DG/SDG based sensor deployment shows 
that the inclusion of signs may improve the fault resolution of SDG, but the signs of 
some of the arcs in the SDG might require plant-specific information that might not be 
available at the design stage. These two graph methods were largely qualitative without 
including quantified information from the system. Thus it was hard for them to model 
the fault propagation in complex systems only with the qualitative information on faults 
and sensors.  
To overcome the deficiencies of qualitative method, Bhushan et al. proposed a 
comprehensive design strategy considering the quantitative information including fault 
occurrence and sensor failure probability into an integer programming formulation [9]. 
They tried to minimize the cost of the sensory monitoring system while ensuring that the 
solution provides threshold reliability. Following this paper, he presented a detailed 
application of applying the proposed approach to a large flowsheet, various issues 
involved in the application of the reliability maximization based optimization procedure 
were discussed [10]. They only optimized one objective, either minimum cost or 
maximum reliability at one time, and only mentioned a little bit on the multiple objective 
issue based on the one step optimization approach.  
Zhang et al. also tried to attack this problem using quantified directed graph 
(QDG) [11, 12] and particle swarm optimization. Various fault properties including fault 
severity, criticality, occurrence rate, sensor properties including sensitivity, and sensor-
fault relation including propagation time and gain were included into the graph 
modeling. These quantitative values were fused using empirical equation into single 
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edge values representing sensors’ detectability to faults. Zhang’s method on 
quantitatively defining the sensor detectability did not well address the uncertainties 
involved in fault detection, and the optimization process is not clear on the criterion 
either.  
From the discrete event system (DES) control perspective, researchers have used 
Petri net (PN) [55] or finite state automaton [56, 57] to model the sensor deployment. Ru 
[55] assumed the DES is partially observable, then used Petri Nets to model optimal 
sensor selection in DES, thus achieving a minimum number of sensors while 
maintaining structural observability to uniquely determine the system state based on 
sensor information. He divided this problem into optimal place sensor selection (OPSS) 
and optimal transition sensor selection (OTSS). To avoid NP-hard in OPSS problem, 
they first reduced the problem to linear integer programming, and then proposed two 
heuristic algorithms (top-down, and bottom-up) to approximate its solution with 
polynomial complexity. The OTSS problem is solvable with polynomial complexity. But 
their methods all strive to optimize the single objective: minimizing the total number of 
sensors, and they cannot specify where to locate the selected sensors.  
From quality control or process variation perspective, Ding et al. have proposed 
several sensor deployment approaches based on different optimality [58, 59, 60], Then 
fast exchange routine with a sort-and-cut procedure was applied to place coordinate 
sensors for estimating variation means and variance, but their assumptions are for 
homogeneous sensor types such as coordinate measuring machines (CMMs). Nof et al 
proposed sensor economy principles and selection procedures in manufacturing systems, 
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thus enabling flexible automation and quality control [61]. He noted that it was not 
possible to develop an accurate model on predicting sensor performance in the real 
world, so performance could only be derived in an empirically but systematic manner. 
Based on operational analysis and economical condition, he decided on a general design 
guideline for sensor numbers, types, locations, interaction modes and overall 
performance. Li had proposed a sensor deployment approach in order to detect system 
abnormality in time [62]. She formulated the casual relationship among the system’s 
physical variables using Bayesian Networks (BN) model. The sensor allocation task was 
formulated into a “set covering” problem with the aim of minimizing cost while 
observing detectability requirement. An integrated algorithm combing pre-processing 
and greedy search was applied to optimally decide which physical variable deserved 
sensing. Khan et al proposed a methodology by configuring sensors to provide an 
optimally distinctive signature for detecting faults in discrete part assembly processes 
[63]. Based on assembly structure data derived from CAD files, a multi-level, two-step, 
hierarchical (bottom-up or top-down) optimization procedure was used to obtain a novel, 
distributed sensor configuration. He quantified diagnosability performance in the form of 
a defined index, so the diagnosability index can guide the optimization and establish the 
diagnostics worth of sensor distribution candidates. 
After modeling the cause-effect relation between faults and sensors, we are 
starting to optimize the sensor deployment model. Various optimization algorithms, 
from heuristic search to mathematic programming, have been used for optimizing the 
sensor deployment. Most of the qualitative graph based sensor deployment approaches 
 20 
including spanning tree [52-54], DG [7] or SDG [8] were using heuristic search. In 
spanning tree based sensor deployment, authors used the concept of cutsets and hill 
climbing to identify the sensor set with optimal reliability. SDG and DG approaches 
were using the concepts of key component and greedy search to solve the sensor-fault 
cover problem. Other heuristic methods, including simulated annealing (SA), Tabu 
search (TS), and genetic algorithm (GA), have been applied to this problem. Both TS 
and SA evaluate a neighborhood on performance, and move to the neighbor with better 
performance. However, whereas SA relies on probabilistic events to search for good 
solutions, TS deterministically incorporates search history as well as structural features 
of the model to drive it towards higher quality solutions.  
Kannan had proposed a two phase simulated annealing based localization (SAL) 
algorithm to address the flip ambiguity issue in wireless sensor network localization 
[64]. In the first phase, SA was used to obtain an accurate estimate of location. Then a 
second phase of optimization was performed only on those nodes that are likely to have 
flip ambiguity problem. Based on the neighborhood information of nodes, those nodes 
likely being affected by flip ambiguity were identified and moved to the correct position.  
Kincaid [65] used a simple static Tabu Search method to seek the number and 
location of sensors for active controlling and/or sensing vibrations of truss structure. The 
search showed Tabu Search approach dominates the traditional approaches to finding D-
optimal designs. Compared to other heuristic search methods GA can reduce the elapsed 
time required for solution of a large combinatorial problem because GA methods are 
easy to adapt for use on parallel computing. Swann had used GA and finite element 
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analysis (FEA) technique to develop an optimal sensor placement procedure that is used 
to determine the optimal sensor pattern for detecting seeded delamination locations in a 
composite plate [66]. Sen et al. had developed a sensor network design approach based 
on graph theory and genetic algorithm [67]. The sensor network was designed to 
optimize a single criterion of cost, reliability or estimation accuracy, using a minimum 
number of sensors. However, Sen’s algorithm cannot solve the multi-objective 
optimization problem. The heuristic optimization algorithms cannot guarantee 
convergence to the global optima, but can cover useful local optima after examining part 
of all possible combinations, so they are suitable for a small and simple sensor 
deployment problem, although it is straight forward and easy on implementation.  
Sensor optimization problem have also been studied from mathematic 
programming such as Integer Programming (IP) [55, 68], Nonlinear Programming [69], 
Dynamic Programming (DP) [58] etc.  
Bagajewicz proposed a mixed integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem 
to obtain cost optimal sensor networks for linear systems subject to constraints on 
precision, residual precision and error detectability [69]. He used the tree enumeration 
and branch first rule to optimize the nonlinear programming problem thus achieving 
cost-optimal sensor network under the constraint of precision, gross error, availability 
and resilience. 
Projection matrix based sensor deployment such as fault signature matrix [70, 
71] was used to classify fault variables. Using fault signature matrix, Fijany et al. [71] 
generated analytical redundancy relations between faults and sensors, then applied 
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matrix operation such as Gauss-Jordan elimination to optimize sensor deployment. 
Yahya et al. [68] studied the problem of minimum sensor placement cost for directional 
wireless sensor networks. An integer linear programming model was proposed for the 
sensor placement problem in directional sensor networks to minimize the total sensor 
cost by properly choosing the type and direction for each sensor to be installed in the 
sensor field. However, the computation requirement for mathematic programming will 
increase considerably with the increasing of sensor numbers. 
 
 
Table 2 Literature summary in sensor deployment 
Modeling  Classification  Reference  
Qualitative  Spanning tree Ali (93’) 52, Ali (95’) 53, Ali (96’) 54  
Direct graph  Raghuraj (99’) 7, Bhushan (00’) 8  
Signed direct graph  Bhushan (00’) 8  
Petri net Ru (10’) 55 
Finite state automaton Jiang (03’) 56, Park (96’) 57  
Quantitative  Quantitative direct graph  Zhang (05’) 11, Zhang (07’) 12  
Mathematic programming  Bhushan (02’) 9, Bhushan (02’) 10  
Fault signature matrix  Osais (08’) 68, Abed (08’) 70  
Optimization  Classification  Reference  
Heuristic 
search  
Simulated annealing  Kannan (06’) 64  
Tabu search  Kincaid (02’) 65  
Genetic algorithms  Swann (04’) 66, Sen (98’) 67  
Mathematic 
programming  
Integer programming  Bhushan (02’) 9, Bhushan (02’) 10 
Dynamic programming  Liu (04’) 58  
Nonlinear programming  Bagajewicz (97’) 69  
 
 
The references were summarized in above Table 2. From the literature readings, 
we identified two typical issues in sensor deployment remain intact: 1) Heterogeneous 
properties of sensors in the diagnosis process. In a typical fault diagnosis system, it 
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usually deploys sensors which generally have different sensing characteristics including 
uncertainty, accuracy, resolution and statistical property on physical signal data. 
Nevertheless, how to systematically select crucial and optimum sensor deployment for 
heterogeneous sensor system poses a unique problem in the automated assembly system, 
which has never been reported [13]. 2) Multiple-objective optimization. Sensor 
deployment for fault diagnosis is a delicate work which tackles multiple objectives 
including observability, reliability, accuracy and efficiency under the constraints of cost, 
resources and environment etc. Most of the sensor deployment researchers only targeted 
single objective such as either cost or reliability. A comprehensive method that considers 
the multiple-objective decision making involved in the sensor deployment is yet to be 
created. As such, these two issues call for a systematical procedure to design a cost-
effective and highly reliable sensor deployment strategy. This approach should be able to 
incorporate the heterogeneous properties of sensors uncertainties such as sensor failure 
and accuracy into the cause effect model, also consider the multiple objectives including 
cost, reliability, observability, etc. involved in fault detection while subjecting to the 
constraints. 
 
2.3 Literature review on diagnoser for discrete event system 
Many methods, including the mathematical model based approach [72], fault tree 
[73, 74], artificial intelligence such as expert system [75], neural network [76] etc have 
been developed to deal with fault diagnosis. A comparison on these approaches’ 
applications on diagnosis system is summarized in Table 3. 
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We focused on discrete event systems which have inherent discrete state space of 
logic values and event-driven. System models based on DES descriptions may give more 
efficient diagnosis algorithms than models based on continuous time system approaches 
[15]. FSA and PN are the two most commonly used methods on modeling and 
diagnosing the DES. Besides this, I focused more on diagnosing stochastic DES faults. 
How to incorporate “stochastic” and “uncertainty” properties into diagnoser were also 
key words when I was reviewing the literature. Based on these, the literature was 
searched from the aspects of: stochastic fault diagnosis based on 1) FSA or 2) PN. 
 
 
Table 3 Comparisons on different fault diagnosis approaches 
Approaches Pros Cons 
Fault tree Easy to read and understand, can 
be synthesis automatically [18] 
Difficult to include information about 
ordering and timing information of events in 
fault tree. No way to treat common-cause 
failures resulting from fault propagation [18] 
Expert 
system 
Suit for systems that are difficult to 
model, i.e. systems involving 
subtle and complicated interaction 
whose outcomes are hard to predict 
[23] 
A considerable amount of time may elapse 
before enough knowledge is accumulated to 
develop the necessary set of heuristic rules for 
reliable diagnosis, very domain dependent, 
difficult to validate [23] 
Model 
based 
analytical 
redundancy  
Mostly for continuous system, is 
able to detect abrupt faults and 
incipient fault [23] 
Computation load for detailed online 
modeling of process, the sensitivity of 
detection process with respecting errors and 
measurement noise [23] 
Finite state 
automaton 
Easy to set up the component and 
system model, mostly for DES 
Model complexity explosion by explicitly 
listing all possible states and events, lack of 
readily available software packages 
Petri net Mathematical capability and graph 
description of DES 
Lack of readily available software packages 
 
 
2.3.1 Literature on FSA diagnoser design  
In order to identify the existing work related to the FSA diagnoser design, the 
literature review was further classified from two aspects: fault characteristic (stochastic 
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or deterministic) and diagnoser architecture (centralized or decentralized). The 
summarization of FSA diagnoser design is in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4 Review on FSA based diagnoser design 
Reference Method Fault 
Character 
Diagnoser 
Architecture 
Sampath [16] The process to model the plant and to construct 
the diagnoser using classical DES theory 
Deterministic Centralized and 
Decentralized 
Zad [18] The automaton based diagnosis framework and 
scheme to reduce the diagnoser complexity 
Deterministic Centralized 
Sampath [17] Necessary and sufficient condition for 
diagnosability and I-diagnosability 
Deterministic  Centralized 
Holloway [19, 
20] 
Use discrete-event template to monitor the 
manufacturing system 
Deterministic Decentralized 
Mouchaweh 
[22] 
Decentralized diagnosis using Boolean discrete 
event model  
Deterministic Decentralized 
Lunze [40] state observation and diagnosis discrete event 
systems described by stochastic automata 
Stochastic Centralized 
Thorsley [42] Embed Markov model in DES to diagnose 
system, proposed the theory of A-
diagnosability and AA-diagnosability 
Stochastic Centralized 
Liu [43] Extend Thorsley’s stochastic diagnosability 
theory to decentralized diagnoser, propose the 
concept of co-diagnoser 
Stochastic Decentralized 
Inagaki [77] Use Bayesian network as global diagnoser and 
timed Markov model as local diagnoser, to 
diagnose event-driven controlled systems.  
Stochastic Decentralized 
Anthanasopoul
ou [78] 
Probabilistic algorithm to calculate the 
likehood of normal model and faulty model 
under partial observation 
Stochastic Centralized 
 
 
There are two important papers [16, 18] that we need to highlight in the FSA 
diagnoser design, because other FSA diagnoser designs were extended from the 
framework proposed in these two papers. Sampath et al. proposed a method to model the 
system’s faulty behavior in the plant model. This modeling process includes: 1) 
identification of possible states and events transitions with them; 2) sensor mapping 
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between states and observing sensors; 3) estimation on occurrence of events based on the 
reading changes in the observing sensors; and 4) then use label propagation and events 
observations from 3) to construct the diagnoser [16]. They also provided necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the diagnoser’s diagnosability as well as I-diagnosability [17]. 
Sampath’s method required that the plant model and the diagnoser start from the same 
starting point which may not be easy to synchronize at the initial time for many industry 
applications. To overcome this deficiency, Zad et al. proposed a similar method as 
Sampath’s, but without synchronizing requirement [18]. In Zad’s work, he also 
suggested how to reduce the complexity of diagnosers with model reduction approach. 
By nature these two methods explicitly list the possible states and events, which have 
high computation requirements and do not fit for many practical manufacturing systems 
with distributed control requirements and information characteristics. Thus Lafortune 
also proposed a decentralized method to model the system and corresponding distributed 
properties [16] to lower computation load. 
Holloway et al. used the distributed template model to monitor discrete event 
manufacturing systems [19, 20]. Forward and backward templates were developed as the 
diagnoser to predict future events following the triggering events and to indicate possible 
prior events before the trigger. They also combined templates with statistic process 
control (SPC) for discrete I/O signals in manufacturing systems [21]. Nevertheless, their 
template method does not analyze either fault isolation or the diagnosability of the 
diagnoser, it only alarmed the occurrence of faults. Sayed-Mouchaweh et al. proposed a 
decentralized diagnoser for manufacturing systems based on Boolean discrete event 
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models [22]. Local diagnosers were designed using event sequences, time delays 
between correlated events and state conditions to detect abnormalities about system 
execution. To avoid partial observation of local diagnosis, a central diagnoser to 
coordinate local diagnoser was designed based on rules to isolate fault partition.  
All these aforementioned FSA diagnosis methods are for deterministic models. 
Their faulty cases usually were abrupt, either normal or faulty, instead of probabilistic 
nature. However, in the real process, many systems’ faulty processes are stochastic, 
instead of abrupt. The stochastic faults show undetermined properties and are even 
harder to be detected with partial information. To design a diagnoser that can locate such 
kind of unobservable probabilistic faults will be more realistic and meaningful to real 
applications.  
Lunze is the first researcher studying the stochastic fault diagnosis with 
automaton. He solved the problems of state observation and diagnosis discrete event 
systems described by stochastic automata [40]. They assumed that systems were not 
observable but it was possible to reconstruct the state unambiguously. The observation 
problem was set up as the problem of determining the smallest possible set of states that 
are compatible with the measured input and output sequences. The diagnostic problem 
was solved as an observation problem. They also discussed the conditions for the 
observability and diagnosability of stochastic automata. 
David Thorsley proposed an approach on applying stochastic techniques on the 
partially observed discrete event systems [42]. In his approach, Markov model was 
embedded with the FSA to model and diagnose DES. With Markov model’s 
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computation ability, the possibilities of the states in each discrete step were calculated 
using Bayesian law. Also it relaxed Sampath’s diagnosability condition to A or AA 
diagnosability with probability. The difference between Thorsley and Lunze’s stochastic 
diagnoser lies in that: Lunze clearly pointed out that the diagnostic problem of a 
stochastic automaton cannot be solved by another stochastic automaton. On the contrary, 
Thorsley inherited the diagnoser approach, where the diagnoser possesses a probabilistic 
structure by appending to each transition on a matrix that can be used to update the 
probability distribution on the state estimate. Besides this, Thorsley’s diagnoser does not 
require detailed in-depth modeling of the system to be diagnosed. 
Liu et al extended Thorsley’s stochastic diagnoser to decentralized stochastic 
diagnoser. He investigated the decentralized diagnosis of stochastic discrete event 
systems (SDESs) by using multiple local stochastic diagnosers, each possessing its own 
sensors to deal with different information [43]. They formalized the notions of 
decentralized diagnosis for SDESs by defining the concept of codiagnosability for 
stochastic automata in which any communication among the local stochastic diagnosers 
or to any coordinators is not involved. A stochastic system being codiagnosable means 
that a fault can be detected by at least one local stochastic diagnoser within a finite 
delay. A codiagnoser was constructed from a given stochastic system with a finite 
number of projections, each of which contained a local diagnoser to complete the model 
of the system. Necessary and sufficient conditions of the codiagnosability, as well as 
computing method to check the codiagnosability for SDESs was presented, which 
generalizes the corresponding results of centralized diagnosis for SDESs. 
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Inagaki et al. presented a decentralized fault diagnosis strategy, which used timed 
Markov models (TMM) as local diagnosers and Bayesian networks as global diagnoser, 
for the event-driven controlled systems such as PLC control systems [77]. The 
relationship between two successive events observed in the corresponding subsystem is 
represented by TMM. The probability density function for the successive events in 
TMM was estimated with maximum entropy theory. The Bayesian network represents 
the causal relationship between the faults and observations from subsystem. They build 
the Bayesian network using the control logic through sensor actuator dependency graph 
and dependency tree.  
To overcome the partial observation problem in the finite state machine, 
Anthanasopoulou et al. have proposed the approach of maximum likelihood diagnoser 
under unreliable observations [78]. In this research, they developed a probabilistic 
methodology for calculating the likelihood of an observed, possibly corrupted event 
sequence that was generated by two candidate FSAs (one representing normal model of 
operation and the other for failed model). They formulated the fault diagnosis problem 
as deciding which FSA is most likely to have generated the observed event sequence. 
The observed events may be corrupted by failures causing event insertions and deletions 
or transposing etc. Given the possibly erroneous observed sequence, they proposed an 
efficient recursive algorithm by extending Viterbi algorithm in HMM to obtain the most 
likely underlying FSA. Diagnosability analysis was also implemented for her proposed 
diagnoser based on “miss detection” measurement. However, she missed the “false 
alarm” analysis for her diagnoser, which means her diagnosis may enlarge faulty 
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decision even when the system is fault-free. When doing fault isolation, it needs to 
compare the normal and every faulty mode to identify the exact fault. It requires heavy 
computation load. 
Finite state automaton (FSA) is a language based analysis method, which 
qualitatively analyzes the behavior of the discrete event systems by listing all possible 
transitions and states. When applying automaton on fault diagnosis, the main difficulty is 
the significant size of state space, which leads to problems of over-complexity, memory 
and speed of execution for the diagnosis. Petri net is an alternative to automaton on 
analyzing discrete event systems. Because Petri net focuses on structure modeling of the 
DES systems, applying Petri net on fault diagnosis may overcome the potential 
complexity deficiency. In the following section, we will review the Petri net’s 
application on diagnosing stochastic faults. 
 
2.3.2 Literature on Petri net diagnoser design 
Following the way on reviewing FSA diagnoser, the research on PN diagnoser 
were also classified according to the fault character and diagnoser architecture as 
tabulated in Table 5.  
PNs have been applied on many applications such as discrete event simulation 
and control, manufacturing system planning and scheduling, and manufacturing 
modeling and evaluation [79]. Recently, PNs have also been used for fault diagnosis 
applications including electro-mechanical equipment [80], power system [81], discrete 
event systems [24~39] etc. Maria gave a comprehensive survey of the state of the art of 
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fault diagnosis and identification with the framework of Petri net [24], but most of 
researches in Maria’s survey focused on diagnosing deterministic faults instead of 
stochastic ones.  
 
Table 5 Review on PN based diagnoser design 
Reference Method Fault 
Character 
Diagnoser 
Architecture 
Ushio [25] Extend Sampath’s diagnosability theory to 
unbounded Petri net, Proposed  -diagnoser and -
refined diagnoser  
Deterministic Centralized 
Chung 
[26] 
Extend Ushio’s diagnosability condition on PN, 
constructed the label propagation function and the 
range function in a diagnoser, proposed the associated 
verifier to check PN’s diagnosability 
Deterministic Centralized 
Lefebvre 
[27] 
Decide which set of places must be observed, defined 
minimal diagnosers to detect and isolate the firing of 
fault transitions immediately 
Deterministic Centralized 
Ruiz-
Beltrán 
[28] 
Use interpreted PN to model the system behavior that 
includes partially observable events and states. Based 
on the IPN model derived from an on-line 
methodology, proposed an on-line diagnosis scheme 
utilizing a solution of a programming problem 
Deterministic Centralized 
Genc [37] Distributed diagnosis of PN faults Deterministic Decentralized 
Wen [32] Proposed an approach to test diagnosability by checking 
the structure property of T-invariants of the nets under 
the assumption that a given subset of places are 
observable 
Deterministic Decentralized 
Ru [38] Transformed the partially observed PN into labeled PN, 
calculate the belief  regarding the occurrence of faults 
belonging to each type 
Stochastic Centralized 
Lefebvre 
[39] 
Proposed a fault diagnosis approach based on timed 
PN, but the transition period in the timed PN is 
stochastic, 
Stochastic Centralized 
 
 
Ushio et al. is the first have developed a Petri net model for discrete event system 
with faulty behaviors and introduced the diagnosability into PN diagnoser [25]. They 
assumed some of the places and all transitions were unobservable,  -diagnoser and  -
refined diagnoser were designed to detect failure transitions using coverability tree based 
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on this assumption. Finally they extended Sampath’s diagnosability condition [17] to 
unbounded Petri net.  
Chung et al. [26] extended Ushio’s PN fault diagnosis approach. They further 
assumed only some of the transitions (not all of them) were unobservable, and showed 
how to construct the label propagation function and the range function in PN diagnoser 
with newly available information provided by observable transitions, and presented a 
verifier algorithm as a polynomial check mechanism on PN diagnoser’s diagnosability.  
Dimitri et al. proposed an approach using partial but unbiased measurement of 
the places marking to estimate the firing sequence [27]. They modeled PN diagnoser’s 
diagnosability as the undetermined cycles included in the reachability graph, so they 
could decide which set of places must be observed for the exact estimation of some 
giving firing sequences, then designed minimal diagnosers to detect and isolate the firing 
of fault transitions immediately. They also investigated causality relationships and 
directed paths to characterize the influence and dependence areas of the fault transitions 
to design a delayed diagnosers. 
Ruiz-Beltrán et al. proposed fault detection and localization in DES using 
interpreted Petri net (IPN) [28]. They constructed a system model and a diagnoser by 
comparing normal and faulty markings, thus identifying fault places with fault isolation 
algorithm. An IPN is event-detectable when any pair of transitions can be distinguished 
from each other by the observation of input/output symbols. However, the IPN approach 
only identifies one fault and their PN model enters a place sink that leads to being 
blocked.  
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In real applications, diagnosis rules had been used to set up the firing rules 
between places to transitions or transitions to places in Petri net [29]. The diagnoser 
monitored the running information from the system, calculated the fault probabilities and 
truth degrees for the precondition and output events. Then it combined these truth 
degrees with fuzzy set operations to decide the root cause of the faults. Colored timed 
Petri net (CTPN) had been used on failure modeling and process monitoring for flexible 
manufacturing systems by Kuo et al. [30], they also studied CTPN’s applications on 
statistic process control, fault diagnosis, and failure model effect analysis (FMEA) . 
Miguel et al. had applied Petri net on the fault diagnosis and modeling of a liquids 
packaging process [31]. Wen et al. have used Petri net to analyze and enhance the 
diagnosability of discrete event systems such as semiconductor fabrication facility [32]. 
They formulated the diagnosability problem into a binary integer linear programming 
with feasible solution, and improved the non-diagnosable system to diagnosable by 
adding extra sensors. Prock proposed a Petri net fault detection method for large systems 
using dynamic measurement signals [33]. Yao et al. have proposed a Visual Basic (VB) 
human machine interface (HMI) platform for hybrid PLC and PC control based on Petri 
net theory for manufacturing systems [34, 35]. Hu et al. used hybrid Petri net to model 
and detect faults in a hybrid automated manufacturing systems [36]. Genc and Lafortune 
et al. presented a PN fault diagnosis approach using limited places on the same example 
of HVAC as Sampath’s [37]. In Genc’s work, components were modeled without 
synchronous composition, and a distributed diagnostic algorithm was proposed to 
identify the faults in an independent way. The approach presented a problem of coupling 
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in places that were executed at the same time, while in the process seeking to be reduced 
by means of an algorithm. They finished diagnosis simulation with Matlab and 
Graphviz. However, this technique is too complicated for implementation thus less 
possible to be applied to medium level of complex industrial processes. 
To study the undetermined fault beliefs with PN, Ru et al. studied fault diagnosis 
in discrete event systems modeled by partially observed Petri nets [38]. They 
transformed a partially observed Petri net into an equivalently labeled Petri net, a 
translator was constructed translating the sensor information from place/transition 
sensors into a sequence of labels in the equivalent labeled Petri net, then calculated the 
belief regarding the occurrence of faults belonging to each type as the sequence order of 
observations from place and transition sensors. Then online monitor was built to 
recursively produce these beliefs by tracking the existence of faulty transitions in 
execution paths that match the sequence of labels observed so far. Nevertheless, Ru’s 
belief calculation assumed that each event has the equal occurrence opportunity; he did 
not take the stochastic property into account.  
Lefebvre proposed an approach based on stochastic Petri nets (PNs) to design 
reference and faulty DES models [39]. They used the statistical analysis of the collected 
alarm sequences on the considered system to design and identify of these models. The 
model structure is described as a state graph, and the parameters of the probability 
density functions (pdfs) for transition firing periods are estimated. The reference models, 
described as timed PNs, are then used for fault detection and isolation issues. Finally, 
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stochastic PNs with normal and exponential pdfs are considered to include a 
representation of the faulty behaviors.  
 
2.3.3 Summary on DES diagnoser design 
Although FSA can build complex system models from individual components 
models and then combine them by parrell composition in a systematic manner, this 
process tries to explicitly enumerate all the possible states, and connect them with 
possible transition events with the system through transition function. Thus the 
complexities of FSA diagnoser usually increase exponentially when systems get larger 
and more complex. PN has more structure in their representation of the transition 
function. State information is embedded among a set of places that captures the key 
operations of the system, only relevant conditions are captured by the places, and then 
properly connect these places to transitions. PN’s “place-transition” graphic mechanism 
and mathematical capability may be used to model “IF-THEN” knowledge rules more 
conveniently.  
As identified in Section 1.2, stochastically failing automated assembly systems 
often have incomplete fault messages and data that render diagnose faults ineffective. 
Although these messages and experiences are useful, it is not that complete and precise 
with uncertainties in it. How can we integrate the experience and knowledge about the 
stochastic faults and address the uncertainty issue to improve the effectiveness of the 
diagnosis? Comparing with FSA, Petri net may be a better fit to the knowledge 
integration problem. In order to tackle the uncertainty issue, we are trying to introduce 
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the concept of fuzzy logic into the Petri net construction. Based on that, we are trying to 
solve them through designing a realtime fuzzy Petri net fault diagnoser for PLC based 
automated assembly systems. The detailed proposed fault diagnosis method will be 
presented in the later “real time fuzzy Petri net diagnoser” section. 
The difference between the proposed PN diagnoser and the work in [40] lies in 
that: they assume the DES system is a “black box” and no information about the internal 
structure of the system is required to design the reference model. Then they collected the 
alarm sequences about the DES system, and analyze the alarm sequence using statistics 
techniques. We will use the PN to model the key operation of the DES and design the 
reference model. Once observed output is different from the reference model, fault 
isolation algorithm will be started to locate the root causes. 
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CHAPTER III 
PROPOSED SENSOR DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERING HETEROGENEITY AND 
MULTIPLE-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION 
To tackle the question in Section 1.2 on sensor deployment, we proposed the 
approach as Figure 3. Firstly, failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) on the manufacturing 
system is conducted to decide system fault mode. The fault information will formulate 
the values of fault nodes. FMEA also provides some information on how to initially 
select sensor type to detect certain faults. Secondly, a bipartite fuzzy graph is used to 
model cause-effect relation between fault nodes and sensor nodes in sensor deployment. 
In order to handle the uncertain vagueness and trade-offs in the sensor deployment 
decision, quantitative fuzzy graph [82], which is an extension of crisp graph theory, is 
applied to represent the detection relationship between sensors and faults. In the fuzzy 
bipartite graph, fault nodes include the quantitative information such as occurrence rate, 
severity and detecting rate, which are extracted from FMEA; sensor nodes include 
sensor characteristics including signal noise ratio (SNR), accuracy etc; and the edges 
between sensor nodes and fault nodes represent sensors’ detectabilities to faults. The 
detetctabilities can be modeled with sensor property, fault information and sensor fault 
relation including sensing time and sensing gain. It involves aggregating the 
heterogeneous sensor-fault information into a single edge element value. Here we can 
use analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to achieve this. Note that those nodes and edges 
information quantitatively model heterogeneous physical properties, also include 
uncertainties on faults, sensors and detecting relations. Fuzzy theory is used to normalize 
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heterogeneous information into comparable quantitative values and handle uncertainties. 
Finally, we need to optimize the sensor system’s cost and reliability under the 
constraints of detectability. To solve the sensor deployment optimization problem, 
lexicographical mixed linear integer programming and greedy algorithm are applied 
respectively to optimize assigning of sensors to faults. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Sensor deployment strategy 
FMEA to get the fault mode and 
severity 
Generate fuzzy graph for the 
sensor deployment considering 
of sensor factor and fault effect 
with AHP
optimize the matching between 
sensor nodes and fault nodes  
with graph matching algorithm
Evaluate the sensor deployment 
alternative with
diagnosability measurement
Decide sensor type, number 
and location according to 
optimization results
Satisfying
Initially assign sensors to faults 
according to FMEA
Yes
No
Fuzzy set, 
Graph theory, 
Analytical Hierarchy Process
Failure Mode Effect Analysis 
Operation Research
Mixed Integer Linear Programming
Greedy Algorithm
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3.1 Failure mode effect analysis on manufacturing system 
FMEA helps understand fault modes involved in the manufacturing system being 
diagnosed. It is based on the combination of functional analysis and hardware analysis to 
identify the possible failure modes. These effects or consequences of failure modes may 
provide some guidelines on methods of detecting the identified modes, detection 
performance evaluation, and possible means of prevention [83]. Followed that is to rank 
the unique effect of failure one by one. Once being ranked, the systems, components 
designated as severity in term of failure effect, are provided analysis in a grade fashion. 
An example on FMEA work sheet is shown in Table 6. The quantitative information 
extracted from FMEA will be contributed into the fault node values for later sensor 
deployment modeling and optimization. The detail on extraction of quantitative 
information will be presented in the later section. 
3.2 Fuzzy graph 
A fuzzy bipartite graph  SREGF
~~
,
~~
  is used to model the cause-effect 
relations in sensor deployment problem. The bipartite graph for the sensor deployment is 
illustrated as Figure 4. The fuzzy graph is composed of root nodes R
~
 and sensor nodes S
~
, as well as edges E
~
 .Root nodes R
~
 include the information of fault severity, occurrence 
rate and detection rate from FMEA; the FMEA information, which were aggregated and 
normalized with fuzzy set, are included in the square brackets. They represent system’s 
functional information from diagnosis perspective. Sensor nodes S
~
 include information 
such as SNR, resolution, accuracy, and sensor uncertainties. The sensor node values are  
  
4
0
 
 
 
Table 6 An example on failure mode effect analysis worksheet 
Function Failure 
Mode 
Effects Severity 
Rating 
Cause Occurrence 
Rating 
Current 
controls 
Detection 
rating 
Critical 
characteristic 
Risk 
priority 
number 
Recommended 
actions 
Extend the 
arm by 
cylinder 
Cylinder 
can’t be 
retracted 
or 
extended 
Pallet 
cannot 
be 
stopped 
6 Cylinde
r 
leakage 
or rod 
stuck 
2 Regularly 
Check by 
operators 
5 N 60 Check the 
pressure and air 
flow in the 
pipeline  
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decided in a similar way with fault nodes, and included in the parenthesis. The arc E
~
, 
representing fault detection relation between, S
~
 and R
~
, whose values are included in the 
square bracket linking between sensor nodes S
~
 and root node R
~
 represents the sensor’s 
detectability to fault root under the consideration of issues such as fault sensing time, 
sensing gain etc. The smaller the E
~
 value is, the weaker detection ability for S
~
 to detect 
R
~
 is. 
 
R1 R2 R3
S1 S2 S3
[0.3] [0.1] [0.02]
(0.1) (0.01) (0.05)
{0.05}
{0.02}
{0.01}
{0.1}
{0.01}
R: root cause
S: sensor
[ ]: RPN
(): sensor property
{ }: detection charistics
 
Figure 4 A fuzzy bipartite graph for sensor deployment 
 
 
Here path connection with fuzzy nodes and fuzzy edges is determined as: 
considering fuzzy set R
~
, S
~
of nodes and E
~
 of edge, then the path ijp from iR to jS is 
defined as  jkiij SSRp ,,,  , so the value of this path connection, which represents 
the comprehensive detectability of those sensors to that fault is decided as below 
equation: 
 
             jVkViVjjElkEkiEjkiij SSRSSSSSRSSRp ~~~1~~~ ,,,,,,          (3-1) 
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Here we modified the path connection as 
       jjElkEkiEjkiij SSSSSRSSRp ,,,,,, 1~~~    , because the node values 
will be aggregated into edge values using AHP. In this equation,  kiE SR ,~ means the 
fuzzy possibility of connecting two nodes iR and kS ; “ ” is the conjunction operation in 
fuzzy set theory and this equation will calculate the minimum possibility of connecting
iR and jS . If there are several paths from iR to jS , these possible paths form the set of 
        jiiiijiijiijji RxxRxSRpSRpSRP r  ,,,,,, 21  , 
then the connection strength between iR and jS  is gathered as 
 
 
 
jkiij
SRP
ji SSRpSRl
ji
,,,,
,
*                                 (3-2) 
Here “  ”is the disjunction operation in fuzzy set theory, which means the 
maximum intensity connection among those possible paths is the connection strength 
between fault iR and sensor jS . The path connection strength formed the element values 
in adjacent matrix P which is composed of columns representing fault node, rows 
representing sensor nodes; and element  ijp  representing cause-effect relation on sensor 
j’s detectability to fault i. 
 
3.3 Fault node value calculation  
As stated in the section 3.2, fault nodes include information on fault occurrence 
rate (O), severity rate (S) and detection rate (D). Here risk priority number (RPN) [83] is 
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introduced to comprehend these three kinds of information together. After ranking the 
severity, occurrence and detectability, the RPN value can be easily calculated by 
multiplying these three numbers as DOSRPN  . The fault modes that have the 
highest RPN should be given the highest priority for corrective action.  
The RPN value need to be normalized into comparable values based on fuzzy 
membership function [82]. Let RPN be a classical set of object, called universe, whose 
generic elements are denoted as rpn . A fuzzy subset A on RPN is a set defined by a 
membership function 
A which represents a mapping: 
 1,0: RPNA  
Here the value of  rpnA for the fuzzy set A is called the membership value or the grade 
of membership of RPNrpn . The membership value represents the degree of rpn  
belonging to the fuzzy set A. Figure 5 is a fuzzy membership function to normalize RPN 
value. With fuzzy set, we can map RPN value for different types of faults into 
comparable values between 0 and 1. 
 
 
Figure 5 Fuzzy membership function for fault node 
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3.4 Sensor node value calculation 
Sensor nodes include information such as signal noise ratio (SNR), sensitivity 
(sen), resolution (res), and accuracy (acc). Here sensor index (SI) is introduced to 
comprehend the information together. SI can be calculated by multiplying these four 
factors together as:  accressenSNRSI  1 . Similar to the fuzzy normalization 
step on deciding fault node value, the SI values can be mapped to [0, 1] for comparable 
values. Some illustrations on sensor properties are given below: 
Noise caused by sensor measurement: here we use SNR as the measurement to 
quantify how much a signal has been corrupted by noise when sensing signals. It is 
defined as nature logarithm operation on the ratio of signal power to the noise power 
corrupting the signal. A higher SNR values means a better detectabity of sensor to faults 
with other equal factors. 
Sensitivity: Sensitivity of a sensor is defined as how much the sensor's output 
changes when the measured faulty cause quantity changes. Sensors that measure very 
small changes must have very high sensitivities. The sensor’s fault detectability is 
positive proportional to its sensitivity. 
Accuracy: The accuracy of the sensor is the maximum difference that will exist 
between the actual value (which must be measured by a primary or good secondary 
standard) and the indicated value at the output of the sensor. The accuracy can be 
expressed either as a percentage of full scale. 
Resolution: The resolution of a sensor is the smallest change it can detect in the 
quantity that it is measuring. The resolution is related to the precision with which the 
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measurement is made. 
3.5 Sensor-fault value calculation 
Sensor-fault values include information such as sensing gain (SG), sensing time 
(ST). Here sensor-fault index (SFI) is introduced to comprehend the information 
together. SFI can be calculated as sensing gain dividing by sensing time as: 
STSGSFI / . Similar to the fuzzy normalization step on deciding fault node and 
sensor node values, the SFI values can be mapped to [0, 1] for comparable values. Some 
illustrations on sensor-fault relation are given below: 
Sensing time and Sensing gain are defined based on a sensor’s step response. 
The sensing time is defined as the rise time, while sensing gain is defined as the steady 
state gain [84].The shorter the sensing time and the higher the sensing gain, the better the 
sensor fault detectability.  
3.6 Edge relationship value calculation using AHP 
After calculation values on fault nodes and sensor nodes, deciding the values of 
edge elements in the graph is critical to the success of sensor deployment because the 
edge values represents sensors’ capabilities to observe certain fault signatures under 
constraints of sensor characteristics. When determining the edge values, it usually 
involves multiple attributes on faults, sensors and sensor-fault relations. All these factors 
will affect sensor deployment on fault diagnosis.  
In order to integrate these properties into one edge element value in fuzzy graph, 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) [85] is used as the mechanism to handle the trade-off 
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between the properties in deployment. The detailed decision hierarchy of sensor 
deployment is shown as Figure 6. 
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Figure 6 Decision hierarchy for sensor deployment 
 
 
 
In Figure 6, the goal is to achieve the edge value between sensor and fault nodes 
for diagnosis purpose under the consideration of attributes including sensor properties, 
fault characteristics, and sensor-fault relations. When applying AHP to coalesce these 
heterogeneous properties, the procedures are as following: 
1) Generate comparison matrix. ija  
is the pair-wise significance comparison of 
objective element i to objective element j, and its value is decided using Satty’s scale 
table [85]. Assuming there are n pieces of criteria, the pair-wise comparison matrix nCM
is obtained as equation (3), here jiij aa /1 . 
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












nnnn
n
n
n
aaa
aaa
aaa
CM




21
22221
11211
                    (3-3) 
2) Calculate the geometric means of each row ( im ) and relative priorities ( jp ): 
n
n
j
iji am
/1
1






 

as well as 


n
i
ijj mmp
1
, then we are going to have principle 
eigenvector for n criteria  TnpppPV ,,, 21  . 
3) Calculate the consistency index (CI) to verify the consistency of the result. If 
we define PVCMPV n 
' , and the maximum or principal eigen value from 'PV as max ,  
we get 
 
n
pp
n
j jj 

1
'
max
 . Then the consistency index (CI) is obtained as:
 
 1
1max



n
CI

, 
and we can calculate the consistency ratio (CR) as 
RI
CI
CR  , RI is the random index can 
be gotten from [85]. If CR is smaller or equal than 0.1, the AHP process is acceptable. 
4) Once the CR is value is acceptable, which means the decision process is 
consistent, we can coalesce the multiple attributes into single value with the following 
equation:    Tnn PPPPattattattE ,,,,,,,
~
32121   , here iatt is the value for the ith 
attribute. Using the AHP iteratively from the lowest decision hierarchy to the highest 
hierarchy, finally we can aggregate the decision attributes involved in the sensor 
deployment into the edge element E
~
. 
Sensor characteristics including sensitivity, SNR, resolution and accuracy; and 
sensors observabilities to faults including sensing gain and sensing time were collected 
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for sensor deployment. They along with fault effect will be processed using AHP 
method as Figure 6. Comparison weight matrix was decided based on AHP priority 
matrix as shown in Table 7. From the table, if we assume equal importance to the three 
factors since they are independent from each other, we can see that these factors will 
have the priority vector (PV) of 33.33% each. With these PV values, the heterogeneous 
sensor deployment decision attributes can be aggregated into single edge element value 
as equation (3-4): 
   TFSFS PVPVPVFISFISIE ,,,,
~
               (3-4) 
Table 7 Comparison matrix and AHP results 
Criteria Sensor 
Sensor-Fault 
Relation Fault 
Priority 
vector 
Sensor 1 1 1 33.33% 
Sensor-Fault 
Relation 1 1 1 33.33% 
Fault 1 1 1 33.33% 
%0%,0,3max  CRCI  
 
3.7 Sensor deployment optimization model 
After constructing the fuzzy graph as well as calculating the fuzzy relation value 
of the connecting edges and the node values, the final step is to match the fault nodes 
and sensor nodes into groups. This kind of matching should achieve overall minimum 
unobservability and cost as under the predefined performance requirements such as 
detectability.  
The unobservability with faults on the manufacturing system is defined as the 
equation (3-5) [9]: 
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    





 


n
j
xd
jii
jijfU
1
Prmaxmax                (3-5) 
This equation means the maximum probability of fault occurrence at the moment 
of sensor failure. At that time, the fault is unable to be observed due to sensor failure. 
Here if  is fault occurrence probability, j
Pr is sensor failure probability, jx is the 
number for sensor j . D is a binary bipartite matrix, which represents the cause-effect 
information between faults and sensors. The rows of this matrix correspond to faults, and 
the columns correspond to sensor nodes. The (i,j)th entry ( ijd ) of this matrix is 1 if fault 
i affects sensor j and is zero otherwise.  
 




 otherwise
jfaultobservetosensori
d
SRij 0
1
    (3-6) 
To map the relations between sensors and faults, another matrix is generated: 
detectability connection bipartite matrix ( P ). In this matrix, the columns are associated 
with candidate sensor pairs and the rows are corresponding to the faults. ijp is the 
connection strength between sensor j  and fault i . ijp ’s value, which has fused sensor 
nodes’ detectability information including sensing time, sensing gain, sensitivity etc, as 
well as fault nodes’ occurring rate and severity etc, was calculated through AHP with 
Figure 6’s decision hierarchy. 
 



 


otherwise
relationectsensorfaultp
pP
ij
SRij
0
det     (3-7) 
The objective of sensor deployment is to achieve the minimum unobservability 
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and cost under the constraints of as detectability. Mathematically, this can be expressed 
as: 
   
 
















j
i
j
jij
j
jj
n
j
xd
jii
x
MxptoSubject
xCMin
fUMin jij
*
1
:
:
Prmaxmax:
                        (3-8) 
In the objective modeling, jx are the decision variables which mean how many j 
type sensors need to be placed in order to monitor the system operation; unobservability 
and cost are the primary and secondary objective function that needs to be minimized 
under the constraints of detectability on the ith fault (
*
iM ) requirement. 
We notice that the primary objective is nonlinear function, which involves huge 
computation complexity on optimization. Thus we transform this nonlinear 
unobservability equation (3-5) into linear equation with the same objective through 
logarithmic operation, the unobservability for the system can be expressed as equation 
(3-9). 
      



















 

n
j
jijji
n
j
d
jii dxffU
ij
11
PrloglogmaxPrlogmaxlogmax       (3-9) 
Now we prove the logarithm transformation won’t change the optimality. 
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Proof: 
From    



n
j
xd
jii
jijfxU
1
Pr , we can get      jij xdjijij
j
i fd
x
U 



PrPrln . 
We know that for all nj ,,2,1  ,    0Prln 


ijij
j
i fd
x
U
for 1Pr0  j while 
   0Pr  jij xdj , so    



n
j
xd
jii
jijfxU
1
Pr is monotonically decreasing with its negative 
derivative. In another word, the more sensors are added; the lower the unobservability 
for the system it is. 
Because the derivative of  xlog is a positive quantity for positive x, when 
applying logarithm,  xlog  is a monotonically increasing function for x >0. Then we 
have for 01 x and 02 x , 
   2121 loglog xxxx   
The unobservability of a fault i,  



n
j
xd
jii
jijfU
1
Pr is always nonnegative. 
Given a set of selected sensors, the fault i for which iU is maximum will also give the 
maximum value of  iUlog . Hence, minimizing the maximum iU is the same as 
minimizing the maximum  iUlog . Therefore, logarithm transformation  iUlog  is 
equivalent to iU on objective solution. 
After logarithm transformation, we can get the linear expression for equation (3-
8). Mathematically, this can be expressed as (3-10): 
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*
1
:
:
Prloglogmaxlogmax:
              (3-10) 
 
3.8 Optimization approaches 
As illustrated in section 3.6, the sensor deployment was formulated as multiple 
objectives on observability (primary) and cost (secondary) under the constraints of 
detectability. Given the above defined objective function, now the problem is one of 
choosing the minimum number of sensors key components that would cover all the root 
nodes, also satisfy the detectability requirement. This is the well-known ‘‘minimum set 
covering’’ problem [7]. An exhaustive search algorithm, which covers all fault nodes 
from 1 to n and tests if any combinations of sensor nodes can form a minimal cover set, 
is a possible solution. However, it was proved that the “set covering” problem is NP-
hard; that is, an algorithm to obtain the optimal solution in polynomial-time has not been 
found [62]. Thus the exhaustive searching on all options may not be computationally 
efficient. In order to solve the multiple-objective optimization problem, we developed 
two ways: 1) lexicographical mixed integer linear programming problem (L-MILP), and 
2) greedy algorithm. 
3.8.1 Lexicographical mixed integer linear programming 
In the survey paper [86], authors summarized current multi-objective 
optimization methods as the below Table 8. It is hard to say which method is better than 
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the other because it really depends on the application. But we need look into whether the 
selected approach is necessary and sufficient for Pareto optimality. Other considerations 
include programming complexity (PC), software use complexity (SUC), and 
computation complexity (CC). 
 
Table 8 Summarization optimization methods based on the priori preference 
[86] 
 Scalar 
Method 
Possible 
Pareto 
Opt. 
Necessary 
for Pareto 
Opt. 
Sufficient 
for Pareto 
Opt. 
PC SUC CC 
Weighted 
Global 
Criterion 
√  N/A √ 0 1 1 
Weighted Sum √   √ 0 1 0 
Lexicographic    √ 2 1 2 
Weighted 
Min-Max 
  √ weak 
Pareto opt. 
1 1 2 
Exponential 
Weighted 
√  √ √ 0 1 0 
Weighted 
Product 
√  N/A √ 0 1 1 
Goal 
Programming 
 √   1 1 2 
Bounded Obj. 
Function 
 √   1 1 1 
Physical 
Programming 
  √ √ 3 3 1 
 
For weighted criterion method:   


k
i
P
ii xFU
1
 , it requires a relatively large 
value of P to capture certain Pareto optimal points especially with non-convex Pareto 
optimal sets. As P is approaching infinity, this minimization is no longer sufficient for 
Pareto optimality; but only sufficient for weak Pareto optimality. For other weighted 
methods, a priori selection of weights does not necessarily guarantee the final solution 
will be acceptable; the weight must be a function of original objectives instead of 
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constant in order for a weighted sum to mimic a preference function accurately. 
However, varying the weight weights constantly and continuously may not necessary 
result in an even distribution of Pareto optimal points and an accurate, complete 
representation of the Pareto optimal set. With physical programming, the decision-
makers need to specify a relatively large amount of information, which can be viewed as 
a hindrance or as an opportunity. With relatively complex preferences, one must provide 
more information for physical programming. Then, the more information one provides, 
the more accurately preferences are represented.  
Thus we pick up lexicographical method for our sensor deployment optimization; 
now let us prove that lexicographical method won’t change the optimality on our sensor 
deployment scenario.  
Proof: 
Definition: Pareto optimal which is defined as: a point, Xx * is Pareto optimal 
if and only if there does not exist another point, Xx  such that    *xFxF  , and 
   *xFxF ii   for at least one function [87]. In another  word: when a system is under 
Pareto optimal already, given a “Pareto optimal” allocation of resources among a set of 
individuals, a change to a different allocation that makes at least one individual better off 
will make any other individuals worse off. 
According to lexicographic method’s assumption [87], objective functions are 
first arranged in the order of their importance. After ordering, the most important 
objective will be firstly optimized subject to the original constraints. If the problem has 
the only solution at this moment, this optimized solution is the solution to the whole 
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multiple-objectives optimization problem. Otherwise, the second most important 
objective will be optimized. However, when optimizing the second objective, we need to 
add a new constraint that guarantees the first objective function preserves its optimal 
value in addition to the original constraints. If this problem has the unique value on the 
second round optimization, it is the solution of the original problem. Otherwise, the 
process has to be iterated as above until going over the whole set of objectives. 
Firstly, suppose we had arranged the objective functions in the order from the 
most important 1F  to the least important kF , and then the lexicographic problem can be 
re-written as  
     
sxtoSubject
xFxFxFMin k
:
,,,: 21 
             (3-11) 
Here      xFxFxF k,,, 21  are the unobservability and cost functions in (3-10). We have 
previously proved that the unobservability function and cost function are monotonic on 
sensor numbers. Assume that sx * is a solution to the lexicographical multiple-objective 
optimization problem but not Pareto optimal, then there should exist another sx   such 
that    *xFxF ii  for all ki ,,2,1  , and there exists at least one j which strictly has
   *xFxF jj  . 
As aforementioned lexicographic optimization process, there are two possible 
situations when determining the optimized solution: 1) the unique solution can be found 
during the optimization process, or 2) optimizations have to be performed for every 
objective function   kixFi ,,2,1,  .  
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1) If the unique solution *x  to iF  can be found by lexicographic method before 
examining every objective function. The assumption    *xFxF ii   and the fact that 
objective functions in (3-10) are all monotonic functions imply that    *xFxF ii   is the 
only option, which is a contradiction with at least one i that has    *xFxF ii  . Thus *x is 
Pareto optimal, and there does not exist another point, sx  such that    *xFxF ii   for 
at least one i .  
2) If optimizations have to examine every objective function from  xF1 to  xFk , when
1i , since lexicographic ordering requires that  xF1 reaches minimum at
*x , we will 
have    *11 xFxF  , we also know  xF1 is monotonic, at this moment    *11 xFxF  is the 
only possible situation. Using the similar reasoning we have    *xFxF ii   for every
ki ,,2 . This contradicts the assumption that at least one objective function is 
strictly inequal. Thus *x is also Pareto optimal. 
So for the sensor deployment problem, the lexicographical optimization to 
optimize the objectives in an ordered sequential way won’t change the optimality of the 
original problem.  
Now we know that we can optimize the multiple objectives problem in sensor 
deployment in an ordered lexicographical MILP manner. There are several ways to solve 
a MILP problem. One is linear programming (LP) relaxation, which uses linear 
programming to solve the integer programming problem [88]. It attempts to use the 
approximate procedure of simply applying the simplex method to the LP relaxation and 
then rounding the noninteger values to integers as the resulting solution. However, an 
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optimal linear solution is not necessarily feasible after the rounding. Even if an optimal 
solution for the LP relaxation is rounded successfully, there is still no guarantee that this 
rounded solution will be the optimal integer solution. Because of these, another common 
approach called “branch and bound” was developed for integer programming. It 
systematically enumerates all candidate solutions, then discards large subsets of fruitless 
candidates, by using upper and lower estimated bounds of the quantity being optimized. 
For the branch and bound method, when listing a finite number of feasible solutions 
ensures that the problem is readily solvable, finite numbers usually increase 
exponentially. The key to the remarkable efficiency of the branch and bound method lies 
in removing some feasible solution from a linear programming problem which will make 
it easier to solve. However, this efficiency condition is not always satisfied especially 
when we try to solve multiple-objective optimization sequentially. Because of these, a 
better approach for dealing with multiple objective IP problems that are too large to be 
solved exactly is to use one of the available heuristic algorithms such as greedy search. 
They tend to be considerably more effective in finding good feasible solutions. 
3.8.2 Greedy algorithm 
To reduce the optimization load, we also tackled this optimization problem with 
greedy algorithm, which iteratively adjusts the cover (R, S) until the subgraph SRG ,  has 
an optimized matching. The detail of the greedy algorithm is shown as below: 
1) Initialize those variables: current solution ( 0CS ), optimal solution ( 0OS ), total 
available cost (TC ), cost used ( 0UC ) and current available cost ( AC ). 
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2) Sort the fault nodes in descending order according to the fault nodes’ unobseravbility 
values; 
3) Since the primary object is to lower the maximum unobseravbility, pick the fault 
node with the highest unobservability, because such a selection will lead to the 
greatest reduction on unobservability. If there exists several fault nodes with the 
same unobservability, choose the one with the highest RPN value, which means this 
fault is the most critical; 
4) Sort the sensor nodes that have connection strength to the selected fault node; 
5) Pick up the sensor node that has the largest connection with the fault node; 
6) If more than one sensor node satisfy the requirement, pick up the one with the lowest 
cost; 
7) Update the variables with jSCSCS  , jCUCUC  ; 
8) Recalculate the detectability for the updated system and maximum unobseravlity as 
equation (3-9) for the sensor remainders; 
9) Check the constraints requirement with the updated detectability; 
10) If it satisfies all the constraints, stop the search. Otherwise, go back to repeat step 2) 
to 10) iteratively. 
11) The condition that will terminate the procedure is based on the detectability criteria: 
if the selected sensor set can satisfy the minimum detectability request. We will stop 
the search on sensor set and the set of sensors in OS is the selected sensor set for the 
diagnosis purpose. 
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3.9 Case studies 
 
In order to illustrate the proposed sensor deployment approach on diagnosing 
manufacturing system, two case studies, one for continuous manufacturing and the other 
for discrete manufacturing system, were developed respectively.  
3.9.1 Application on continuous manufacturing system 
3.9.1.1 Graph model on the continuous manufacturing system 
A five-tank system (the data is available from Zhang [11]) is employed to 
demonstrate the proposed sensor deployment approach on continuous manufacturing 
system. The five tank system is composed of piping, valves, pumps and reservoirs in the 
facility as shown in Figure 7(a). In Zhang’s publication [11], he assumed that all the 
fault nodes have the same RPN values, so their fault nodes are normalized as [1] in the 
fuzzy graph the directed graph for the five-tank system is shown as below Figure 7(b). 
Table 9 and 10 summarized the sensing gain/time, and sensor properties to determine the 
detectability of sensors to faults. After transform the directed graph into the bipartite 
graph, the incidence matrix or the connection matrix between the sensors and the faults 
is shown as Table 11. 
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(a)                                                                                                      (b) 
Figure 7 (a) A five tank system, (b) quantitative directed graph between faults and 
sensors 
 
 
Table 9 Sensing gain and time to determine the fault detectability  
[11] 
Sensor Sign Sens. 
gain 
Sens. 
time 
Sensor Sign Sens. 
gain 
Sens. 
time From To From To 
F-L1**  L1 - 0.65 1/100 F-L2  L2 - 24.4 4/100 
F-L3  L3 - 0.14 1/100 F-L4  L4 - 1.1 4/100 
F-L5  L5 - 5.34 4/100 F-V6  F6 - 19.8 0 
F-V7  F7 - 99 0 F-V8  F8 - 19.8 0 
F-V9  F9 - 44 0 F-V10  F10 - 55 0 
F-V11  F11 - 55 0 F-V12  F12 - 44 0 
F-Qi+  L1 + 0.34 2/100      
L1  F6 + 5 0/100 F6  L1 - 0.03 2/100 
F6 L2 + 0.8 12/100 F7 L3 + 0.01 21/100 
L2  F8 + 1.25 0/100 F8  L2 - 0.95 4/100 
L1  F7 + 25 0/100 F7  L1 - 0.04 1/100 
L3  F9 + 36 0/100 F9  L3 - 0.01 1/100 
F9  L5 + 0.2 81/100 F10  L4 + 0.06 20/100 
L5  F12 + 5.05 0/100 F12  L5 - 0.23 4/100 
L3  F10 + 45 0/100 F10  L3 - 0.01 1/100 
L4  F11 + 16.1 0/100 F11  L4 - 0.07 4/100 
 
 
L2
L1
L1
L3L2 L3
L4 L4L5
Qi+
L5
V6 V7
V8 V9
V10
V11V12
F6 F7
F8 F9 F10
F11F12
[1]
[1]
[1][1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1] [1]
[1]
(0.6)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)
(1)(1)
(1) (1)
{0.7}
{0.7}
{0.9} {1}
{0.93} {0.75}
{0.75}
{0.78}
{0.99} {1}
{1}{0.99}
{0.9}
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Table 10 Sensor information about the five tank system  
[11] 
Sensor Cost SNR Pr Resolution 
L1 100 6 0.001 0.01 
L2 100 10 0.001 0.01 
L3 100 10 0.001 0.01 
L4 100 10 0.001 0.01 
L5 100 10 0.001 0.01 
F6 100 10 0.001 0.01 
F7 100 10 0.001 0.01 
F8 100 10 0.001 0.01 
F9 100 10 0.001 0.01 
F10 100 10 0.001 0.01 
F11 100 10 0.001 0.01 
F12 100 10 0.001 0.01 
 
 
Table 11 ijd connection matrix for between sensors and faults in five tank system 
[11] 
Sensor 
Fault L1 F2 L3 L4 L5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 
F-L1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
F-L2  -1      -1     
F-L3   -1 -1 -1    -1 -1 -1 -1 
F-L4    -1       -1  
F-L5     -1       -1 
F-V6 +1 -1 +1 +1 +1 -1 +1 1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
F-V7 +1 +1 -1 -1 -1 +1 -1 +1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
F-V8  +1      -1     
F-V9   +1 +1 -1    -1 +1 +1 -1 
F-V10   +1 -1 +1    +1 -1 -1 +1 
F-V11    +1       -1  
F-V12     +1       -1 
F-Qi+ +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
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With the sensor, fault information, the aggregate them into a single using the 
aforementioned AHP approach, the connection matrix representing the detecting ability 
of sensor j to fault i is shown as Table 12. 
 
Table 12 ijp connection matrix for between faults and sensors in five tank system 
 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 Un Order 
F-L1 0.54 0.67 0.67 0.67   0.68 0.72 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67   -32 10 
F-L2   0.69           0.69         -8 1 
F-L3     0.67 0.67 0.67       0.68 0.69 0.67 0.67 -23 9 
F-L4       0.67             0.68   -8 2 
F-L5         0.67             0.69 -8 3 
F-V6 0.53 0.67 0.67 0.67   0.73 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67   -32 11 
F-V7 0.54 0.67 0.67 0.67   0.70 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67   -32 12 
F-V8   0.68           0.73         -8 4 
F-V9     0.67 0.67 0.67       0.81 0.70 0.67 0.67 -23 7 
F-V10     0.67 0.67 0.67       0.70 0.85 0.68 0.67 -23 8 
F-V11                     0.85 0.67 -8 5 
F-V12         0.67             0.81 -8 6 
F-Qi+ 0.53 0.67 0.67 0.67   0.67 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67   -32 13 
 
3.9.1.2 Results on continuous manufacturing system and discussions 
Zhang’s SDG model cannot include the quantitative sensor-fault information in 
the model, so we used the fuzzy graph to improve the existing work. In the fuzzy graph 
based optimization, lexicographic and greedy optimizations were used to optimize the 
model in equation (3-10) with the quantitative connection matrix information. The 
outcome performance comparisons between the SDG and fuzzy graph sensor 
deployment follow the flow chart in Figure 8. 
Table 13 summarized the comparisons on performance between SDG and fuzzy 
graph on sensor deployment. In this table, the second row is the optimization outcome 
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based on signed directed graph (SDG), which was applied by [11] to optimize the sensor 
deployment on the five-tank system. The third and fourth rows are the results based on 
fuzzy graph with lexicographical and greedy optimization respectively. We compared 
the SDG and fuzzy graph’s performance on deploying sensor to diagnose faults from the 
aspects of: total number of selected sensors, total cost, minimum detectability among all 
faults, and average detectability among all faults. The definition of minimum 
detectability and average detectability were defined as below equation (3-12) and (3-13) 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Comparisons between SDG and fuzzy graph on sensor deployment 
 
 
The Minimum detectability among all faults is defined as: 
 





ij
sensorselectedji
pD maxmin)min(               (3-12) 
The average detectability among all faults is defined as: 
 





ij
sensorselectedji
paverageDave max)(             (3-13) 
 
SDG based sensor 
deployment
Optimally select 
sensors
Remove unwanted 
sensors columns in 
Pij Compare SDG and 
fuzzy graph’s 
performance
Fuzzy graph based 
sensor deployment
Optimally select 
sensors
Remove unwanted 
sensors columns in 
Pij
Calculate min(D) and 
ave(D) according to 
equation (12) and (13)
Calculate min(D) and 
ave(D) according to 
equation (12) and (13)
Greedy
search
Greedy search 
or L-MILP
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From Table 13, we can see that the minimum detectability on the five-tank 
jumped from SDG’s 0 to fuzzy graph’s 0.67, and average detestability also increased 
from SDG’s 0.62 to fuzzy graph’s 0.70. Thus we conclude that with the inclusion of 
quantitative information, fuzzy graph based sensor deployment modeling greatly 
enhanced the diagnosing systems’ detectability to faults than signed directed graph 
approach. 
 
 
Table 13 Results for the five tank system 
Approach Sensors 
selected 
# of 
selected 
sensors 
Total 
cost of 
selected 
sensors 
Minimum 
detectability 
among all 
faults 
Average 
detectability 
among All 
faults 
Signed directed 
graph [11] 
[L2, L4, L5]  3 300 0 0.62 
Fuzzy graph 
with 
lexicographical 
 [F8,F11, F12] 3 300 0.67 0.70 
Fuzzy graph 
with greedy 
 [F8, F11,F12] 3 300 0.67 0.70 
 
 
The SDG method only cares the single attribute that whether there is a 
connection between the fault and sensor, but not considering how the connection it is, 
for example, the strength of the connection. The fuzzy graph included quantitative 
information such as sensor properties, fault modes and sensor-fault relations into the 
connection. These attributes are heterogeneous and not comparable, so we used fuzzy 
membership function to normalize them into values in [0, 1], then aggregate them into 
single edge values with AHP method. In the SDG approach, the aforementioned 
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quantitative sensor-fault relation cannot be included in the modeling. Thus when 
allocating the sensors, it is just the problem of choosing the minimum number of sensors 
key components that would cover all the root nodes.  Thus SDG’s optimization always 
tries to choose the sensor node that has the most edge connections with the faults. After 
including the quantitative information in fuzzy graph, its optimization algorithm will 
pick up the sensor that has the largest edge connection with the fault at each time. Here 
we included the SDG based sensor deployment in the paper appendix. 
 
3.9.2 Application on discrete manufacturing system 
The other case study for discrete manufacturing system was developed on a dual 
robot in Rockwell
®
 Automation System Integration Laboratory at Texas A&M 
University. The dual robot is as shown in below Figure 9 (a) [89]. It is a robot work cell 
including conveyor, two 4-axis robot arms, stoppers, parts feeders, computer vision and 
controller. The robot arm1 is composed of shoulder, elbow, wrist and gripper. The 
sequential operations for the robot arm are: 1) stopper block the pallet and send signal to 
initiate arm; 2) open gripper, lower elbow, pick up part from part feeder; 3) raise elbow, 
extend the shoulder, lower elbow, open gripper; and 4) close gripper, raise elbow, retract 
shoulder. These actions were controlled by Allen Bradley
®
 programmable logic 
controller SLC 5/05 with other modules. Due to space limitation in the paper, we only 
concentrate on deploying sensors to diagnose faults with robot arm1. 
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(a) 
 
   
(b) 
Figure 9 (a) An automated assembly dual robot (b) initial fuzzy graph for dual 
robot  
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3.9.2.1 Graph model on the discrete manufacturing system 
Arm1 includes shoulder, elbow and gripper which are mostly composed of 
pneumatic control devices such as air cylinders, solenoid valves; and Hall sensors. A 
simplified FMEA on arm1 is shown as Table 14. Literature [90] and [91] illustrated that 
the most common failures with solenoid valves were caused by either overpowering and 
eventual overheating of the valves, or wearing out of the valve components; while the 
failures with cylinder were due to leakage and cylinder stuck. Thus the promising sensor 
candidates to detect those faults can be pressure sensors and voltage current checking. 
 
 
 
Table 14 Faults and sensors in dual robot arm 
 Component 
Fault 
Node 
Possible 
Fault 
Occurrence 
Rate 
Severity 
Rate 
Detection 
Rate Sensor Candidates 
Shoulder 
  
  
R1 Cylinder 6 7 2 pressure sensor (S1) 
R2 Hall sensor1 2 1 5 voltage sensor (S2) 
R3 Hall sensor2 2 1 5 voltage sensor (S3) 
R4 Solenoid 6 8 9 voltage sensor (S4) 
Elbow 
  
  
R5 Cylinder 6 7 2 pressure sensor (S5) 
R6 Hall sensor1 2 1 5 voltage sensor (S6) 
R7 Hall sensor2 2 1 5 voltage sensor (S7) 
R8 Solenoid 6 8 9 voltage sensor (S8) 
Gripper 
  
R9 Solenoid 6 8 9 voltage sensor (S9) 
R10 Cylinder 6 7 2 pressure sensor (S10) 
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Table 15 Factors to determine fault detectability 
Sensors to detect 
faults 
Sensitivity 
(full  
scale) 
SNR 
(dB) 
Resolution 
(bit) 
Accuracy 
(full 
scale) 
sensor 
fail rate 
(Pr) 
 
Sens. 
gain 
Sens. 
time 
(ms) 
Cost 
($) 
Fault  
node 
Sensor 
node 
R1 S1 2.5% 20 12 3% 0.001 1 4.6  30 
R2 S2 1%  100 16  1%  0.001 1 3 80 
R3 S3 1%  100 16  1%  0.001 1 3 80 
R4 S4 1%  100 16  1%  0.001 1 3 80 
R5 S5 2.5% 20 12 3% 0.001 1 4.6  30 
R6 S6 1%  100 16  1%  0.001 1 3 80 
R7 S7 1%  100 16  1%  0.001 1 3 80 
R8 S8 1%  100 16  1%  0.001 1 3 80 
R9 S9 2.5% 20 12 3% 0.001 1 4.6  80 
R10 S10 1%  100 16  1%  0.001 1 3 30 
 
Table 15 listed the factors that will determine the fault detectability. After 
normalization of the sensor nodes, fault nodes as well as edges, the bipartite graph for 
the sensor deployment is initially shown as Figure 9(b), and the bipartite connection 
matrix ijp with the graph are also listed with Table 16.  
 
 
Table 16 ijp Connection matrix for initial fuzzy graph 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Unobservability RPN Order 
R1 0.55          -6 0.083 1 
R2  0.81 0.81 0.34    0.67 0.67  -17 0.43 9 
R3  0.81 0.81 0.34    0.67 0.67  -17 0.43 10 
R4 0.55   0.34       -9 0.009 4 
R5     0.55      -6 0.083 2 
R6      0.81 0.81 0.67 0.67  -14 0.43 7 
R7      0.81 0.81 0.67 0.67  -14 0.43 8 
R8     0.55   0.67   -9 0.009 5 
R9         0.67 0.55 -9 0.009 6 
R10          0.55 -6 0.083 3 
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3.9.2.2 Results on discrete manufacturing system and discussions 
With this bipartite graph and connection matrix ijp , we started to optimize the 
sensor deployment using lexicographical mixed integer linear programming (L-MILP) 
and greedy algorithm respectively. The L-MILP and greedy optimization results are 
listed in Table 17 and 18 respectively. It illustrated how to choose sensor deployment 
including location, number and type in order to satisfy detectability requirements. In 
Table 17, when required detectability constraint was 0.1, L-MILP predicted that using 5 
sensors with cost of 250 could achieve minimum unobservability of -5. These five 
selected sensors locate at the end of the graph (S1, S3, S5, S7, S10 in Figure 9 (b)). This 
is consistent with the fault identification reasoning: these three sensors (S1, S5, and S10) 
are for monitoring the solenoids, which drive cylinders with the most observable actions 
for the troubleshooting. Thus in order to maintain the minimum detectability, the sensors 
to the solenoid shall be considered first. S3 and S7 are for monitoring control input 
signals (A1XH3 and A1ZH2), so they are also selected for better detectability. Later 
when required detectability constraints increased to 0.8, L-MILP predicted that it needed 
10 sensors with cost of 500 to achieve minimum unobservability of -5. In Table 18, 
when required detectability constraint was 0.1, greedy predicted that 5 sensors with cost 
of 250 could achieve minimum unobservability of -5. Later when required detectability 
constraints increased to 0.8, greedy predicted that it needed 8 sensors with cost of 340 to 
achieve minimum unobservability of -5. 
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Table 17 Optimization results using L-MILP 
Required 
Detectability 
Sensor selected Cost  
utilized 
Achieved 
unobservability 
Total 
Sensor 
number 
Optimization 
Time 
(Seconds) 
0.1 S1, S3, S5, S7, S10 250 -5 5 0.01 
0.2 S1, S3, S5, S7, S10 250 -5 5 0.02 
0.3 S1, S3, S5, S7, S10 250 -5 5 0.02 
0.4 S1, S2, S5, S6, S10 250 -5 5 0.03 
0.5 S1, S2, S5, S6, S10 250 -5 5 0.03 
0.6 S1(2), S2, S5, S7(2), 
S10(2) 
390 -5 5 0.02 
0.7 S1(2), S2(2), S5(2), 
S6(2), S10(2) 
500 -8 10 0.03 
0.8 S1(2), S2(2), S5(2), 
S6(2), S10(2) 
500 -8 10 0.03 
 
 
 
Table 18 Optimization results using greedy algorithm 
Required 
Detectability 
Sensor selected Cost  
utilized 
Achieved 
unobservability 
Total 
Sensor  
number 
Optimization 
Time 
(Seconds) 
0.1 S1, S2, S5, S6, S10 250 -5 5 0.0050 
0.2 S1, S2, S5, S6, S10 250 -5 5 0.0050 
0.3 S1, S2, S5, S6, S10 250 -5 5 0.0058 
0.4 S1, S2, S5, S6, S10 250 -5 5 0.0049 
0.5 S1, S2, S5, S6, S10 250 -5 5 0.0049 
0.6 S1, S2, S5, S6, S10 250 -5 5 0.0049 
0.7 S1(2), S2, S5(2), S6, 
S10(2) 
340 -5 8 0.0050 
0.8 S1(2), S2, S5(2), S6, 
S10(2) 
340 -5 8 0.0049 
 
 
 
Comparisons were conducted from the perspectives of cost and detectability on 
the system. Cost of the sensor system is simply summing all the sensor costs involved in 
the deployment. The unobservability of the system follows the equation (3-12) and (3-
13)’s definition.  
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Table 19 Results comparison for the dual robot system 
Approach Sensors 
selected 
# of 
selected 
sensors 
Total 
cost of 
selected 
sensors 
Minimum 
detectability 
among all 
faults 
Average 
detectability 
among all 
faults 
Signed directed 
graph 
[S1, S5, S9, 
S10]  
4 170 0.55 0.61 
Fuzzy graph 
with 
lexicographical 
 [S1, S3, S5, 
S7, S10] 
5 250 0.55 0.654 
Fuzzy graph 
with greedy 
 [S1, S2, S5, 
S6, S10] 
5 250 0.55 0.654 
 
 
From Table 19, further consideration is that if we pick up any one more sensors 
in addition to the current SDG optimization result, how the optimization comparison will 
be looked like? The newly achieved minimum detectability and average detectability for 
adding one more sensor are summarized in the Table 20. From the table, we can see that 
the SDG approach still cannot have better performance than the proposed approach even 
adding an additional sensor to the current optimized sensor selection, because the 
proposed approach selected the sensor of [S1, S3, S5, S7, S9] and achieved minimum 
detectability of 0.55 and average detectability of 0.654 (Table 19). 
 
Table 20 Summarization of results on adding any another sensor 
Newly 
added 
sensor 
New sensor 
configuration 
Minimum 
detectability 
Average 
detectability 
S2 [S1, S2, S5, S9, S10] 0.55 0.638 
S3 [S1, S3, S5, S9, S10] 0.55 0.638 
S4 [S1, S4, S5, S9, S10] 0.55 0.598 
S5 [S1, S5, S6, S9, S10] 0.55 0.638 
S6 [S1, S5, S7, S9, S10] 0.55 0.638 
S8 [S1, S5, S8, S9, S10] 0.55 0.61 
 
  
72 
Articles have mentioned that including redundant sensors will improve the 
performance of fault detection [92]. However due to the budget or space installation 
constraint, it may not be possible to install every redundant sensor. In literature [92], it 
noted that that in a nuclear plant, adding extra sensor will impact the maintenance, 
sometimes only with an average variation of 0.35% on the optimization results, it can 
still make some difference on the efficiency. 
We also compared the optimization approaches with the reasoning process and 
found that the selection of sensor for each fault node is based on the biggest path 
connection due to the greedy principle. Only one sensor either S2 or S3 is kept in the 
sensor system. Possible reason for this deletion is that: sensor nodes S2 and S3 monitor 
fault nodes R2 and R3, which are the hall sensors A1XH2 and A1XH3’s abnormalities. 
Those two Hall sensors are the input signals to activate the actions of shoulder. A1XH1 
and A1XH2’s on/off states are opposite to each other ( 3121 XHAXHA  ).  Thus the 
faults R3 can be inferred from the signals related on S2. Besides this, R2 and R3 are the 
least crucial (with the unobservability order of 9 and 10, and unobservability value of -
17) in Table 12, so only one S2 kept in the optimized sensor system will still guarantee 
the detectability. The selection of S6 or S7 can follow the similar reason as selecting S2 
and S3. 
We compared the offline sensor selection computation cost in terms of the 
computation time. The greedy search was programmed in Matlab
®
 and MILP in 
LINGO
®
. The computation was performed on a 2.7G dual core computer with memory 
of 6.0G RAM. The computation time is shown as Figure 10. We can see that greedy 
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search is more computation efficient that the lexicographical integer programming. 
Possible reason may be like this: L-MILP was carried out to solve the optimal objectives 
one by one; branch and bound is used as the mechanism to find the integer solution. This 
recursion process hinders the computation efficiency. However, greedy algorithm selects 
the solutions that target the objectives directly. It may be an efficient approach for 
dealing with mixed integer linear problem that is too large to be solved exactly, 
especially when there is some experience knowledge to guide the search.  
 
 
 
Figure 10 Sensor selection computation comparison 
 
 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
Optimal sensor deployment is an important research issue for monitoring and 
detecting faults in that the accurate and efficient collection of fault signal signature is the 
very first step for diagnostics. The objective of this chapter is to develop a fuzzy 
quantitative graph based sensor deployment methodology which can process 
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heterogeneous properties and multiple-objective optimization in fault diagnosis. In the 
proposed methodology, sensor deployment started with studies on failure mode effect 
analysis (FMEA) on the manufacturing system, which specified the failure modes and 
their criticality and probability of occurrence. Quantitative fuzzy graph was used for 
modeling cause effect between faults and sensors. The element values in the fuzzy graph 
were decided with the considerations on fault characteristics, sensor properties, as well 
as sensors’ detectabilities to faults. To handle the trade-off caused by heterogeneous 
properties among sensors, AHP was applied to aggregate those properties into a single 
edge value. With the fuzzy bipartite graph, sensors were optimally assigned to faults 
under the help of lexicographical mixed integer linear programming and greedy 
algorithm respectively. Finally case studies on how to deploy sensors to detect faults on 
continuous and discrete type manufacturing systems were presented to illustrate the 
proposed design. Various issues discussed in the methodology were demonstrated in the 
case studies; results from different modeling and optimization approaches were 
compared and discussed also. The case study validated that the proposed fuzzy graph 
based methodology can greatly enhance the detectability to faults than SDG based 
sensor deployment (from SDG’s 0.62 to fuzzy graph’s 0.70 in the five-tank application 
and from SDG’s 0.61 to fuzzy graph’s 0.654 in the dual-robot application). The 
contribution of our work lies on that the optimized sensor deployment approach can 
include kinds of heterogeneous quantitative information to direct the multiple-objective 
decision in sensor deployment, thus achieving the minimum unobservability and cost 
under the constraints of detectability, resources and uncertainties. The fuzzy graph based 
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sensor deployment is systematic and can be easily integrated into diagnosis architecture 
to detect faults in complex systems such as flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), 
HVAC and semiconductor production facilities. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PROPOSED DIAGNOSER DESIGN BASED ON REALTIME FUZZY PETRI NET 
 
To efficiently detect the stochastic faults in automated assembly system, 
considering integration of industrial experience (useful but with uncertainty) into the 
diagnoser design, we proposed a realtime fuzzy Petri net (RTFPN) diagnoser 
architecture as shown in Figure 11. This architecture includes a realtime PN model 
 0, MQ , and a fuzzy PN diagnoser  0, MQd . The realtime model keeps checking the 
input and output of the PN plant, and compares them with the pre-settings. Once a 
difference is detected, it will start the fuzzy Petri net diagnoser to locate the root cause of 
the fault. The details of this diagnosis architecture will be specified in the following 
sections. 
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Figure 11 Fault diagnosis based on realtime fuzzy Petri net for automated system 
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4.1 Realtime Petri net model 
The procedure of constructing RTPN model to monitor discrete manufacturing 
systems is as following [79]: 
1) Model the control sequence using PN to obtain the model of the sequence controller. 
2) Formulate an input mapping table between the system’s input devices such as limit 
switches, sensors with the places in the PN model. The initial states of the system 
decide the initial marking of RTPN. Identify the timing information for activities to 
formulate the later mapping table. 
3) Assign output channels to the system’s output devices such as solenoids, relays. 
Also, identify timing information for activities to formulate an output mapping table.  
4) Using output mapping table and the actions that are modeled by a transition, assign a 
number to each transition in a PN based controller. The operations and time delays 
given in the sequence to be controlled decide firing time function of RTPN.  
Following the above procedures, Petri net model is defined as
 hYXMWOITPQ ,,,,,,,, 0 , where:  mPPPP ,,, 21  is the finite set of places. 
 nTTTT ,,, 21  is the finite set of transitions, these transitions are classified as 
observable transitions ( oT ) or unobservable transitions ( uoT ), so we have uoo TTT  and 
uoo TT  . The observable transitions can be indicated by sensors on whether a 
transition has been fired or not. In contrast, the unobservable transitions cannot be 
observed directly given the current sensor configuration. The association between 
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sensors and transitions are linked by the labeling function: **: TLA , which will be 
defined later. 
In our PN model, faults (
FT ) were modeled as a subset of unobservable 
transitions and partitioned into m independent types, so we have (1) uoF TT  , (2)
FmFFF TTTT  21 , and (3) FjFi TT   if  mji ,,2,1,  and ji  . This model 
includes both normal and faulty behavior of the system; fault can happen at any state of 
the normal operation. TPI :  is the pre-condition of transition which is the finite set 
of arcs from places to transitions; PTO : is the post-condition of transition which is 
the finite set of arcs from transitions to places; 0M is the finite set of initial token 
markings; and W is the incidence matrix and IOW  ;  kPX ,2,1,0:  and
    jipXpX ji  , , is the input signal vector; Y  is the output signal vector. h is the 
mapping function between input/output devices and places/transitions. It is noted that: 
Input signal vector ( X ) reads the state of input signals from digital input 
interface. X associates attributes with every transition.  ii thX  is the attribute 
associating with transition it . 
Output signal vector (Y ) intends to send output signals through digital output 
interface. Y also associates attributes to every place.  iii tphY ,  is the attribute 
associating with transition it and place ip which represents the number that is to be sent 
to the digital output interface. 
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With the realtime PN model structure, we further build an integrated I/O 
mapping table to describe the relation between the PN model and the input/output 
devices. This table integrates different combinations of input sensor readings and output 
status, so it can help locate which place is achieved and which may lead to the faults 
according to the location of the process. The mapping table is built in this way: let 
 0, MQR be the reachable set from initial marking, so we will refine the model to 
remove the states that cannot be reached, thus we have
   0,: MQRpMPpp iii  . Then the input/output function
   iiii YXPMh ,:   is set up for each possible input/output. h  associates each 
marking in  0, MQR with input/output vector with sensors, the timing information of 
each I/O are also integrated in the table. 
Finally, the state equation for the realtime Petri net can be calculated as:  
   




iiiii
iii
MtphYX
WuMM
,,,
1                    (4-1) 
Where iM is the marking of plant; iu is the firing vector to indicate which transition is 
currently fired; h is the mapping table between the discrete set of possible inputs/outputs
 ii YX ,  each marking  iii Mtp ,, in the reachable set  0, MQR . 
4.2 Diagnoser design 
In automated assembly system, faults maybe caused by design errors, 
manufacturing defects, users or programs that do not follow the protocols, component 
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aging/deterioration etc. Because each faulty event in the manufacturing system has a 
degree of uncertainty, which can be expressed as the IF-THEN rule. These events will 
form a possible set of place/transition modes described by the fuzzy Petri net. We can 
model the faulty events by PN as: 1) a transition is fired, but the tokens are neither added 
nor removed to the respective input or output places of that transitions; or 2) a transition 
is fired, but the tokens are moved to the incorrect output places of the transition. In order 
to detect these two kinds of fault situations, the fuzzy PN diagnoser 
 lOITPQ ddd ,,,,,,  , which has the ability to incorporate uncertainties in event 
detection, is used to determine the fault mode by detecting events signifying a switch in 
the sequence of operation. The fuzzy Petri net consists of two parts: the structure of Petri 
net  OITP dd ,,, and fuzzy logic reasoning l,,  associated with each transition. The 
following sections will present how to model the Petri net structure and fuzzy reasoning. 
4.2.1 Petri net structure 
The dQ observes the RTPN mode Q ’s input/output signals which represent the 
running status of the manufacturing plant in realtime. In this diagnoser, dP is the set of 
places which relates to the fault partitions, some places may contain a token marked with 
a fuzzy truth value between 0 and 1, and some places may not, which are the same as the 
ones in ordinary Petri net. dT is the set of faulty transitions and belongs to the 
unobservable transitions. **: ETLA  is the transition labeling function; E is the event 
set for transition labeling, which is a set of fault labels which are defined with 
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 mffff ,,, 21  and normal status is as N . Then all possible set of labels with 
diagnoser is   fNE   . For every place of diagnoser it has the form  idi EP , and the 
initial place is   NP ,0 . The language generated from the Petri net diagnoser is: 
    stateinitialwithTsEslQL d ** ::                       (4-2) 
Suppose that the system starts from normal status with the initial marking, when 
an observed marking is changed, a new diagnoser state is generated. Let dQq be a 
diagnoser state, which in general consists of pairs of markings and a label concerning 
whether a fault has occurred. In notations, for each diagnoser state dQq ,
   02 MRdQ , 
it takes the general form of:     nn lMlMq ,,,, 11  , of which all of the markings in 
the estimate pairs of marking and label look the same and belong to the same equivalent 
class,  0MRM i  and each label lli  . Then labels are assigned to that failure by fault 
labeling function. Suppose s is a string that starts from state 0x  and ends in an observable 
event, it forms a sequence of firing transitions nn MttMtMs 2110 . Labeling function
LApropagates the label l over s . Thus we have   lslMRLA 0: , LAassigns the 
label l over s starting from P following the state transition of dQ as: 
 
   
   






sTif
sTiN
slPLA
i
i
fi
f
,
,
,,                          (4-3) 
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The fault labeling function helps assign the labels from one diagnoser state to another 
state over observed sequence s .  
4.2.2 Fuzzy logic reasoning with transitions 
Once the Petri net structure and labels are ready, the possible event transitions 
will be decided with fuzzy reasoning on input/output signal features to describe which 
faulty event will be fired. If the reasoning possibility is greater than or equal to the 
threshold, then that transition will be fired. 
As shown in Figure 12, we first assumed that every fault event has a unique 
feature from sensor signals and a threshold characterizing by the DES state transitions. 
Mode identification will firstly be processed by extracting features from I/O sensor 
signal data. The signal feature data are then classified through fuzzy logic to determine 
the faulty mode. Features are extracted by a feature extraction module and placed into 
the diagnostics database. The fuzzy logic reasoning loads the required features from the 
database and then determines the current operating mode through inference engine and 
defuzzification algorithms. 
 
 
 
Figure 12 Fuzzy logic reasoning process 
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In the reasoning process, signal features will be firstly fuzzificated with 
membership functions in a variety of shapes including triangular, trapezoidal, Gaussian, 
Sigmoid, bell functions etc. Expertise information about the symptoms of faults is then 
used to create both the membership functions and rules to detect faults. For each rule, 
there are two kinds of fuzzy rule implications: either (1) Mamdani model, or (2) Takagi-
Sugeno-Kang (TSK) model, be used for rule inference [93]. Examples of rules in 
Mamdani or TSK type are expressed as below: 
Mamdani type: 
Ri: IF elbow is extended for too long period THEN sensor AXH2 is abnormal 
TSK type: 
Ri: IF elbow is extended for too long period THEN sensor AXH2 reading AXH2=3+4*t 
The difference between these two kinds of rule models lies in the consequent 
part: Mamdani model’s consequence is a fuzzy set, which is easier to understand and 
more suitable for capturing imprecise human expertise; While TSK’s functional 
consequent can be used to approximate complex nonlinear model using only a small 
number of rules. Like that, Mamdani model fits our application better, because how to 
effectively render knowledge accumulated from the system operations to facilitate 
diagnosis is the targeting problem we identified in Section 2. Thus we use the Mamdani 
model as our rule implication in the fuzzy Petri net. After the fuzzy implication has been 
performed for each rule for a particular fault, these rules need to be unioned through 
“AND” or “OR” operation upon the resulting membership functions. The typical union 
operations in fuzzy Petri net are shown as Figure 13. 
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Figure 13 Union operations in fuzzy Petri net (a) “AND” operation, (b) “OR” 
operation 
 
The mathematic operations on “AND” and “OR” are as below: 
“AND” operation:  
    
 
 
 
 
 
   
 ijijijij TOPj
n
j
TIPjTOPjTIPjj
PPPPjP









 


 
1
111    (4-4) 
“OR” operation:  
    
 
 
 
 
ijij TOP
jTIPjj
PPjP

  max1                (4-5) 
After these operations, de-fuzzification is performed on the union output results 
based either on (1) Mean of Maximum (MOM) method, or (2) Center of Area (COA) 
method [92]. 
For MOM, suppose “y is A” is a fuzzy conclusion to be defuzzied, MOM de-
fuzzification can be expressed as: 
 
P
y
AMOM
Py


*
*
             (4-6) 
Where P is the set of output values y with highest possibility degree in A. 
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For COA, suppose  yA serves as the weight for value y, then COA de-
fuzzification is: 
 
 
 
 

y
A
y
A
y
yy
ACOA


                (4-7) 
Between these two de-fuzzification methods, MOM is less complicated and easy to 
implement. However, a major limitation of MOM de-fuzzification is that it does not 
consider the overall shape of the possibility distribution. Two fuzzy conclusions with the 
same peak points, but otherwise different shape, will yield the same de-fuzzification 
result using the MOM method. So here we pick up COA as our de-fuzzification 
approach. The de-fuzzification output result will be compared with the threshold. Once 
the result is greater than the threshold, that faulty event will be fired; otherwise, it will 
not be changed.  
 
4.3 System developments  
4.3.1 Descriptions on the dual robot arm 
The proposed approaches were implemented to diagnose a dual robot assembly 
arm as shown in below Figure 14. It is a robot work cell including a conveyor, two 4-
axis robot arms, four stoppers, two parts feeders, a computer vision and a controller. The 
robot arm is composed of a shoulder, an elbow, a wrist and a gripper. The sequential 
operations for the robot arm are: 1) the stopper blocks the pallet and sends signal to 
initiate the arm; 2) open gripper, lower elbow, pick up part from part feeder; 3) raise 
elbow, extend the shoulder, lower elbow, open gripper; and 4) close gripper, raise elbow, 
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retract shoulder. These actions were controlled by Allen Bradley
®
 programmable logic 
controller SLC 5/05 with other I/O modules. Due to the space constraint, we 
concentrated more on station3 and robot arm1 since they are functioning together. The 
diagnosis on arm2 can follow the similar procedures from arm1. The possible faults and 
their corresponding symptoms are listed in Table 21. As we assumed in the beginning, 
the occurrences of these faults were classified as unobservable transitions, so their 
places/transitions cannot be related to the observable input/output sensor events. 
 
 
Figure 14 An automated assembly dual robot at Texas A&M University 
 
The RTFPN model is shown as Figure 15 (a) and (b). All the actuators used in 
the dual robot arm1 are pneumatic cylinders, which are driven by the solenoids after 
receiving commands from PLC. For those pneumatic devices, possible faults are 
solenoid abnormal and cylinder abnormal. Their corresponding model is as Figure 15 
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(a). This diagnoser fits the application for all the dual robot arm pneumatic devices 
including a stopper, a gripper and X, Z actuators. They will be integrated into the 
diagnoser for the whole system. Figure 15 (b) is the PN model supervising the whole 
system. In these two plots, solid boxes are the observable transitions while the nonsolid 
boxes are unobservable transitions. Places described by the possible sensor sets with 
each state and transition are related with the actions. Since we assumed that faults are 
unobservable places, no sensor mapping is assigned to faults, but their existences can be 
inferred from the sensor signal features. With this in mind, we constructed the I/O 
mapping as Table 22. 
 
 
Table 21 Possible faults and symptoms 
No. Failure Root Cause Symptom 
F1 Not a correct product The gripper cannot pick up the part, but the arm1 will move to the 
carrier position then only move up and down in the z-direction. At this 
moment, the ZH1 and ZH2 are triggered alternatively, Z is also 
triggered periodically. 
F2 XH2 abnormal It lowers the arm and grip the part, then extends the arm, but it will 
open the gripper without lowering the arm at the carrier position. XH2 
can get signal when arm1 is retrieved back, but will not be triggered 
when it is extended, z is triggered only on the part feeder position, but 
won’t be triggered when it arrive on the carrier position. 
F3 XH3 abnormal The arm1 will not be lowered, neither the gripper pick up the part, but 
arm1 will move to the carrier position, then move up and down in the Z 
direction. 
F4 ZH1 abnormal It will lower the arm, but it won’t grip the part, then raise the arm, then 
it extend the arm, then stands above the carrier and does nothing. 
F5 ZH2 abnormal It will not lower the arm, neither grip parts. It only extends the arm. 
The durance of arm is controlled by timer, not A1ZH2. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 15 PN model for arm1 
 
4.3.2 Diagnoser design 
With the RTPN model in Figure 15, the diagnoser for the dual robot was built as 
Figure 16. This Figure 16 was built based on the concept of “coverability tree” [5], 
which represents all possible markings. Because we assume that some transitions and 
places are unobservable, an efficient way to update the system estimate is to use the 
observation on the changes in observed markings. In this figure, the first 16 numbers 
mean the possible markings in each place associating with the sequence of operations. 
The last letter associates with the possible normal/faulty states. We can see that F2 can 
be easily identified without any confusion. However, in order to differentiate the faults 
of (F1, F3, F4, F5), diagnoser need to be delicately designed. When we were running 
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and testing the system, we have accumulated plentiful experiences on its normal and 
faulty conditions. If we can integrate these experiences into our diagnoser design, it will 
greatly improve the efficiency and accuracy of diagnostics. Here fuzzy Petri net was 
used in our diagnoser to isolate the faults. 
 
Table 22 Place, transition and input/output mapping table 
Places Description Output Devices Transition Input events 
P1 Stopper3 {C3,PSS3,PS3} T1 Start 
P2 Feeder part 
ready 
{Part, PSS3} T2 Lower elbow1 
P3 Elbow1 
lowered  
{PSS3, Part Ready, 
A1ZH2,A1XH3} 
T3 Close gripper2 
P4 Part1 picked  
(close gripper1) 
{A1ZH1,A1XH3} T4 Raise elbow2 
P5 Elbow1 raised  {T40.TT} T5 Extend arm1 
P6 Arm1 extended  {PSS3, T11} T6 Lower elbow1 
P7 Lower elbow1 {PSS3,A1XH2,A1ZH2} T7 Open gripper1 
P8 Open gripper1 {T55.DN} T8 Raise elbow1 
P9 Raise elbow {T40.DN} T9 Retract arm1 
P10 Retract arm1 {A1XH2}   
Faulty Places Faulty Transitions 
PF1 Part fault {A1ZH2, A1XH2, gripper} F1  
PF2 A1XH2 
abnormal 
{A1ZH2, A1XH2, gripper} F2  
PF3 A1XH3 
abnormal 
{A1ZH2, A1XH2, gripper} F3  
PF4 A1ZH1 
abnormal 
{A1ZH2, A1XH2, gripper} F4  
PF5 A1ZH2 
abnormal 
{A1ZH2, A1XH2, gripper} F5  
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0010 0000 0000 0000N
1100 0000 0100 0000N
0000 1000 0000 0000N
0001 0000 0000 0000N
0000 0100 0000 0000N
0000 0010 0000 0000N
0000 0001 0000 0000N
0000 0000 0110 0000N
0000 0000 1010 0000N
0000 0000 0001 0000 
F1
0000 0000 0000 0010 
F4
0000 0000 0000 0001 
F5
0000 0000 0000 0100 
F3
0000 0000 0000 1000 
F2
 
Figure 16 Fault diagnoser design for dual robot 
 
For the control of the robot arm, it involves coordinating actions in the X-axis 
and Z-axis as well as gripping; we selected the readings from the sensor Z and XH2 as 
the input features to our fuzzy reasoning process. Their signal features on normal and 
different faulty states are shown as Figure 17 (a) and (b). 
As shown in the figures, those two signals (A1Z and XH2) have the 
characteristics of event driven. For this type of system, sequence of events and timing 
intervals of each event are the most useful signal features. Thus they are selected as the 
inputs to the fuzzy reasoning. In Figure 17 (a), at the normal states (pink square dot line), 
there are two intervals in each work cycle; and each interval lasts for 1 second. If the 
intervals appear periodically as yellow dots in the figure, possible fault is XH3 
abnormal. When the interval appears only once, possible faults can be either ZH1 
abnormal or XH2 abnormal. If the interval never appears, ZH2 abnormality might 
happen. 
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In Figure 17 (b), at the normal state, there is only one interval in each working 
cycle for signal XH2 and the interval lasts for 2 second to cover the duration of Z. If the 
signal stays at high forever, the possible fault can be XH3 abnormal. If the interval never 
appears, XH2 abnormal might happen. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 17 Input signal features 
 
Summary on these, the fuzzy rules were derived as below: 
R1: IF A1Z has two 1 second cycles AND each cycle lasts for 1 second, THEN the 
system is normal 
R2: IF A1Z has periodic cycles, THEN XH3 is abnormal (F3) 
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R3: IF A1Z has one 1 second cycle AND XH2 also has one 1 second cycle, THEN ZH1 
is abnormal (F4) 
R4: IF A1Z never appears, THEN ZH2 is abnormal (F5) 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 18 Membership functions for A1Z (a), XH2 (b) and faults (c) 
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The membership functions for A1Z, XH2 and possible faults are illustrated in 
Figure 18 (a), (b), and (c). Their linguistic terms are shown on these figures respectively 
also. The identified rules are plotted in Figure 19. Possible faults were encoded as 
numbers and formed the Z-axis in Figure 19, inputs are the periods in XH2 and Z. Figure 
19 illustrated what the possible fault output is as observed signals in XH2 and A1Z vary. 
 
    
Figure 19 Fuzzy rules for dual robot diagnosis 
 
Finally the fuzzy Petri net to isolate the faults is constructed in Figure 20. With 
the inclusion of the signal features, the faults can be identified without any confusion. 
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Figure 20 Fuzzy diagnoser to isolate faults 
 
4.3.3 System implementation  
In order to illustrate how to apply the proposed approach on diagnosing a real 
manufacturing system, we implemented the proposed PN model and diagnoser using 
Visual Basic
®
. The architecture for the diagnosis platform is shown in Figure 21. This 
architecture consists of: 1) the main Petri net screen to monitor the whole system; 2) four 
distributed Petri net forms to monitor each substation respectively; and 3) an additional 
forcing output form to manually drive the outputs of PLC when diagnosis needs. The 
implemented diagnoser capitalizes the event-driven and discrete I/O characters of the 
discrete manufacturing system to monitor and diagnose the system in realtime. To enable 
the real time property, all the inputs (sensors) and outputs (actuators) of the system are 
physically connected to the I/O modules of the PLC, and then PLC communicates with 
the personal computer through the Visual Basic’s MSComm object (serial RS232 
communication port). The detailed implementation on communication setup, Petri net 
implementation and fault reasoning will be presented in the following sections. 
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Figure 21 Flow chart for the RTFPN diagnoser on dual robot arm 
 
4.3.3.1 Communication setup to enable realtime control 
It is critical to set up the communication between the PC and PLC, so the Petri 
net can monitor or diagnose the plant in real time. This communication set up involves 
two aspects: 1) enable the communication protocol between the PC and PLC, and 2) 
enable PC to read or write the PLC’s I/O registers.  
To enable PC read/write the PLC register in real-time, we need programming to 
set up the communication protocol between lower machine and host computer. In this 
research RS232 serial communication is the protocol, PLC is the lower machine and PC 
is the host machine. The communication set up on host machine is as follows.  
 
Private Sub CommunicationSetup( ) 
' Set up the Communications Port 
    MSComm1.CommPort = 2 'change according to your system configuration 
    ' 19200 baud, no parity, 8 data, and 1 stop bit. 
    MSComm1.Settings = "19200,N,8,1" 
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    ' Tell the control to read entire buffer when Input is used. 
    MSComm1.InputLen = 1 
'Set the characters to return to 1 
MSComm1.RThreshold = 1 
    ' Open the port. 
     MSComm1.PortOpen = True 
   'set up PLC Communication Parameters 
    bDST = 1 'destination address 
    bSRC = 0 'source address: The computer is address zero 
 End Sub 
 
In this application, the function of MOV in PLC programming was used for 
transferring the status of inputs and outputs of PLC into data registers for data 
interchange with the computer. A typical PLC program for this data transfer is shown in 
Figure 22. It moves the data from source to destination for either indicating the 
input/output or forcing the output. In this way the information of PLC and 
manufacturing operation status can be used in the diagnosis platform. 
 
 
Figure 22 An example PLC rung on read/write Register 
 
4.3.3.2 Petri net programming 
Figure 23 illustrates the main Petri net interface at runtime. The VB application 
reads data from the PLC’s data registers. displays the firings on Petri net and tokens in 
the main Petri net screen in real time, and it also shows the “Record of sequence of 
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operations” and timer intervals on each station. Each station in the assembly line is 
represented by a circular place beneath the button for the station. Additionally, there are 
places corresponding to every event in the sequence of operations at each station. When 
the base part coming along the conveyor reaches a station, the token goes into that 
particular place indicating that the operation at that station is fired and active. Once the 
base part leaves the station and all the outputs corresponding to that station have been 
de-energized in accordance with the control logic, the token leaves that place and gets 
ready to the next place. 
The user can also go into great detail about the running status on each substation 
by clicking on either one of the buttons: ‘Base Part Inspection’ or ‘Buffer station’ or 
‘Assembly 1’ or ‘Assembly 2’. It will open a more detailed sub-form on the status of all 
the I/Os at that station. For example, by clicking “Assembly 1”, the detailed view of 
station 3 (assembly arm1) is shown in the Figure 23. It is possible to see the real time 
status of all I/Os at that station and the accumulation of timing and/or counting elements 
through the control logical sequence.  
4.3.3.3 Fault localization and isolation based on fuzzy logic 
The Petri net model keeps checking the input/output device status. If a difference 
is detected between the desired I/O value and the actual value, it means a faulty event 
happens then the fuzzy Petri net will be started to isolate the fault. The signal features to 
identify a failed event are signal values and timing intervals. An event is considered 
faulty if it does not occur at the time when it was supposed to occur (non-occurrence) or 
the occurrence interval is not correct (mis-timed occurrence). The non-occurrence or 
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mis-timed occurrence event is predetermined through simulations and experiments. 
During the operation, the ladder logic in the PLC verifies whether each event occurs as 
timed. In case of a faulty event, the Petri net fires the identified fault place on the Petri 
net interface to indicate a faulty operation.  
 
 
 
Figure 23 PN diagnoser with detailed view on assembly-1 
 
 
 
 
In order to illustrate how the Petri net diagnoser diagnoses faults, let us consider 
the event of “pick part” which corresponds to closing of the gripper. Figure 24 shows the 
part of the ladder logic for detecting the failure of the event: closing the gripper on robot 
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arm1. T4:9 is the triggered timer when the base part reaches station 3, the first assembly 
station detected by the part stopper sensor at that station. Within 2 seconds of this timer, 
the output to close the gripper, “A1_GRIPPER” must be energized for a period of 0.4 
seconds. If this is true, the bit “N9:26/4” will be latched indicating that the event is 
executed successfully. Otherwise, the event is faulty and the fault places in the diagnoser 
to “pick part” will be fired to denote a failed event. The cause of this failure is the loss of 
input from the sensor “A1XH2” or “A1ZH1” which senses that the arm’s position along 
the x-axis and z-axis. To locate the exact fault, fuzzy Petri net will read the PLC bits 
from the I/O register, and feed them to the fuzzy reasoning inference to notify the faulty 
state. This interface corresponding to this failure is depicted in Figure 25 (a), where the 
token marking in the first “lower arm” place is on, which means this place has been 
executed; while the second “lower arm” place never on, which means this place has 
never been executed, this place/transition sequence corresponded to A1ZH1’s failure 
mode. So the fuzzy isolation algorithm concludes it is A1ZH1 abnormal.  From the 
detailed view of station 3 in Figure 25 (b), it is possible to view the real time status of 
the input A1ZH1, which always keeps grey and never turns green. It also means that the 
fault happens with A1ZH1. 
4.3.3.4 Forcing outputs 
In order to confirm the diagnosis result from the previous methodology, we also 
included a forcing outputs module in our diagnosis system. Making temporary changes 
to the process like bypassing certain inputs and forcing outputs on or off is an important 
part of troubleshooting. The form that can be used to force the actuators manually acting 
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is shown in Figure 26. While the right half of the form displays the current I/O status, the 
left half of the form is used for forcing the outputs by clicking the label above the output 
that is desired to be energized. The inputs and the outputs have been placed beside one 
another in order to be able to see how forcing outputs affect the inputs at all. For 
example, forcing the robot arm to extend along the x-axis will activate “A1XH2” to 
sense that the arm is extended. If it does not extend, we can conclude that some faults 
happen with input or output, then troubleshooters can go into the detailed “forcing 
output” form to check which device is in abnormal. 
 
 
 
Figure 24 Abnormal event detection logic 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 25 PN diagnoser for fault to close gripper 
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Figure 26 Forcing outputs in VB and examining I/Os 
 
 
4.4 Experiments 
A series of experiments were carried out to validate the proposed approach and 
system implementation on the diagnosis accuracy, delay etc. Before the experiment, 
failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) had been conducted to identify the possible faults, 
their severities and effects on the mission of the system. There are five most common 
faults F1~F5 involved in the dual robot arm. The FMEA analysis is shown as Table 
23.The effectiveness of the diagnoser to these faults was evaluated using the metrics 
including recognition accuracy, diagnosability. 
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Table 23 Failure mode effect analysis on the dual robot arm 
Function Failure 
Mode 
Effects Current 
controls 
Severity  
Rate 
Occurrence 
Rate 
Detection 
rate 
Risk 
priority 
number 
Recommended 
actions 
Grip Not 
correct 
part 
(F1) 
Gripper can not 
pick up the part, 
and the arm1 only 
move up and 
down in the z-
direction. 
Regular 
check by 
operator 
6 2 5 80 Check the part 
and reject the 
wrong part 
sense 
that the 
arm is 
extended 
XH2 
abnorm
al (F2) 
Gripper opens  
without lowering 
the arm at the 
carrier position 
Regular 
check by 
operator 
6 2 5 80 Check the I/O 
circuit with 
force I/O 
sense 
that the 
arm is 
retracted 
XH3 
abnorm
al (F3) 
Same effect as 
not correct part 
Regular 
check by 
operator 
6 2 5 80 Check the I/O 
circuit with 
force I/O 
sense 
that the 
elbow is 
raised 
ZH1 
abnorm
al (F4) 
It won’t grip the 
part, then raise 
the arm, then it 
extend the arm, 
then stands above 
the carrier and 
does nothing.   
 
Regular 
check by 
operator 
6 2 5 80 Check the I/O 
circuit with 
force I/O 
sense 
that the 
elbow is 
lowered 
ZH2 
abnorm
al (F5) 
It will not lower 
the arm, neither 
grip parts. It only 
extends the arm. 
The durance of 
arm is controlled 
by timer, not 
A1ZH2. 
Regular 
check by 
operator 
6 2 5 80 Check the I/O 
circuit with 
force I/O 
 
4.4.1 Recognition accuracy 
The recognition accuracy of fault detection is simply defined as equation (4-8): 
the ratio of correct fault detections to the total trials. 10 runs of each fault were 
introduced into the experiment randomly, so total 60 runs of experiment were conducted.  
 
Recognition accuracy= (total number of correct decisions)/(total number of trials)
100%    (4-8) 
 
The results of recognition accuracy are shown as below Table 24. In this table, 
“Y” means correct detection of fault, and “N” means misdetection of fault. It shows that 
“F1” is the hardest to detect while “F3” and “F5” are the second. Possible explanation 
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for this can be traced as: F1 is the part fault, which means the fault cannot trigger the 
Hall sensor to operate the right actions. This fault can be interrupted by many factors 
such as the position between the part and the sensor, the part itself and the Hall sensor 
abnormality etc. Thus it complicates the fault isolation on F1. It is hard to detect F3 
because F3 has almost the same symptom as F1, so the sequences of firing transitions 
and places for F1 and F3 are similar to each other. Thus it created some mis-detections. 
The same situation fits for F5. 
 
Table 24 Correctness measurement 
 Runs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Recognition 
accuracy 
F1 Part fault 10 Y Y Y Y N Y N Y Y Y 80% 
F2 A1XH2 
abnormal 
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 100% 
F3 A1XH3 
abnormal 
10 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 90% 
F4 A1ZH1 
abnormal 
10 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 100% 
F5 A1ZH2 
abnormal 
10 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 90% 
normal 10 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 100% 
Total 60 93% 
 
4.4.2 Diagnosability evaluation 
Diagnosability checking is for the purposes of: 1) on-line detection and isolation 
of faults and 2) off-line verification of system whether can be diagnosed or not [17].  
The diagnoser should be able to detect fault after a finite step of delay from its 
occurrence. Suppose  is the sequence of observable transitions. Therefore, a PN that 
represents the system model is diagnosable if in a finite number of observable transitions 
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it reaches a fault marked as  fPM . Only the  ifPM or with other fault marked as
 
kf
PM can identify a fault of higher order or a critical fault.  
Following the diagnosability definition: the occurrence of faulty event iF should 
be detected in at most in transitions of the system after the occurrence of an indicator 
event, a delay diagnosis matrix (DDM) for diagnoser on each fault was built to define 
diagnosability quantatively [22]. This matrix has a number of columns equal to the 
number of the diagnosis desired states, while the number of rows is equal to the number 
of fault partitions or labels. Each matrix element ijDDM indicates if a fault belonging to 
the fault partition of line i can be diagnosed, then that element 1ijDDM , after the 
occurrence of one observable transition or the violation of an expected starting from the 
place j or not, 0ijDDM . Then the diagnosis delay can be calculated as the maximum 
number of successive zeros in each line plus one. In this way, the delay diagnosis matrix 
was built to evaluate the diagnosability. The number of elements was observed from the 
experiment running. In Table 25, we can see that in order to detect F3 it takes eight 
steps, which is the longest diagnosis delay. So we concluded that the diagnosis delay for 
this diagnoser on those identified faults was equal to eight occurrences of transitions.  
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Table 25 Diagnosis delay matrix 
 Feeder 
peg part 
Lower 
arm 
Pick up 
part 
Raise 
elbow 
Extend 
arm 
Lower 
elbow  
Release 
peg 
Raise 
elbow 
Release 
stopper  
Retra
arm 
F1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
F2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
F3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
F4 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
F5 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
N 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
We presented a realtime fuzzy Petri net (RTFPN) based approach to detect 
progressive faults in discrete manufacturing system. This fault diagnosis approach 
includes: 1) a real time Petri net (RTPN) model aiming at the nonsynchronizing problem 
in the PN diagnoser, and 2) a fuzzy Petri net (FPN) diganoser with the ability of 
integrating knowledge and handling uncertainties. The RTPN model replicates the 
sequence of operations of the plants, set up the mapping between the I/O devices and PN 
places/transitions thus monitor the manufacturing plant in real-time; while the FPN uses 
the signal features as inputs to decide the occurrence of possible outputs through fuzzy 
reasoning inference, so useful but incomplete knowledge can be integrated into 
diagnosis process to locate and isolate fault root causes upon occurring. To validate the 
proposed approach, a diagnosis prototyping system to a dual robot arm was developed 
using Visual Basic. Performance evaluations including correctness, diagnosability and 
time delay on the diagnoser were analyzed through experiments. It illustrated that the 
prototyping diagnoser can have a high accuracy rate of 93% and maximum diagnosis 
delay of eight steps. The proposed system remedies the nonsynchronizing issue and can 
handle uncertainty thus achieving high correctness. Experiment process showed that this 
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system can perform multiple fault diagnosis on system with fast fault propagation and 
complex physical phenomena. Also, it allows various dynamic windows of human-
machine interface to be created providing visual data and realtime place-transition 
diagrams for operators, engineers and experts. The proposed approach is systematic and 
can be easily extended to other complex systems as flexible manufacturing system 
(FMS), HVAC, and semiconductor manufacturing facilities. 
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CHAPTER V 
BENCHMARK DIAGNOSER BASED ON FINITE STATE AUTOMATON AND 
SEQUENTIAL FUNCTION CHART 
 
To efficiently detect the stochastic faults and compare the performance between 
PN and FSA diagnosers, I implemented a diagnoser based on FSA with sequential 
function chart. The finite state automaton models keep checking the inputs/outputs of the 
DES plant, and calculating the probabilities of possible normal/abnormal states. 
Sequential function charts behave as a decision coordinator to locate the exact root cause 
of the fault. The details of this FSA diagnoser will be specified in the following sections. 
5.1 Plant model 
The plant model follows the definition and concept in [16]. The manufacturing 
system G  is modeled as an automaton:  0,,, xfEXG  , and  GLL  is sG'
corresponding prefixed closed language. In this model, X is the finite set of states; E is 
the finite set of events associated with transitions inG . There are two ways to classify the 
total event set according to whether they are abnormal/functional, or 
observable/unobservable. Events can be either faulty ( fE )/normal ( nE ) events, or 
observable ( oE )/unobservable ( uoE ) events. Typical observable events are the 
commands issued by the controller, the sensor reading changes after the execution of 
commands, etc. The unobservable events include the faulty events and events that cannot 
be recorded by the sensors etc. It is obvious that uoonf EEEEE  : . f is the state 
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transition function, XXEf : and       1,1  mEmXfmX ; 0x is the initial 
state. Furthermore, plant G is decomposed into subsystems kGGG ,,, 21  ; each 
subsystem is modeled as its own automaton  iiiii xfEXG 0,,, , so we have 
kGGGG |||||| 21  , kXXXX  21 , kEEEE  21 , and
 kxxxx 002010 ,,,  .  
Then projection is applied on the automaton of each subcomponent. Projection is 
an operation such that let oEEP : : 
                             (5-1) 
In other words: given that P  is the standard projection from
*E to
*
oE , we will 
have that . The projection operation aims at screening the 
disturbing sequential events such as unobservable events to retain the useful information 
from the automaton. 
 
5.2 Sequential function chart based control 
SFC is a graphical programming language used for processes that can be split 
into steps in PLC applications [94]. Main components of SFC are: 1) steps with 
associated actions, 2) transitions with associated logic conditions, and 3) directed links 
between steps and transitions. The steps in SFC can be either activated or deactivated. 
Steps are activated when all steps above it are active and the connecting transition is 
 
     
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superable (i.e. its associated condition is true). When a transition is passed, all steps 
above are deactivated at once and after all steps below are activated immediately. In our 
proposed approach, the PLC control logic is generated into a ladder diagram from SFC; 
SFC is also used as the basis to composite the action of each component thus modeling 
the plant and designing the diagnoser. 
 
 
Figure 27 A sequential function chart example 
 
5.3 FSA diagnoser design 
When the system is running, the diagnoser keeps monitoring the observable 
events generated by the plant, and makes conclusion on normal/abnormal status of the 
system. To construct the stochastic diagnoser, we first classify the set of faulty events as
mFFFf
EEEE 
21
 and uf EE  , then the possible fault labels are defined as 
   mFFFNl ,,, 21  . We further define the label propagation function under event 
string s lElXLP
f
oo : as 
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 
     
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i
fii
f
,,       (5-2) 
Combining observable state oX and LP, we newly generate a set of labeled states
dQ , which have the form of  ii lx , . Then we define the automaton for the diagnoser as a 
five tuples:  
 hqfEQG dodd ,,,, 0 . 
 dQ is a set of labeled states generated from the plant. The set of logical elements, dQ
is the subset of labeled states which are reachable and observable from oq under the 
transition function df . An element dd Qq   has the form of:     nnd lxlxq ,,,, 11  . 
The set of all  ii lx , s in dq  have the relationship of dQq , oi Xx  , lli  . The number 
of such components  ii lx , in an element dq will be denoted by dq . 
 oE is a set of observable events. 
 df  is the transition function of the diagnoser. It includes the state transition and label 
transition, and can be defined as        
  
 
qlx xGLs
d
f
slxLPsxfqf
 

, ,
,,,,, . The function 
LP shows that a label iF is added whenever the true behavior of the system contains an 
event
ifF
E  . Once this label is appended, it cannot be removed regardless of whether 
an event in 
if
 occurs or not in the system behavior following the label. 
 oq is the initial labeled state in the diagnoser, which is  Nxqo ,0 . 
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This  0,,, qfQ dod  is used to provide estimates of the state and information on the 
possible faulty events. This is the “discrete-event” part of the stochastic diagnoser, 
which is used to determine the logical element of the diagnoser state.  
 h is the sensor mapping between the states and the readings on the sensors. 
Suppose there are m sets of sensors to monitor the manufacturing system. Sensor 
mapping is denoted as         xhxhxhxh m,,, 21  . 
Here let us use a simple example to illustrate the proposed diagnoser design 
approach. Figure 28 (a) presented an automaton. It has the set of states is  10,,2,1 X
, and the initial state is 10 x . The set of events is  fgbaE ,,, , here  gbaEo ,,  and
 fEuo  . f also belongs to fE . A transition arc is drawn between two states if the 
probability of that transition occurring is greater than zero. With the labeled states, we 
build the diagnoser as Figure 28 (b). 
5.4 Fault isolation and detection 
The fault isolation reasoning is as follows: for the SFC based control the previous 
and current machine states and state changes (events) in time sequence are inputs to the 
fault decision. The current fault state  tF is determined by the combination of previous 
step, current step and current input commands. Then we have        tOtItOtF 1 . 
Here   0tF means that fault happening with current step.  tO  is also dependent on 
 1tO as well as  tI . Either   01 tO or   0tI won’t make desired  tO happen. 
Assume  tO and  1tO are the combined observed output states of all the steps for the 
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tth and (t-1)th steps respectively. Since the system was decomposed into subsystem
kGGGG |||||| 21  , then we are going to have        tOtOtOtO k21  as well as 
       1111 21  tOtOtOtO k . In this equation,  tOi means whether the output 
steps with plant iG are satisfying or not; means the current step satisfies and the 
next step can be started, while means the current step does not satisfy and desired 
sequential actions cannot be carried out. Let  tI be the combined event of input 
commands in the tth step, then        tItItItI k21 . Here 1I means the commands 
are received, while 0I  means the commands are not received.  
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Figure 28 Finite state automaton plant (a) and its diagnoser(b) 
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Once abnormality happens on one step, SFC will alarm that step based on
 1tO ,  tI  and  tO information. Then further fault checking will trace into the local 
sensors to identify the exact fault. In such a way, faults are isolated and detected. 
 
5.5 Case study 
5.5.1 System description 
The proposed FSA diagnoser design was implemented to diagnose a dual robot 
system as shown below in Figure 29 [95]. It is a robot work cell including a conveyor, 
two 4-axis robot arms, four stoppers, two parts feeders, a computer vision and a 
controller. It mimics the pick and place operation in the assembly process. Here we 
focus on diagnosing arm1, and the diagnosis on arm2 can follow the similar procedure as 
on arm1. 
 
 
Figure 29 An automated assembly dual robot at Texas A&M University 
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The robot1 arm is composed of shoulder, elbow, wrist and gripper. The 
sequential operations for the robot arm are: 1) stopper blocks the pallet and sends signal 
to initiate arm; 2) open gripper, lower elbow, pick up part from part feeder; 3) raise 
elbow, extend the shoulder, lower elbow, open gripper; and 4) close gripper, raise elbow, 
retract shoulder. The control on the arm1 based on sequential function chart (SFC) is 
show as below in Figure 30. The enable condition and desired outcome in each state is 
summarized in Table 26. 
 
 
Figure 30 Sequential function chart for dual robot assembly (a) and its 
components-stopper (b), shoulder (c), gripper (d) and arm (e) 
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Table 26 Enablement conditions for states in the dual robot arm assembly 
 States Enabled 
outcomes 
Preconditions 
1 Fixture arrive PSS3 (I:5/10)  N/A 
2 Part feed Feeder start 
(O:1/1)  
PSS3 (I:5/10)  
3 Lower arm A1Z (O:2/10) , 
T4:40/TT  
PSS3(I:5/10) , part(I:4/3) , 
A1XH3(I:5/11) , A1ZH2 (I:5/9)  
4 Grip part Gripper(O:2/13) , 
T4:55/TT  
A1ZH1(I:5/13) , A1XH3(I:5/11)
  
5 Raise arm A1Z(O:2/10)  T4:40/TT  
6 Extend arm A1X(O:2/9)  T4:40/TT , A1XH3(I:5/11)  
7 Lower arm  A1Z(O:2/10) , 
T4:40/TT  
A1XH2(I:5/7) , 
A1ZH2 (I:5/9)  
8 Drop part Gripper(O:2/13)  T4:55/TT  
9 Raise arm A1Z(O:2/10)  T4:40/TT  
10 Release fixture PS3(O:1/13) , 
T4:25/TT  
T4:55/DN  
11 Retract arm A1X(O:2/9) , 
T4:11/TT  
PSS3(I:5/10)  
 
As the analysis from the Chapter III, we used five sensors to monitor the 
assembly system. These five sensors are [S1, S3, S5, S7, S10]. They measured the 
signals of: pneumatic pressure on A1X solenoid valve, voltage reading on A1XH3, 
pneumatic pressure on A1Z solenoid valve, voltage reading on A1ZH2, and pneumatic 
pressure on gripper solenoid valve. The signal features on these five sensors at different 
normal/faulty situations are plotted as below Figures 31 (a) ~ (e). We need to note that 
the pressure values were already calibrated into voltage readings. Because they are 
discrete signals at either ON/OFF or low/high voltage status, here we use “0” on sensor 
readings representing OFF and “1” representing ON. The mapping h between the states 
and sensor readings is as below Table 27. 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
Figure 31 Signal features for different situations: (a) Normal operation, (b) F1 part 
error, (c) F2 XH2 abnormal, (d) F3 lose wiring and (e) F4 tolerance fault 
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(d) 
 
(e) 
Figure 31 Continued. 
 
Table 27 Sensor mapping between states and sensors 
State Physical meaning Readings on S1, S3, S5, S7, S10 
1 Fixture arrived 11010 
2 Feed part 11010 
3 Lower arm 11100 
4 Grip part 11101 
5 Raise arm 11011 
6 Extend arm 00011 
7 Lower arm 00101 
8 Drop part 00100 
9 Raise arm 00010 
10 Release fixture 00010 
11 Retract arm 11010 
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Possible faults with the arm1 and their symptoms are tabulated in the Table 28. 
Table 28 Possible faults and symptoms with the arm 
Faults Root causes Symptoms 
Failure to pick up part (F1) Bad part that cannot be detected by the sensor prior to 
assembly combined with ladder logic written without 
accounting for failed inputs. 
Robot extends along the X-axis 
without initially lowering the elbow 
to grasp the peg. Once extended, 
the elbow raises and lowers 
repeatedly. The base part is never 
released. 
Failure to lower arm and pick 
up parts (F2) 
Loss of signal from sensor (A2XH2) that detect the 
arm is extended in the X direction, caused due to 
misplacement of the sensor. 
Robot does not lower arm and 
grasps peg, it extends (along X). but 
raise and lower arm alternatively in 
the Z-axis. The fixture will not be 
released. 
Failure to close gripper (F3) Communication failure between the PLC output port 
and the solenoid valve controlling the gripper caused 
due to a disconnected wire. 
Gripper fingers are jammed open 
during the entire assembly sequence 
while the rest of the operations 
occur normally. Consequently, the 
peg is never grasped. The final 
product is output without a peg. 
Insertion failure (F4) Loss of tolerance between the grasping location of the 
gripper and the location of the parts in the part feeder. 
The parts are round and are made of rubber. They 
push each other on the feeder track. Given minor 
clearance between the parts and the walls of the track, 
they move sideways resulting in inaccurate placement 
of the parts prior to grasping by the robotic gripper. 
Insertion failure occurs in the form 
of a non- insertion of the peg into 
the hole similar to jamming or 
scratching of the edge of the hole in 
the base part by the peg before 
insertion. In the first couple of runs, 
the pegs under-travel the hole and 
in the last couple of runs the pegs 
over-travel the hole. 
 
When we are conducting the experiment, we found that the occurrences of events 
under different faults are as below: 
F1: feed part-F1-extend arm-lower arm-raise arm-lower arm-….; 
F2: feed part-lower arm-pick part-raise arm-extend arm-F2-drop part-release fixture-
retract arm; 
F3: feed part-lower arm-pick part-raise arm-extend arm-lower arm-drop part-raise arm-
release fixture-retract arm; 
F4: feed part-lower arm-pick part-raise arm-extend arm-lower arm-drop part-raise arm-
release part-retract arm. 
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Combining the normal occurrence and faulty occurrence of the events, we have 
the automaton for the dual robot arm as below Figure 32. 
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Figure 32 Plant automaton for the dual robot 
 
On this automaton, we first took the projection operator P as follows. Given a 
timed sequence  and a set of events EE 
' ,  ', EP  was the timed sequence obtained 
by erasing from  all events in
'E and summing up the delays between successive events 
in the resulting sequence. This projection is very important in analyzing the 
manufacturing automaton in that manufacturing process involves multiple parallel 
actions which may disturb each other and thus confuse the analysis. Such an erasing 
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projection can screen the disturbing sequential events from the analysis, thus making the 
automaton analysis only focus on the most related events. 
Applying the build up process of diagnoser including projection, form labeled 
state, and sensor mapping, we get the diagnoser as below Figure 33. We will implement 
this diagnoser in a VB human machine interface to indicate the occurrence of faults. 
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Figure 33 Stochastic diagnoser for the dual robot 
 
5.5.2 System implementation  
The above diagnoser structure was implemented into a human machine interface 
(HMI) as shown in Figure 34. The interface capitalizes the discrete event nature of the 
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automated PLC system. All the inputs and outputs of the dual robot arm system are 
physically connected to the I/O modules of the PLC and the PLC’s communication with 
the VB interface is through the RS-232 communication port. The serial communications 
protocol is used to pass commands, information and sensor data reading between the 
PLC and a personal computer. 
“Unprotected read operation” between PLC and PC is applied for PC to read the 
information on PLC I/O porters. During the unprotected read operation, PLC’s MOV 
commands are used to continually transfer the data contained in the input registers I:5 
and I:4 to the registers N9:2 and N9:3 respectively and also the data contained in the 
output registers O:2 and O:3 to the registers N9:4 and N9:5. This data is used to 
represent the status of I/Os on the interface. Each register mentioned above is a group of 
16 bits or one word. Along with these, several other data registers are used during the 
‘Read’ operation to transfer the accumulated values of all the timers in the process. 
When an input or output is high, the corresponding bit in the data registers is set, since 
the contents of the I/O registers are transferred to the data registers by the program. This 
activates appropriate shape elements (rectangular indicators) under appropriate labels on 
the interface. For example, if the MSComm detected the bits on “S1, S3, S5, S7, S10” is 
“11100”, we can know from the sensor mapping that the event of “lower arm” had 
happened, then its rectangular indicator under “lower arm” will turn green to indicate the 
occurrence of “lower arm”. 
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5.5.3 Normal working status 
As shown in Figure 34, when fixture is placing on the conveyor and “Autoread” 
is checked, the VB HMI starts to read data from the PLC data registers. Along the 
assembly line, we have four stations: inspection station, buffer station, assembly1 and 
assembly2. These four stations are respectively represented by a large rectangular 
indicator beneath the button for the station. Additionally, there are smaller indicators 
corresponding to every state in the sequence of operations at each station. When the base 
part moving along the conveyor reaches a station, the large indicator at that particular 
station turns green, indicating that the process at that station is active. Once the base part 
leaves the station and all the normal output states corresponding to that station have been 
successfully carried out in accordance with the control logic, the large indicator turns 
green. In Figure 34, it illustrates that all the desired operation events/states in sequential 
function chart for assembly1 and assembly2 were successfully implemented, so all the 
smaller indicators under the events were turned green. 
5.5.4 Abnormality diagnosis 
If any of these smaller indicators at the assembly stations turns red, it means that 
the operation is deviated from the normal status. In conjunction with this, the large 
indicator for the station on the assembly line containing the failed event turns grey. Then 
the application will start the fault isolation program. In order to understand how the stage 
diagram aids diagnosis, let us consider the scenario in which the robot arm fails to lower 
when extended to insert the peg into the base part. The cause of this fault is the loss of 
input from the sensor “A1XH2” which senses that the arm is extended along the x-axis. 
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When an A1XH2 abnormality happens, the event sequence for this abnormality is: 
Fixture arrive-Feed part-Lower arm-Pick part-Raise arm-Extend arm-F2-Drop part-
Release fixture-Retract arm. From this observed sequence of operations under A1XH2 
abnormality. 
 
 
Figure 34 Normal operation on assembly arm1 and 2 
 
 
We know it skipped step 7). The reason for step 7) not being executed is fault of 
(A1XH2, or A1ZH2). It will not be A1ZH2’s abnormality; otherwise step 3) will not be 
executed. We even don’t need sensor mapping, and we can conclude that it is “A1XH2 
fault”. The interface corresponding to this failure is illustrated on the stage diagram as 
shown in Figure 35. The fault indicator “F2 (XH2)” has been turned red. The indicator 
below the tag “lower arm” has turned red indicating an abnormal event. Also, the 
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indicators for the station ‘Assembly1’, and ‘release peg’ as well as ‘raise arm’ have 
turned grey indicating an incomplete assembly process on assembly arm1, ‘release peg’ 
and ‘raise arm’ have not been executed. This helps the diagnoser to isolate the problem 
to a sensor malfunction which is later confirmed from the time based record of events. 
 
 
Figure 35 Operation on XH2 fault 
 
5.6 Experiment results and discussions 
Series of experiments on detecting were carried out to validate the proposed 
approach and system implementation on detecting four kinds of typical faults involved 
in the dual robot arm. The effectiveness of the diagnoser to these faults was evaluated 
using the metrics including recognition accuracy, detect delay. 
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5.6.1 Accuracy evaluation 
The recognition accuracy of fault detection is simply defined as Equation (5-3): 
the ratio of correct fault detections to the total trials. Ten runs of each kind of fault were 
introduced into the experiment randomly, so the total 40 runs of experiment were 
conducted. 
 
Recognition accuracy=(total number of correct decisions) 
/(total number of trials)  100%     (5-3) 
 
Table 29 Correctness measurement 
Runs N F N N F F F N F F Accuracy 
F1 F3 F1 N N F1 F1 F1 N F1 F1 90% 
F2 F3F2 F2 N N F2 F2 F2 N F2 F2 90% 
F3 N F3 N N F3 F3 F3 N F3 F3 100% 
F4 N N N N N N N N N N 40% 
Total 40 80% 
 
In Table 29, it summarizes the diagnosis results for faults. For example, if the ‘N’ 
columns mean introducing no fault into the system, at this moment, the correct diagnosis 
outcome is ‘N’ (normal) only, all the other diagnosis results are wrong. If ‘F’ columns 
meet with the F1 row, it means F1 fault were introduced into the experiment at this 
moment. The correct diagnosis outcome should be ‘F1’ only. All the other diagnosis 
results are wrong. The other contents in this table follow the similar explanation. 
In the correctness measurement table, we can see that the diagnoser has high 
accuracy rate over faults F1 (part error), F2 (XH2 abnormal) and F3 (lose wiring) while 
a poor performance on F4 (tolerance fault). Except the F4, the average accuracy of 
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diagnosing F1~F3 is 93%. This reason is because that F1, F2 and F3 are faults related to 
equipment error, which is the typical application of DES fault diagnosis. These faults 
occurrences can be inferred with DES diagnoser design and sensor mapping. While F4 is 
more related to product quality defect, when F4 occurs, it has the same outcome event 
sequence as well as sensor mappings with the normal operation. Thus the diagnoser 
cannot isolate F4 with normal operation. For the product tolerance error, it is usually 
handled by statistical quality control and there is no report on applying DES approach to 
model and detect quality defects yet. 
5.6.2 Detect delay evaluation 
The occurrence of a faulty event iF should be detected in finite time after its 
occurrence. If the diagnoser cannot detect a fault, the detect delay on that fault is infinite. 
A delay table on diagnosing each fault was built to define detection delay quantitatively. 
In the experiment evaluation, we included the software of Camtasia
®
 (black block shown 
in Figure 35) to record the indication of events in the VB HMI, as well as the time span 
between the fault’s occurrence and its identification. Table 30 below records the detect 
delay for the four kinds of faults. This table has a number of columns equal to whether 
normal or faulty status is included in the experiment, while the number of rows is equal 
to which kind of fault is included. We can see that the maximum detect delay for the F1, 
F2, F3 fault is 9 seconds. While the diagnoser cannot detect the tolerance fault, so the 
detect delay is infinite for fault F4. 
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Table 30 Detect delay 
Runs N F N N F F F N F F 
F1 N/A 9s N/A N/A 7s 8s 9s N/A 9s 8s 
F2 N/A 6s N/A N/A 7s 6s 6s N/A 5s 6s 
F3 N/A 7s N/A N/A 9s 7s 7s N/A 8s 7s 
F4 N/A   N/A N/A       N/A     
 
 
5.6.3 Complexity of the DES model 
Following [43], we considered the complexity of the DES diagnoser design. 
Suppose a DES system  0,,, qQG   and his diagnoser is  0,, qQG odd  . For 
each component of the system, the local diagnosers are  011 ,, 11 qQG odd  … 
 modmd qQG mm 0,,   codiagnoser  
T
TTTT qQG 0,,,  . And we have that in the 
most complex situation for the system:  
mddd
QQQQ ,,max
1max
 , 
 
mooo
 ,,max
1max
 . The illustration of the complexity is shown as Table 31.  
 
 
Table 31 Complexity of DES model and diagnoser 
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5.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we designed and implemented a diagnoser based on finite state 
automaton and sequential function chart for diagnosing discrete manufacturing systems. 
Firstly, the system was decomposed into subsystems based on component properties and 
functionalities. Finite state automaton was used to model the event-state relationship on 
each subsystem; projection was operated on the automaton to extract the desired 
information from each subsystem; and the event-state based model was used to infer the 
occurrence of the faults and locate the possible cause. Finally, a global coordinator based 
on sequential function chart (SFC) was proposed to fuse the decisions from each local 
diagnoser to gain a comprehensive view on the whole system. To test the proposed 
decentralized diagnoser design, a detailed experiment was studied on detecting typical 
faults on a PLC controlled dual robot system. It illustrated that the proposed diagnoser 
can detect and isolate most of the DES faults with a high fault detection rate of 93% and 
maximum fault detection delay of 9 seconds, although it cannot handle the product 
tolerance fault. The contribution of this work lies on the proposed plant and diagnoser 
model, which can model observations from complex discrete manufacturing systems, 
thus detecting stochastically unobservable faults.  
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CHAPTER VI 
COMPREHENSIVE EXPERIMENT EVALUATION ON PROPOSED 
METHODOLOGIES  
6.1 Experiment objective and description 
In order to determine how sensor deployment and diagnoser facilitate fault 
diagnosis in discrete manufacturing systems and to understand the impact of the factors 
on troubleshooting performance, the objectives were established in the following 
aspects: 
1) To develop a model for evaluating diagnosis performance under alternative 
combinations of sensor deployments, diagnosers and faults.  
2) To study the effect of the sensor deployment strategy on performance with a 
diagnosis architecture.  
3) To study the effect of the diagnoser on performance with a diagnosis 
architecture. 
4) To study the effect of the nature of faults diagnosed on the troubleshooting 
performance with different diagnostic configurations.  
The proposed experiment was carried out on the dual robot system in Rockwell
®
 
Automation System Integration Laboratory at Texas A&M University. The dual robot is 
shown in below Figure 36 [95]. It is a robot work cell including a conveyor, two 4-axis 
robot arms, four stoppers, two parts feeders, a computer vision and a controller. The 
actions of those components are controlled by programmable logic controller (PLC). We 
concentrate more on one stopper (stopper3) and one robot arm (arm1) as they are 
  
131 
functioning together, and the diagnosis on stopper4 and arm2 can follow the procedures 
from arm1.  
 
 
Figure 36 An automated assembly dual robot at Texas A&M University 
 
 
6.2 Design of experiment 
6.2.1 Design table 
Factorial design is an experimental methodology which permits researchers to 
study behavior under conditions in which independent variables vary simultaneously, so 
the researchers can investigate the joint effect of two or more factors on a dependent 
variable [96]. The factorial design also facilitates the study of interactions, illuminating 
the effects of different conditions of the experiment on the identifiable subgroups of 
subjects participating in the experiment. Specifically, the full factorial design is an 
experimental design which consists of two or more factors, each with discrete possible 
values or "levels", and whose experimental units take on all possible combinations of 
these levels across all such factors.  
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For this research, there are three variables: Sensor deployment strategy (X1), 
Diagnoser (X2), and Fault (X3). Detect delay, probability of detection (POD), 
probability of false alarm (POFA), and accuracy are the response variables. The levels of 
factors used in the experimental design are listed in Table 32. There are two sensor 
deployment strategies (2), two diagnosers (2) and four faults (4), so total combinations 
of experiments are going to be 16422  . In one combination, I repeated the 
experiment 10 times. Faults were randomly introduced in experiment as shown in Table 
29. 
 
 
Table 32 Experiment design table 
RUN Sensor 
deployment 
strategy 
Diagnoser Fault Detect 
delay 
(Seconds) 
POD  POFA Accuracy 
1 1 1 1 8.33 1.00 0.25 0.90 
2 1 1 2 6 1.00 0.25 0.90 
3 1 1 3 7.5 1.00 0.00 1.00 
4 1 1 4 11 0.00 0.00 0.40 
5 1 2 1 8 1.00 0.00 1.00 
6 1 2 2 3.67 0.92 0.25 0.85 
7 1 2 3 6.4 0.83 0.00 0.90 
8 1 2 4 11 0.00 0.00 0.40 
9 2 1 1 11.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
10 2 1 2 5.33 0.75 1.00 0.45 
11 2 1 3 6.5 0.75 0.25 0.75 
12 2 1 4 11 0.00 0.00 0.40 
13 2 2 1 8.67 0.83 0.50 0.70 
14 2 2 2 3 0.75 0.50 0.65 
15 2 2 3 6 0.50 0.25 0.60 
16 2 2 4 11 0.00 0.00 0.40 
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The descriptions for the input and output are as following: 
Input Variables 
X1: sensor deployment strategy. There are two sensor deployment strategies 
applicable to discrete event systems: (1) optimized sensor deployment results based on 
fuzzy quantitative directed graph (FQDG, proposed approach) [97]; and (2) optimized 
sensor deployment results based on sign directed graph (SDG, benchmark approach). 
They formed the alternatives in X1. Through the SDG methodology, the chosen sensors 
are (S1, S5, S9, S10), which represent [pressure on A1X valve, pressure on A1Z valve, 
voltage reading on gripper controller, pressure on gripper valve]. Using the proposed 
quantitative fuzzy directed graph (FQDG) methodology, the chosen sensors are (S1, S3, 
S5, S7, S10), which represent [pressure on A1X valve, voltage reading on A1XH3, 
pressure on A1Z valve, voltage]. The detailed selection process of these two sensor 
deployment strategies is specified in Appendix II. 
X2: Diagnoser. FSA and PN are the two most popular approaches for analyzing 
discrete event systems. Two kinds of fault diagnosers: 1) diagnoser based on finite state 
automaton and sequential function chart (FSA+SFC, benchmark), and 2) realtime fuzzy 
Petri net diagnoser (RTFPN, proposed) were respectively developed to detect faults in 
discrete manufacturing systems. The construction process can be referred as Chapter IV 
and V, Appendix II also states how to build up the diagnoser. 
X3: Faults. From the observations in Section 2.1, in the robot assembly process 
there are five typical faults involved: 1) hardware fault, 2) software fault,3) product 
fault,4) task fault, and 5) tolerance fault. Inserting and grasping a part and keeping hold 
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of it are among the difficult robotic operations and are most susceptible to faults. This is 
followed by sensing failure and bad parts. These failures would ideally represent typical 
situations that need to be addressed in the implementation of diagnosis for automated 
assembly systems. Thus we replicate the faults as Table 33 to represent the typical faults. 
 
 
Table 33 Fault candidates for experiment design 
Faults Root causes Symptoms 
Failure to pick up 
part (F1), represent 
software fault and 
task fault 
Bad part that cannot be 
detected by the sensor prior 
to assembly combined with 
ladder logic written without 
accounting for failed inputs. 
Robot extends along the X-axis 
without initially lowering the 
elbow to grasp the peg. Once being 
extended, the elbow raises and 
lowers repeatedly. The base part is 
never released. 
Failure to lower arm 
and pick up parts 
(F2), represent 
hardware fault 
Loss of signal from sensor 
(A1XH2) that detects the arm 
is extended in the X 
direction, caused by the 
misplacement of sensor. 
Robot does not lower arm and 
drop part at the lower position; it 
extends (along X). but drops the 
part at the higher position. The 
fixture will be released finally. 
Failure to close 
gripper (F3), 
represent product 
fault 
Communication failure 
between the PLC output port 
and the solenoid valve 
controlling the gripper caused 
due to a disconnected wire. 
Gripper finger is jammed open 
during the entire assembly 
sequence while the rest of the 
operations occur normally. 
Consequently, the peg is never 
grasped. The final product is 
output without a peg. 
Insertion failure 
(F4), represent 
tolerance fault 
Loss of tolerance between the 
grasping location and the part 
insertion location in the 
fixture. The parts are made of 
rubber. They push each other 
on the feeder track. 
Inaccurate placement of the 
parts prior to grasping by the 
robotic gripper makes scrape 
when insertion. 
Insertion failure occurs in the form 
of a non- insertion of the peg into 
the hole similar to jamming or 
scratching of the edge of the hole 
in the base part by the peg before 
insertion. In the first couple of 
runs, the pegs under-travel the hole 
and in the last couple of runs the 
pegs over-travel the hole. 
 
 
 
Output variables 
The output variables refer to the measures of fault diagnosis performance. In 
[98], the authors listed the major performance metrics for diagnostic system include, 
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among others: 1) False positive alarm, 2) False negative miss-detection, 3) Accuracy, 
and 4) Time delay. 
These performance metrics can be calculated using the decision matrix in Table 
34. It is based on the hypothesis-testing methodology and represents the possible fault-
detection combinations that may occur. 
 
Table 34 Decision matrix for fault-detection evaluation 
[98] 
Outcome Fault (F1) No Fault (F0) Total 
Positive (D1) 
(detected) 
a 
number of detected faults 
b  
number of false alarms 
a+b 
total number of 
alarms 
Negative (D0) 
( not detected) 
c 
number of missed faults 
d 
number of correct rejection 
c+d 
total number of non-
alarms 
 a+c 
total number of faults 
b+d 
total number of fault-free cases 
a+b+c+d 
total number of cases 
 
 
From Table 34, the decision matrix can be computed readily. The probability of 
detection (POD) given a fault assesses the detected faults over all potential fault cases:  
POD=P(D1/F1)=
ca
a
            (6-1)
 
The probability of a false alarm (POFA) considers the proportion of all fault-free 
cases that trigger a fault detection alarm: 
POFA=P(D1/F0)=
db
b
             (6-2)
 
The accuracy metric is used to measure the effectiveness of the diagnostic system 
in correctly distinguishing between fault-presence and the fault-free condition. 
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Accuracy= P(D1/F1 & D0/F0)=
dcba
da


                  (6-3) 
Time delay is the time span between initiation and the detection of a fault event. 
6.2.2 Hypothesis and statistic testing 
Statistical analysis of the data involving all the sensor deployment strategies, 
diagnosers, and faults was performed using the general analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
in order to test if the different levels of any of the factors are statistically different in 
terms of the various performance metrics. The datasets collected were assumed to be 
replicates which allowed the ANOVA analysis to be performed considering the factors-
sensor deployments, diagnosers and faults. Three two-way interactions (diagnoser-fault, 
sensor-fault, sensor-fault) and one three-way interaction (sensor-diagnoser-fault) were 
conducted. The hypotheses for the ANOVA analysis can be formulated as: 
Null hypothesis (H0): There is no significant effect of different levels of a factor 
on the true average performance. 
Alternate hypothesis (H1): At least one level of the factor has significant effect 
on the true average performance. 
The following experimental hypotheses for the main effects are formulated: 
1. H0: There is no difference in the diagnosis performance with the SDG and FQDG 
based sensor deployment strategies.  
     H1: FQDG based sensor deployment induces better diagnosis performance than SDG 
based sensor deployment. 
2. H0: There is no difference in the diagnosis performance for all the four faults. 
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     H1: Fault-1, 2 and 3 induce better diagnosis performance than fault-4. 
3. H0: There is no difference in the diagnosis performance with FSASFC and RTFPN 
diagnosers. 
     H1: The RTFPN diagnoser’s diagnosis performance is better than FSASFC’s. 
To compare the performance of sensor deployments and diagnosers in improving 
the diagnosis performance, the experiment results were examined using two stages of 
statistical testing: analysis of variance (ANOVA), and Least Significant Difference 
(LSD) comparison.  
First, ANOVA was tested to determine whether there is any significant 
difference between the alternatives. Significant difference means input variables affect 
the performance; then paired comparisons between alternatives were conducted. 
However, if there was no statistically detectable difference, the statistical testing process 
stopped. 
Following, ANOVA was paired comparisons which consider a set of statistical 
inferences simultaneously. Errors in inference, including confidence intervals that fail to 
include their corresponding population parameters, or hypothesis tests that incorrectly 
reject the null hypothesis, are more likely to occur when one considers the family as a 
whole. As a statistical testing method, LSD is an effective test for detecting differences 
in means [96]: therefore, it is chosen as a candidate to compare the measured 
performance mean values of the search methodologies.  
Suppose that the data to be analyzed is composed of A groups; a given group is 
denoted a. The number of observations of the a th group is denoted aS . If all groups 
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have the same size it is denoted S . The total number of observations is denoted N . The 
mean of Group a  is denoted aM . From the ANOVA, the mean square of error (i.e., 
within group) is denoted  ASMS  and the mean square of effect (i.e., between group) is 
denoted
AMS . 
The value of the t statistics evaluating the difference between groups a and 'a is 
equal to 
  







 
'
'
11
aa
AS
aa
SS
MS
MM
t         (6-4)  [96] 
The ratio t is declared significant at a given  level if the value of t is larger than the 
critical value for the  level obtained from the t distribution and denoted ANt , . 
Rewriting this ratio shows that a difference between the means of Group a and 'a will be 
significant if 
  







 
'
,'
11
aa
ASANaa
SS
MStLSDMM 
      (6-5)  [96] 
6.3 Analysis results 
6.3.1 Stage I-ANOVA results 
The raw data collected from the experiments were listed in Appendix III and 
summarized in Table 32. The general linear models on all factors’ effects on the 
diagnosis performance are shown below as Table 35. This table illustrates that sensor 
deployment strategy and fault are important factors that will influence the diagnosis 
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results, while diagnosers did not show significant impact on the diagnosis performance. 
Possible reasons for the diagnoser’s insignificant difference may be traced to the well-
tuned and delicately designed diagnosers . Another conclusion that we can draw from 
this table is cross-effects (Sensor*Diagnoser, Diagnoser*Fault and Sensor*Fault) are not 
important factors influencing the diagnosis performance, so we will not perform two-
way ANOVA, but only the one-way ANOVA in the later analysis. 
 
Table 35 General linear model 
Source of variation 
(Factors)  
Detect delay POD POFA Accuracy 
Sensor F=0.07  
P=0.809 
F=6.58  
P=0.083 
F=33  
P=0.01 
F=12.3  
P=0.039 
Diagnoser F=15.42  
P=0.029 
F=0.16  
P=0.719 
F=6.82 
P=0.08 
F=1.49 
P=0.31 
Fault F=99.26  
P=0.002 
F=13.9   
P=0.029 
F=16.27 
P=0.023 
F=4.2 
P=0.135 
Sensor * Diagnoser F=0.38  
P=0.581 
F=0.97  
P=0.396 
F=2.45  
P=0.215 
F=1.14  
P=0.364 
Diagnoser* Fault F=2.96  
P=0.198 
F=1.58  
P=0.357 
F=2.45 
P=0.24 
F=1.63  
P=0.349 
Sensor * Fault F=0.83  
P=0.15 
F=1.31  
P=0.414 
F=5.36 
P=0.101 
F=2.3 
P=0.256 
Error df 3 3 3 3 
Total df 15 15 15 15 
 
 
We need to note the results on the detect delay in Table 32 and Appendix III. Our 
experiments show that it took 11 seconds for the arm1 to finish the whole assembly 
process. Theoretically, detect delay is supposed to be infinite if the faults cannot be 
isolated. When fault occurs, if the fixture is not blocked in the assembly process (for 
example, when fault 3 or 4 occurs), the detect delay should be smaller than 11 seconds. 
Otherwise, the fault cannot be detected. In other words, if we cannot detect the faults in 
11 seconds after its occurrence, then we cannot isolate them from other faults, so we take 
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11 seconds as the detect delay for  the faults that cannot be detected by our proposed 
sensor deployment and diagnoser design.  
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 37 Residual plots for detect delay (a), accuracy (b), positive detection (c) and 
false alarm (d) 
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(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 37 Continued. 
 
To check the normality assumptions, we draw residual plots (Figure 37) for the 
detect delay, accuracy, POD, and POFA. Normality assumptions usually are checked 
with normal probability plots or histogram plots. The histogram can be made to check 
the normality. However, with small samples, considerable fluctuation often occurs, so 
the appearance of a moderate departure from normality does not necessarily imply a 
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serious violation of the assumption. Gross deviations from normality are potentially 
serious and require further analysis [96]. Another useful procedure is to construct a 
normal probability plot of residuals. If the underlying error distribution is normal, this 
plot will resemble a straight line. In Figure 37, the residuals distributed closely along a 
straight line in the normal probability plots, with no abnormalities observed in the plot. 
Thus, the experiments fit a normal distribution. This implies that the experiments are 
valid with ANOVA to analyze the results. To identify the hypothesis we raised before, 
we will do the paired comparisons. 
 
1) One-way ANOVA on Accuracy 
One-way ANOVA: Accuracy versus Diagnoser  
Source     DF      SS      MS     F      P 
diagnoser   1  0.0400  0.0400  0.51  0.487 
Error      14  1.0975  0.0784 
Total      15  1.1375 
 
S = 0.2800   R-Sq = 3.52%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean   StDev  -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
1      8  0.5875  0.3281  (-------------*-------------) 
2      8  0.6875  0.2216         (-------------*-------------) 
                          -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                             0.45      0.60      0.75      0.90 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.2800 
 
 
One-way ANOVA: Accuracy versus Sensor  
Source  DF      SS      MS     F      P 
Sensor   1  0.3306  0.3306  5.74  0.031 
Error   14  0.8069  0.0576 
Total   15  1.1375 
 
S = 0.2401   R-Sq = 29.07%   R-Sq(adj) = 24.00% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
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Level  N    Mean   StDev  ----+---------+---------+---------+----- 
1      8  0.7813  0.2390                (--------*--------) 
2      8  0.4937  0.2412  (--------*--------) 
                          ----+---------+---------+---------+----- 
                            0.40      0.60      0.80      1.00 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.2401 
 
 
One-way ANOVA: Accuracy versus Fault  
Source  DF      SS      MS     F      P 
fault    3  0.3387  0.1129  1.70  0.221 
Error   12  0.7987  0.0666 
Total   15  1.1375 
 
S = 0.2580   R-Sq = 29.78%   R-Sq(adj) = 12.23% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean   StDev  -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
1      4  0.6500  0.4509            (----------*----------) 
2      4  0.7125  0.2056              (-----------*----------) 
3      4  0.7875  0.1436                 (-----------*----------) 
4      4  0.4000  0.0000  (----------*----------) 
                          -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                             0.25      0.50      0.75      1.00 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.2580 
 
 
From the ANOVA, significant differences were observed for sensors’ detection 
accuracy at the significance level of 0.05 among different alternatives. However, there is 
no significant difference on different diagnosers’ and faults’ effects on the diagnosis 
accuracy. Further comparison will be conducted on accuracy for the sensors.  
 
2) One-way ANOVA on POD 
One-way ANOVA: POD versus Sensor  
Source  DF     SS     MS     F      P 
Sensor   1  0.293  0.293  1.69  0.214 
Error   14  2.429  0.173 
Total   15  2.722 
 
S = 0.4165   R-Sq = 10.78%   R-Sq(adj) = 4.41% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean   StDev  -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
1      8  0.7188  0.4475             (------------*-----------) 
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2      8  0.4479  0.3830  (------------*------------) 
                          -----+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                             0.25      0.50      0.75      1.00 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.4165 
 
 
One-way ANOVA: POD versus Diagnoser  
Source     DF     SS     MS     F      P 
diagnoser   1  0.007  0.007  0.04  0.853 
Error      14  2.715  0.194 
Total      15  2.722 
 
S = 0.4404   R-Sq = 0.26%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean   StDev  ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
1      8  0.5625  0.4772  (----------------*----------------) 
2      8  0.6042  0.4003     (---------------*----------------) 
                          ---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                                 0.40      0.60      0.80      1.00 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.4404 
 
 
One-way ANOVA: POD versus Fault  
Source  DF      SS      MS     F      P 
fault    3  1.8576  0.6192  8.59  0.003 
Error   12  0.8646  0.0720 
Total   15  2.7222 
 
S = 0.2684   R-Sq = 68.24%   R-Sq(adj) = 60.30% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean   StDev  -------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
1      4  0.7083  0.4787                   (-------*------) 
2      4  0.8542  0.1250                       (------*-------) 
3      4  0.7708  0.2083                     (------*-------) 
4      4  0.0000  0.0000  (------*------) 
                          -------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
                               0.00      0.40      0.80      1.20 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.2684 
 
 
From the ANOVA, we find that at the significance level of 0.05 there is no 
significant difference on different sensor deployment strategies’ effects and diagnosers’ 
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effects on the POD. However significant differences were observed among faults. 
Further LSD comparison will be conducted on POD for the faults.  
 
3) One-way ANOVA on POFA 
One-way ANOVA: POFA versus Sensor  
Source  DF      SS      MS     F      P 
Sensor   1  0.4727  0.4727  5.46  0.035 
Error   14  1.2109  0.0865 
Total   15  1.6836 
 
S = 0.2941   R-Sq = 28.07%   R-Sq(adj) = 22.94% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean   StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
1      8  0.0938  0.1294  (----------*----------) 
2      8  0.4375  0.3953                   (----------*----------) 
                          ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                              0.00      0.20      0.40      0.60 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.2941 
 
 
One-way ANOVA: POFA versus diagnoser  
Source     DF     SS     MS     F      P 
diagnoser   1  0.098  0.098  0.86  0.369 
Error      14  1.586  0.113 
Total      15  1.684 
 
S = 0.3366   R-Sq = 5.80%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00% 
 
 
                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                          Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean   StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
1      8  0.3438  0.4213         (------------*------------) 
2      8  0.1875  0.2216  (-----------*------------) 
                          ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                           0.00      0.20      0.40      0.60 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.3366 
 
 
One-way ANOVA: POFA versus fault  
Source  DF      SS      MS     F      P 
fault    3  0.6992  0.2331  2.84  0.083 
Error   12  0.9844  0.0820 
Total   15  1.6836 
 
S = 0.2864   R-Sq = 41.53%   R-Sq(adj) = 26.91% 
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                          Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean   StDev     +---------+---------+---------+--------- 
1      4  0.4375  0.4270                   (----------*---------) 
2      4  0.5000  0.3536                     (----------*---------) 
3      4  0.1250  0.1443         (---------*----------) 
4      4  0.0000  0.0000     (---------*---------) 
                             +---------+---------+---------+--------- 
                          -0.30      0.00      0.30      0.60 
 
Pooled StDev = 0.2864 
 
From the ANOVA, we find significant differences on different sensor 
deployment strategies’ effects ( 05.0 ) and faults’ effects ( 1.0 ) on the diagnosis 
POFA. However no significant difference was observed among diagnosers. Further LSD 
comparison will be conducted on the POFA for the sensors and faults.  
 
4) One-way ANOVA on Delay 
One-way ANOVA: delay versus Sensor  
 
Source  DF      SS    MS     F      P 
Sensor   1    0.02  0.02  0.00  0.958 
Error   14  108.66  7.76 
Total   15  108.69 
 
S = 2.786   R-Sq = 0.02%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00% 
 
                        Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                        Pooled StDev 
Level  N   Mean  StDev  ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
1      8  7.737  2.482  (----------------*-----------------) 
2      8  7.813  3.060  (-----------------*-----------------) 
                        ---+---------+---------+---------+------ 
                         6.0       7.2       8.4       9.6 
 
Pooled StDev = 2.786 
 
 
One-way ANOVA: Delay versus Diagnoser  
 
Source     DF      SS    MS     F      P 
diagnoser   1    4.97  4.97  0.67  0.426 
Error      14  103.71  7.41 
Total      15  108.69 
 
S = 2.722   R-Sq = 4.58%   R-Sq(adj) = 0.00% 
 
 
                        Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                        Pooled StDev 
Level  N   Mean  StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
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1      8  8.332  2.386          (-------------*------------) 
2      8  7.218  3.020  (-------------*-------------) 
                        ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                            6.0       7.5       9.0      10.5 
 
Pooled StDev = 2.722 
 
 
One-way ANOVA: Delay versus Fault  
 
Source  DF      SS     MS      F      P 
fault    3   96.03  32.01  30.35  0.000 
Error   12   12.66   1.05 
Total   15  108.69 
 
S = 1.027   R-Sq = 88.36%   R-Sq(adj) = 85.44% 
 
 
                         Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on 
                         Pooled StDev 
Level  N    Mean  StDev  ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
1      4   9.000  1.361                    (---*---) 
2      4   4.500  1.400  (---*---) 
3      4   6.600  0.638          (---*----) 
4      4  11.000  0.000                            (---*---) 
                         ------+---------+---------+---------+--- 
                             5.0       7.5      10.0      12.5 
 
Pooled StDev = 1.027 
 
 
From the ANOVA, we find no significant difference on different sensor 
deployment strategies’ effects on detect delay at the significance level of 0.05. Neither 
significant difference on the diagnosers’ effects was found. However, significant 
difference was observed among different faults ( 05.0 ). Further LSD comparison 
will be conducted on the detect delay for the faults. 
6.3.2 Stage II-LSD comparison results 
1) Least Significant Difference Analysis on accuracy for Sensor ( 05.0 ) 
 
Table 36 LSD of pairwise comparisons in accuracy with sensors 
Experimental Group 
 FQDG SDG 
FQDG 0.00 0.3 
SDG  0.00 
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The LSD for accuracy is calculated as below 
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From Table 36 and LSD for accuracy with sensors, we conclude that FQDG is 
better than SDG on accuracy at the significance level of 0.05. 
 
2) Least Significant Difference Analysis on POFA for Sensor ( 05.0 ) 
 
Table 37 LSD of pairwise comparisons in POFA with sensors 
Experimental Group 
 FQDG SDG 
FQDG 0.00 -0.34 
SDG  0.00 
 
The LSD for POFA is calculated as below 
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From Table 37 and LSD for POFA with sensors, we conclude that FQDG is 
better than SDG on accuracy at the significance level of 0.05. 
 
3) Least Significant Difference Analysis on delay for faults ( 05.0 ) 
 
Table 38 LSD of pairwise comparisons in detect delay with faults 
 Experimental Group 
Fault1 Fault2 Fault3 Fault4 
Fault 1 0.00 4.5 2.4 -2 
Fault 2  0.00 -2.1 -6.5 
Fault 3   0.00 -4.4 
Fault 4    0.00 
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The LSD for delay is calculated as below 
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From Table 38 and LSD for detect delay with faults, we concluded that it takes 
the least amount of time to detect fault 2, then follows are fault 3 and fault 1 
sequentially. Fault 4 takes the longest time to be detected. 
 
4) Least Significant Difference Analysis on POFA for Faults ( 1.0 ) 
 
Table 39 LSD of pairwise comparisons in POFA with faults 
 Experimental Group 
Fault1 Fault2 Fault3 Fault4 
Fault 1 0.00 -0.0625 0.3125 0.4375 
Fault 2  0.00 0.375 0.5 
Fault 3   0.00 0.125 
Fault 4    0.00 
 
The LSD for POFA is calculated as below 
275.0
4
1
4
1
082.0356.1
11
'
, 











 
aa
EaNPOFA
SS
MStLSD   
From Table 39 and LSD for POFA with faults, we concluded that fault 1 and 2 
have better POFA performance than fault 3 and 4. 
 
6.3.3 Main effects and interaction analysis 
On the main effect plots on accuracy, the sensor strategy 1 (FQDG method based 
sensor deployment) and diagnoser 2 (RTFPN diagnoser) show better performance than 
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the other alternatives. On interactive plots, the combination of strategy 1 and diagnoser 2 
also show the same trends that the combination of FQDG and RTFPN diagnoser has the 
best accuracy performance. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 38 Main effects plots (a) and interaction plots (b) for accuracy 
 
 
On the main effect plots on accuracy (Figure 38), the sensor strategy 1 (FQDG 
method based sensor deployment) and diagnoser 2 (RTFPN diagnoser) show better 
performance than the other alternatives. On interactive plots, the combination of strategy 
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1 and diagnoser 2 also show the same trends that the combination of FQDG and RTFPN 
diagnoser has the best accuracy performance. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 39 Main effects plots (a) and interaction plots (b) for POD 
 
 
On the main effect plots on POD (Figure 39), the sensor strategy 1 (FQDG 
method based sensor deployment) and diagnoser 2 (RTFPN diagnoser) show better than 
the other alternatives. On interactive plots, the combination of strategy 1 and diagnoser 2 
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also show the same trends that the combination of FQDG and RTFPN diagnoser has the 
best POFA performance. 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 40 Main effects plots (a) and interaction plots (b) for POFA 
 
 
On the main effect plots on POFA (Figure 40), the sensor strategy 1 (FQDG 
method based sensor selection) and diagnoser 2 (RTFPN diagnoser) show better than the 
other alternatives. On interactive plots, the combination of strategy 1 and diagnoser 2 
also show the same trends that the combination of FQDG and RTFPN has the best 
POFA performance. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 41 Main effects plots (a) and interaction plots (b) for detect delay 
 
 
On the main effect plots on accuracy (Figure 41), the sensor strategy 1 (FQDG 
method based sensor deployment) and diagnoser 2 (RTFPN diagnoser) show better than 
the other alternatives. On interactive plots, the combination of strategy 1 and diagnoser 2 
also show the same trends that the combination of FQDG and RTFPN has the best 
detectdelay performance. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented a comprehensive evaluation of proposed approaches 
including sensor deployment strategies, and diagnosers on detecting representative faults 
in a PLC based automated assembly system. The diagnosis performance evaluation 
metrics are accuracy, false alarm (POFA), positive detection rate (POD) and detect 
delay, which are the responsive variables in the experiment. The experiment 
combinations were conducted using design of experiment techniques. Two-stage 
statistical analysis, including analysis of variance (ANOVA) and least significant 
difference (LSD), was conducted on the collected responsive variable data. Linear, main, 
and interaction effects of the diagnosis system variables on diagnosis performance were 
also determined. It was observed that that when considering the quantitative information 
from sensors and faults into sensor deployment, fuzzy quantitative directed graph 
(FQDG) provides better diagnosis performance on accuracy and false alarm than without 
quantitative information such as SDG. On the diagnoser design, it also shows that the 
proposed real time fuzzy Petri net diagnoser (RTFPN) has better performance than the 
diagnoser design based on finite state automaton and sequential function chart. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
In this chapter, we highlight the key contributions of this dissertation and identify 
potential research directions. 
 
7.1 Significant contributions 
The significant contributions of this research are two folds. 
On sensor deployment: 
1) A systematic strategy to direct the sensor deployment. It started from failure mode 
effect analysis (FMEA) to obtain the fault information on the system and initially 
choose sensors. Then quantitative fuzzy graph was used to model sensor deployment. 
The nodes of the graph were constituted of fault nodes and sensor nodes. The fault 
nodes contained fault information from FMEA, while sensor nodes contained sensor 
properties such as reliability, sensitivity, and sensor failure rate. The edges between 
sensor nodes and fault nodes represented the sensors’ fault detectability to certain 
faults. Finally, lexicographical integer linear programming or greedy algorithms 
were respectively conducted to optimally assign the sensor nodes to fault nodes, thus 
optimizing the sensor deployment. The proposed strategy covers all the aspects in 
sensor deployment for fault diagnosis and can share some light with other 
applications such as optimal control. 
2) A novel sensor deployment approach considering heterogeneous sensor 
characteristics. Previous sensor deployment approaches only considered whether 
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there is a connection between the fault node and the sensor node, without 
considering how the connection forms such as the strength of connections between 
them. It is a single attribute decision problem. Our proposed sensor deployment 
approach based on FQDG includes multiple attributes into the sensor deployment. 
Fault information, sensor characteristics and fault-sensor relationship are included 
into the cause-effect modeling between faults and sensors. In this approach, the 
fuzzy graph was used to model the cause-effect relationship between sensors and 
faults. The heterogeneous information in the sensor deployment was normalized 
using fuzzy membership function. Through fuzzy normalization, different 
sensor/fault characteristics were successfully transformed into the comparable values 
for later decision. In order to handle the trade-off on multiple attributes, the 
analytical hierarchy process (AHP) was applied to aggregate multiple sensor 
attributes into single edge values. In this way, the relation between sensor and fault 
was quantitatively decided to help deploying sensors. 
3) Practical ways to optimize the sensor-fault graph targeting multiple objectives. With 
the fuzzy quantitative graph, we first transformed the nonlinear programming 
problem into linear optimization, and then we proved that this kind of transformation 
will not change the optimality of the original problem. To solve the multiple-
objective optimization in deployment, two approaches based on lexicographical 
integer linear programming and greedy algorithms were respectively applied to 
optimally assign sensors to faults. The effects of these approaches on the 
optimization results were also discussed for choosing the proper optimization 
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approach. A case study on a five tank system showed that compared to the signed 
directed graph, the proposed fuzzy graph based methodology can greatly enhance the 
detectability to faults (from SDG’s 0.62 to fuzzy graph’s 0.70). The sensor number 
was reduced from unoptimized 13 to optimized 3, which greatly reduced the cost. 
The other case study on a dual robot arm showed how the sensor selection proceeds 
when undetectability requirements vary. The system’s detectability improved from 
signed directed graph approach’s 0.61 to fuzzy quantitative graph’s 0.65. It 
illustrated that the optimization approach can assign sensors to faults in a reliable and 
cost effective way. It also illustrated that the proposed methodology is applicable to 
both the continuous time and discrete event type systems. 
 
On real time fuzzy Petri net diagnoser design: 
1) A systematic design approach on modeling and diagnosing manufacturing systems 
with the Petri net. A realtime PN model, aiming at the nonsynchronization problem, 
was set up to monitor the manufacturing system. The mapping between I/O devices 
with the PN places avoided the aimlessness of monitoring tasks. In order to integrate 
the knowledge and handle uncertainties for diagnosis, a fuzzy Petri net diagnoser 
was proposed to locate the faults. 
2) Solid implementation work of the proposed approach on diagnosing a dual robot arm. 
The proposed diagnoser was implemented into a PN human machine interface using 
Visual Basic. The troubleshooter can monitor the running status of the whole system 
or check the very detailed running status of each station conveniently. It illustrated 
that the implementation of the system is relatively easy. It avoided the complexity 
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problem in the FSA diagnoser, and it is easy for implementation with distributed 
forms. 
3) A novel evaluation experiment on the accuracy and diagnosability on the PN 
diagnoser. Sixty runs of experiments on fault detection were randomly carried out on 
the accuracy of the diagnosis approach; it proved that the proposed system has a high 
accuracy rate of 93%. Then the detect delay matrix was applied to evaluate to the 
diagnosability of the diagnoser. It proved that the diagnoser can detect faults within 
the maximum delay of eight steps. The proposed methodology can remedy the 
nonsynchronizing between the plant and the diagnoser, and it can handle 
uncertainties in knowledge integration. 
 
7.2 Future work 
 
Potential extensions for this dissertation research can be explored in the 
following areas: 
1) Automate the system configuration process in the diagnostic/prognostic architecture, 
including feature selection, system initial configuration and reconfiguration. To 
enhance the flexibility and agility of manufacturing industries, reconfigurable 
manufacturing systems (RMS) are promising solutions that can quickly adjust the 
production capacity and functionality within a part family in response to swift 
market changes or intrinsic system changes. How to reconfigure the diagnosis 
system as the manufacturing system’s configuration changes will be an interesting 
research topic. As identified in Chapter I, how to select and fuse signal features also 
  
159 
affects diagnosis performance significantly. Some researchers have explored the 
feature selection approach through the Taguchi method [2]: the features were 
selected manually through many experimental observations. Potential work can be 
carried out in the area of automated feature selection algorithms.  
2) Although much research progression has been accomplished in the areas of fault 
diagnosis and supervisory control of complex discrete event systems, these two 
problems were tackled separately, and there is no integrated architecture in which 
control and diagnosis can be addressed simultaneously. When integrating different 
techniques together, their underlying modeling frameworks and assumptions pose 
problems to integration. It is important to have a delicately designed architecture, so 
that such tasks can be accomplished while at the same time existing techniques can 
be exploited to the greatest possible extent. The work in this dissertation has 
individually addressed some of these tasks in the diagnosis area. It has the potential 
to be integrated and used as the basis for a unified architecture. 
3) The proposed diagnoser can be extended to handle multiple simultaneous faults. 
Multiple faults may mask or compensate each other’s effects thus hindering the fault 
isolation. Additionally, it is challenging in that the number of candidates grows 
exponentially with the number of faults. Our proposed diagnoser is based on the 
single fault assumption; it can lead to incorrect or failed diagnoses when multiple 
faults happen. We did not see much research involving multiple faults diagnosis in 
discrete event systems. How to isolate multiple faults can be a future direction for 
our research.  
  
160 
4) Study the optimal configuration of sensor system under the life cycle operation cost 
for the automated manufacturing system. Sometimes increasing more sensors in the 
diagnosis system may not be cost efficient when the automated system is subjected 
to the maintenance scheduling, although it can enhance detectability. How to include 
the sensor cost into the life cycle operation of automated system thus optimizing its 
maintenance schedule will be an interesting topic in the future. 
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APPENDIX I 
 I/O MAPPING IN THE EXPERIMENT 
 
TableA1. Input/output mapping on the PLC I/O module 
BReaddata 
 
N9:2 
2^0 I:5/0    not used BReaddata2 
 
N9:2 
2^0 I:5/8       PSS4 
2^1 I:5/1    not used 2^1 I:5/9       A1ZH2 
2^2 I:5/2    not used 2^2 I:5/10     PSS3 
2^3 I:5/3    not used 2^3 I:5/11     A1XH3 
2^4 I:5/4    not used 2^4 I:5/12     PSS2 
2^5 I:5/5    not used 2^5 I:5/13     A1ZH1 
2^6 I:5/6    not used 2^6 I:5/14     PSS1 
2^7 I:5/7    A1XH2 2^7 I:5/15     not used 
 
BReaddata3 
 
N9:3 
2^0 I:4/0 not used BReaddata4 
 
N9:3 
2^0 I:4/8      not used 
2^1 I:4/1 not used 2^1 I:4/9      Pressure1 
2^2 I:4/2 not used 2^2 I:4/10    A2XH2 
2^3 I:4/3    part ready 2^3 I:4/11    load cell 
2^4 I:4/4  feeder2 reverse 
stop 
2^4 I:4/12    A2ZH2 
2^5 I:4/5  vision input 2^5 I:4/13 feeder1 forward 
stop 
2^6 I:4/6  A2XH3 2^6 I:4/14    A2ZH1 
2^7 I:4/7  pressure 3 2^7 I:4/15 feeder1 reverse 
stop 
 
BReaddata5 
 
N9:5 
2^0 O:1/0    speedH_L BReaddata6 
 
N9:5 
2^0 O:1/8      feeder2_reverse 
2^1 O:1/1    feeder1_start 2^1 O:1/9      feeder1_start 
2^2 O:1/2    feeder1_reverse 2^2 O:1/10    feeder1_reverse 
2^3 O:1/3    not used 2^3 O:1/11    not used 
2^4 O:1/4    vision output 2^4 O:1/12    PS4 
2^5 O:1/5    not used 2^5 O:1/13    PS3 
2^6 O:1/6    feeder2_start 2^6 O:1/14    PS2 
2^7 O:1/7    not used 2^7 O:1/15    PS1 
 
BReaddata7 
 
N9:4 
2^0 O:2/0      conveyor BReaddata8 
 
N9:4 
2^0 O:2/8        A2Z 
2^1 O:2/1      not used 2^1 O:2/9        A1X 
2^2 O:2/2      not used 2^2 O:2/10      A1Z 
2^3 O:2/3      not used 2^3 O:2/11      not used 
2^4 O:2/4      not used 2^4 O:2/12      not used 
2^5 O:2/5      not used 2^5 O:2/13      A1 gripper 
2^6 O:2/6      not used  2^6 O:2/14      A2 gripper 
2^7 O:2/7      A2X 2^7 O:2/15      not used    
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TableA2. Timer and counter mapping on the PLC program 
BReaddata9+ BReaddata10: T4:5 (N9:6)  BReaddata11+ BReaddata12: T4:10 (N9:7) 
BReaddata13+ BReaddata14: T4:15 (N9:8) BReaddata15+ BReaddata16: T4:20 (N9:9) 
BReaddata17+ BReaddata18: T4:25 (N9:10) BReaddata19+ BReaddata20: T4:40 (N9:11) 
BReaddata21+ BReaddata22: T4:45 (N9:12) BReaddata23+ BReaddata24: T4:50 (N9:13) 
BReaddata25+ BReaddata26: T4:55 (N9:14) BReaddata27+ BReaddata28: T4:6 (N9:15) 
BReaddata29+ BReaddata30: T4:7 (N9:16) BReaddata31+ BReaddata32: T4:1 (N9:17) 
BReaddata33+ BReaddata34: T4:2 (N9:18) BReaddata35+ BReaddata36: T4:3 (N9:19) 
BReaddata37+ BReaddata38: T4:4 (N9:20) BReaddata39+ BReaddata40: T4:11 (N9:21) 
BReaddata41+ BReaddata42: T4:14 (N9:22)  
BReaddata43+ BReaddata44: C5:0 (N9:23) BReaddata45+ BReaddata46: C5:1 (N9:24)  
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APPENDIX II  
NUMERIC EXAMPLE ON THE SENSOR DEPLOYMENT AND DIAGNOSER 
 
A2.1 Sensor deployment 
There are two sensor deployments: 1) benchmark method: signed directed graph 
(SDG), and 2) proposed method: quantitative fuzzy directed graph (FDG). 
 
How to select sensors based on SDG? 
 
 
FigureA1. SDG model for sensor deployment on dual robot 
 
TableA3. SDG model for sensor deployment on dual robot 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
R1 1          
R2  1 1 1    1 1  
R3  1 1 1    1 1  
R4 1   1       
R5     1      
R6      1 1 1 1  
R7      1 1 1 1  
R8     1   1   
R9         1 1 
R10          1 
 
R1
R2
R
4
R5
R6
R
8
S1
S2
S
4
S5
S6
S8
R3
S3
R7
S7
R
9
R
10S9
S1
0
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The formulation of the SDG based cause-effect relationship between faults and 
sensors is based on the failure mode effect analysis: whether the fault will affect the 
sensor measurement. The optimization of this SDG based sensor deployment model is 
according to the greedy algorithm proposed in [21]. The flow chart for the greedy 
algorithm is as FigureA2. 
 
 
 
 
FigureA2. Greedy algorithm for SDG based sensor deployment model [21] 
 
 
When applying the algorithm in FigureA2 to optimize the graph in FigureA1, we 
have the optimization process as below. 
Step1): select S8 or S9, because they have the highest unmarked arcs. Now we select S9, 
mark and store it by C. 
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Step2): generate all the root nodes covered by C; those root nodes are [R2, R3, R6, R7, 
R9], release the connection between [R2, R3, R6, R7] with their original sensor node arc 
connections.  
Step 3): identify the uncovered root nodes that are not are [R1, R4, R5, R8, R10].  
Repeat step 1), identify the sensor nodes among [S1, S4, S5, S8, S10] with the highest 
unmarked arcs. It was identified as either S1 or S5. 
Step 4): select S1, then the root nodes covered by S1 are [R1, R4]. Release the 
connection between R4 and S4. Store S1 in C. 
Step 5): select S5, then the root nodes covered by S5 are [R5, R8]. Release the 
connection between R8 and S8. Store S5 in C. 
Step 6): uncovered root nodes are R10, select S10 and store it in C. 
Finally, the selected sensors based on SDG are [S1, S5, S9, S10]  
 
How to select sensors based on FDG? 
Step1): Form the fuzzy graph based sensor deployment model 
As mentioned in Chapter III, the FDG based sensor deployment starts from 
failure mode effect analysis (FMEA), we first collected the fault information about the 
system and used them to form the fault nodes in the FDG. These fault information is 
Table A4. 
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Table A4. Fault nodes in FDG based sensor deployment 
 Component 
Fault 
Node 
Possible 
Fault 
Occurrence 
Rate 
Severity 
Rate 
Detection 
Rate 
RPN normalized 
RPN 
Shoulder 
R1 Cylinder 6 7 2 84 0.083 
R2 
Hall 
sensor1 
6 8 9 
432 0.431 
R3 
Hall 
sensor2 
6 8 9 
432 0.431 
R4 Solenoid 2 1 5 10 0.009 
Elbow 
R5 Cylinder 6 7 2 84 0.083 
R6 
Hall 
sensor1 
6 8 9 
432 0.431 
R7 
Hall 
sensor2 
6 8 9 
432 0.431 
R8 Solenoid 2 1 5 10 0.009 
Gripper 
R9 Solenoid 2 1 5 10 0.009 
R10 Cylinder 6 7 2 84 0.083 
 
FMEA also provided some information on how to treat the faults, so we know 
what kind of sensor that needs to be selected. The sensor nodes information is in Table 
A5. 
Table A5. Sensor nodes in FDG based sensor deployment 
Sensors to 
detect faults 
Sensitivity 
(full  
scale) 
SNR 
(dB) 
Resolution 
(bit) 
Accuracy 
(full scale) 
1-acc sensor 
fail 
rate 
(Pr) 
Cost 
($) 
SI 
15.84 
Norm
alized 
SI 
Fault  
node 
Sensor 
node 
R1 S1 1% 100 15 3% 97% 0.001 30 
14.55 0.91 
R2 S2 1% 100 16 1% 99% 0.001 80 
15.84 1 
R3 S3 1% 100 16 1% 99% 0.001 80 
15.84 1 
R4 S4 1% 100 16 1% 99% 0.001 80 
15.84 1 
R5 S5 1% 100 15 3% 97% 0.001 30 
14.55 0.91 
R6 S6 1% 100 16 1% 99% 0.001 80 
15.84 1 
R7 S7 1% 100 16 1% 99% 0.001 80 
15.84 1 
R8 S8 1% 100 16 1% 99% 0.001 80 
15.84 1 
R9 S9 1% 100 16 1% 99% 0.001 80 
15.84 1 
R10 S10 1% 100 15 3% 97% 0.001 30 
14.55 0.91 
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The sensor fault relation is based on the sensing gain and sensing time of the 
sensor’s to the fault. The  raw data for sensors’ sensing gain and time is in Table A6. 
 
Table A6. Sensor nodes in FDG based sensor deployment 
 
Sens. 
gain 
Sens. 
time (ms) 
g/t 
S1 1 4.6 0.217391 
S2 1 3 0.333333 
S3 1 3 0.333333 
S4 1 3 0.333333 
S5 1 4.6 0.217391 
S6 1 3 0.333333 
S7 1 3 0.333333 
S8 1 3 0.333333 
S9 1 3 0.333333 
S10 1 4.6 0.217391 
 
 
In order to aggregate sensor nodes, fault nodes and senor-fault relation into single 
edge value, I used the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). The decision hierarchy is as 
FigureA3. The edge value is aggregated as    TFSFS PVPVPVFISFISIE ,,,,
~

. 
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Decide edge values in the graph
Sensitivity
Resolution
Accuracy
Sensor 
Property
Sensing gain
Sensing  time
Sensor fault 
relation
Severity
Occurrence 
rate
Detection rate
Fault Property
Goal
Factors
SNR
 
FigureA3. Decision hierarchy in the sensor deployment 
 
 
We assume equal importance among these three attributes: 
   333.0333.0333.0,, FSFS PVPVPV .Combining the information, we have the 
edge values in TableA4, and the fuzzy graph model is presented in Figure A7. 
 
Table A7. Connection edge values in FDG based sensor deployment 
 0.918 1 1 1 0.918 1 1 1 1 0.918 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
0.083 R1 0.55          
0.44 R2  0.81 0.81 0.34    0.67 0.67  
0.44 R3  0.81 0.81 0.34    0.67 0.67  
0.009 R4 0.55   0.34       
0.083 R5     0.55      
0.44 R6      0.81 0.81 0.67 0.67  
0.44 R7      0.80 0.81 0.67 0.67  
0.009 R8     0.55   0.67   
0.009 R9         0.67   0.55 
0.083 R10          0.55 
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FigureA4. FDG model for sensor deployment on dual robot 
 
 
Step2): Optimize the above fuzzy graph based sensor deployment model 
1) From the conjunction matrix in Table A7, if we use the greedy algorithm 
proposed in Chapter III to optimize this graph, we have the iterative process as 
Table A8. 
 
Table A8. Iterative process on greedy optimization in FDG based sensor 
deployment 
 
R1
R2
R
4
R5
R6
R
8
S1
S2
S
4
S5
S6
S8[0.009]
[0.43]
[0.08]
{0.55}
{0.81}
{0.34}
{0.55}
{0.67}
(1)
(0.92)
(1)
(1)
(0.92)
(1)
R3
S3
[0.43]
{0.81}
(1)
R7
S7
(1)
[0.009]
[0.08]
[0.43]
[0.43]
{0.81} {0.81}
R
9
R
10S9
S1
0
{0.67}
{0.55}
(1)
(0.92)
[0.08]
[0.009]
    
Iterative1:    pick R1, match S1 and remove S4 
Iterative2:    pick R5, match S5 and remove S8 
Iterative3:   pick R10, match S10, remove S9 
Iterative4:   pick R4, remove S4 since it was covered by S1 
Iterative5:   pick R8, Remove S8, since it was covered by S5 
Iterative6:   pick R9, remove S9,since it was covered by S10 
Iterative7:   pick R6, match S6, remove S7 
Iterative8   pick R6, remove S7,since it was covered by S6 
Iterative9:   pick R2, match S2, remove S3 
Iterative10:   pick R3, remove S3,since it was covered by S2 
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So the selected sensors are: S1, S5, S10,S2, S6 
2) Use mixed integer linear programming to optimize this graph, we have: when 
detectability requirement is 0.1, the selected sensors are: S1, S3, S5, S7, S10. 
When detectability requirement is 0.8, the selected sensors are: S1, S2, S5, S6, 
S10. This is the same with the results from greedy algorithm. 
 
 
FigureA5. LINGO model for FDG based sensor deployment on dual robot 
 
Summarizations on the sensor deployment 
There are two sensor deployments: 1) bench mark: SDG deployment: the 
selected sensors are [S1, S5, S9, S10], which represents [pressure on A1X solenoid, 
pressure on A1Z solenoid, voltage reading on A1Z controller, pressure on gripper 
solenoid]; 2) proposed sensor deployment: the selected sensors are [S1, S3, S5, S7, S10], 
which represent [pressure on A1X solenoid, voltage reading on A1XH3, pressure on 
A1Z solenoid, voltage reading on A1ZH2, pressure on gripper solenoid]. 
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A2.2 Diagnoser design 
There are two diagnoser approaches: 1) bench mark: FSA based diagnoser 
design; 2) proposed diagnoser design: realtime fuzzy Petri net diagnoser.  
1) SDG senor deployment+FSA diagnoser 
Step1: set up the plant model and under this configuration is as shown in FigureA6.  
 
 
Figure A6. Actuators and sensors of the pick and place station 
 
Plant model 
The plant’s control model based on sequential function chart is as FigureA7. The 
enable condition and desired outcome at each step is summarized in Table A9. 
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 C
o
n
tr
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lle
r Actuator
Gripper
X-axis Cylinder
Z-axis Cylinder
Stopper
Sensor
A1ZH1
A1ZH2
A1XH2
A1XH3
Part
Photo sensor Part arrive
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Table A9. Enablement conditions for states on the dual robot arm 
 Event Enabled outcome Precondition 
1 Fixture arrive N/A N/A 
2 Part feed Feeder start (O:1/1)  PSS3 (I:5/10)  
3 Lower arm A1Z (O:2/10)
,T4:40/TT  
PSS3(I:5/10) , part (I:4/3) , 
A1XH3(I:5/11) , A1ZH2 (I:5/9)  
4 Grip part Gripper(O:2/13) , 
T4:55/TT  
A1ZH1(I:5/13) , A1XH3(I:5/11)  
5 Raise arm A1Z(O:2/10)  T4:40/TT  (last 2s using timer) 
6 Extend arm A1X(O:2/9)  T4:40/TT , A1XH3(I:5/11)  
7 Lower arm  A1Z(O:2/10)
,T4:40/TT  
A1XH2(I:5/7) , A1ZH2 (I:5/9)  
8 Drop part Gripper(O:2/13)  T4:55/TT (last 4s using timer) 
9 Raise arm A1Z(O:2/10)  T4:40/TT (last 2s using timer) 
10 Release 
fixture 
PS3(O:1/13) , 
T4:25/TT  
A1ZH1(I:5/13) , A1XH3(I:5/11)
, T4:55/DN  
11 Retract arm A1X(O:2/9)
,T4:11/TT  
PSS3(I:5/10)  
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Figure A7 Sequential function chart for dual robot assembly (a) and its 
components-stopper (b), shoulder (c), gripper (d) and arm (e) 
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The FSA plant model for the dual robot arm is as Figure A8.  
 
 
 
Figure A8. FSA plant model for the dual robot arm 
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Step 2: Sensor mapping 
 
Table A10. Sensor mapping for the FSA plant under SDG sensor configuration 
State Physical meaning S1, S5, S9, S10 
1 Fixture arrived 1,0,0,0 
2 Feed part 1,0,0,0 
3 Lower arm 1,1,0,0 
4 Grip part 1,1,1,1 
5 Raise arm 1,0,1,1 
6 Extend arm 0,0,1,1 
7 Lower arm 0,1,1,1 
8 Drop part 0,1,0,0 
9 Raise arm 0,0,0,0 
10 Release fixture 0,0,0,0 
11 Retract arm 1,0,0,0 
12 F1 occurrence  
13 Extend arm 0,0,0,0 
14 Lower arm 0,1,0,0 
15 Raise arm 0,0,0,0 
16 F2 occurrence  
17 Drop part 0,1,0,0 
18 Release fixture 0,0,0,0 
19 Retract arm 1,0,0,0 
20 F3 occurrence  
21 Raise arm 1,0,1,0 
22 Extend arm 0,0,1,0 
23 Lower arm 0,1,1,0 
24 Drop part 0,1,0,0 
25 Raise arm 0,0,0,0 
26 Release fixture 0,0,0,0 
27 Retract arm 1,0,0,0 
 
Combining the sensor mapping with projection, we get the diagnoser as Figure 
A9 for the dual robot arm. 
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Figure A9. FSA diagnoser model for the dual robot arm with SDG sensor 
deployment 
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2) FDG senor deployment+FSA diagnoser 
Step 1: The plant and under this configuration is as shown in Figure A10. 
 
Figure A10. Sequential function chart for dual robot assembly (a) and its 
components-stopper (b), shoulder (c), gripper (d) and arm (e) 
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Step 2: Sensor mapping 
 
Table A11. Sensor mapping for the FSA plant under FQDG sensor configuration 
State Physical meaning S1, S3, S5, S7, S10 
1 Fixture arrived 1,1,0,1,0 
2 Feed part 1,1,0,1,0 
3 Lower arm 1,1,1,0,0 
4 Grip part 1,1,1,0,1 
5 Raise arm 1,1,0,1,1 
6 Extend arm 0,0,0,1,1 
7 Lower arm 0,0,1,0,1 
8 Drop part 0,0,1,0,0 
9 Raise arm 0,0,0,1,0 
10 Release fixture 0,0,0,1,0 
11 Retract arm 1,1,0,1,0 
12 F1 occurrence  
13 Extend arm 0,0,0,1,0 
14 Lower arm 0,0,0,0,0 
15 Raise arm 0,0,0,1,0 
16 F2 occurrence  
17 Drop part 0,0,0,1,0 
18 Release fixture 0,0,0,1,0 
19 Retract arm 1,1,0,1,0 
20 F3 occurrence  
21 Raise arm 1,1,0,1,0 
22 Extend arm 0,0,0,1,0 
23 Lower arm 0,0,1,0,0 
24 Drop part 0,0,1,0,0 
25 Raise arm 0,0,0,1,0 
26 Release fixture 0,0,0,1,0 
27 Retract arm 1,1,0,1,0 
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Build these events into the plant and use the projection; we can get the diagnoser 
as Figue A11. 
 
Figure A11. FSA diagnoser model for the dual robot arm with FQDG sensor 
deployment 
 
The idea of Petri net diagnoser is different from FSA. It uses the signal feature to 
isolate faults, while the FSA are using the events observations. 
 
Step 3: fault isolation  
The behavior which does not correspond to a normal one is considered as faulty. 
Thus, a fault can occur starting from any state of the desired behavior. This fault 
occurrence is unobservable and it leads the system to a faulty state. Each one of these 
faulty states must be reached within a finite delay for all the event sequences that can 
lead to this state starting from any other one of the desired behavior states. 
1N
(11010)
2N
(11010)
3N
(11100)
4N 
(11101)
5N
(11011)
6N
(00011)
7N
(00101)
8N 8F4 24F3
(00100)
9N 25F3 9F4
(00100)
10N 26F3 10F4 18F2
(00010)
11N 27F3 11F4 19F2
(11010)
Fixture 
arrive
Feed
(Lower arm, 1)
Grip part
(raise arm, 1)
(Extend arm, 1)
(Lower arm, 1)
(Drop part, 1)
Raise arm
Release
Retract arm
13F1
(00010)
14F1
(00100)
15F1
(00010)
(extend, Pf1) 
(lower, 1)
(raise, 1)
17F2
(00010)
(drop, Pf2)
(release, [0  0 0 1] )
21F3
(11010)
22F3
(00010)
23F3
(00100)
20F3
(11100)
(Grip part, PF3)
(raise arm, 1)
(Extend arm, 1)
(Lower arm, 1)
(Drop part, [0 0 1])
  
193 
When part failure occurs, the observed the sequence of events on this:  
a) Part fault 
The observed event sequence is: feed part-extend arm-lower arm-raise arm-lower 
arm-raise arm …. 
The reason for the arm cannot be lowered can because of failure of (part, or 
A1XH3, or A1ZH2), the arm was extended is because of failure of (T4:40/TT or 
A1XH3), arm can be lowered means (A1XH2 and A1ZH2) are normal. Arm cannot be 
retracted is because of (A1ZH1, A1XH3) problem. It will not be the problem of A1ZH1, 
because even A1ZH1 has problem, it still can achieve the work of lower arm in the first 
time. Now from the observed sequence, we cannot isolate the fault with (part, or 
A1XH3), with help of sensor mapping, we are trying to isolate them. 
With SDG based sensor deployment, we cannot tell whether it is part fault or 
A1XH3 fault, because there is no information about them.  However, with FDG based 
sensor deployment, we can isolate part fault and A1XH3 fault because if it is A1XH3 
fault, S3 will always be 0. If S3 initially is not 0 but 1, and the observed event sequence 
is still like: feed part-extend arm-lower arm-raise arm-lower arm-raise arm .., we 
conclude that “part fault” occurred. 
b) A1XH2 fault 
The observed event sequence is: feed part-lower arm-pick part-raise arm-extend 
arm-drop part-release fixture-retract arm; we know it skipped step 7). The reason for 
step 7) not being executed is fault of (A1XH2, or A1ZH2). It will not be A1ZH2’s 
  
194 
abnormality; otherwise step 3) will not be executed. We don’t need sensor mapping, and 
we can conclude that it is “A1XH2 fault”. 
c) Lose wire between gripper solenoid and controller 
The observed event sequence is: feed part-lower arm-pick part-raise arm-extend 
arm-lower arm-drop part-raise arm-release fixture-retract arm; it skips steps 4), 7) and 
8). If step 4) is skipped, it may be because of (A1ZH1, or A1XH3) faults, but it won’t be 
A1XH3 fault, otherwise step 3) won’t happen. Step 7) was skipped may be because of 
(A1XH2, or A1ZH2) faults. However, it won’t be A1ZH2 fault, otherwise step 3) won’t 
happen. Step 8) was skipped may be because of (A1ZH1, or A1XH3) fault, but we 
already remove the possibility of A1XH3. Now let us decide whether it is (A1ZH1 or 
A1XH2)’s problem? It will not be A1XH2’s problem. Because event A1XH2 is faulty, it 
will still grip the part. Now we cannot decide whether is because A1ZH1 or some other 
faults by observed event sequence. Now we use the sensor mapping.  
By SDG, we observed at step 7), S9 has a reading change, while S10 no change. 
So we conclude that it is not the fault of A1ZH1, instead it is the wiring between 
controller and solenoid. 
By FDG, we observed that at step 10) fixture is released, so we conclude that it is 
not the fault of A1ZH1, instead it is the wiring between controller and solenoid. 
d) Tolerance fault  
The proposed sensor deployment and fault diagnoser design cannot identify this 
kind of fault with normal operation. 
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3) SDG senor deployment+PN diagnoser 
 
Step 1: Plant model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A12. PN plant model for the dual robot arm 
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Step 2: Sensor mapping with SDG sensor deployment 
 
Table A12. Sensor mapping in PN diagnoser with SDG sensor deployment 
Places Description Output Devices Transition Input events 
P1 Stopper3 {C3,PSS3,PS3} T1 Start 
P2 Feeder part ready {Part, PSS3} T2 Lower 
elbow1 
P3 Elbow1 lowered  {PSS3, Part Ready, 
A1ZH2,A1XH3} 
T3 Close 
gripper2 
P4 Part1 picked  
(close gripper1) 
{A1ZH1,A1XH3} T4 Raise elbow2 
P5 Elbow1 raised  {T40.TT} T5 Extend arm1 
P6 Arm1 extended  {PSS3, T11} T6 Lower 
elbow1 
P7 Lower elbow1 {PSS3,A1XH2,A1ZH
2} 
T7 Open 
gripper1 
P8 Open gripper1 {T55.DN} T8 Raise elbow1 
P9 Raise elbow {T40.DN} T9 Retract arm1 
P10 Retract arm1 {A1XH2}   
Faulty Places Faulty Transitions 
PF1 Part fault { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F1  
PF2 A1XH2 abnormal { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F2  
PF3 A1XH3 abnormal { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F3  
PF4 A1ZH1 abnormal { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F4  
PF5 A1ZH2 abnormal { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F5  
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Step 3: Diagnoser 
 
Figure A13. Coverability tree model for the dual robot arm 
 
Step 4: Fuzzy fault isolation rules 
 
Figure A14. Signal features for normal operation on SDG based sensor deployment 
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Figure A15. Signal features for F1-part error on SDG based sensor deployment 
 
 
Figure A16. Signal features for F2-XH2 error on SDG based sensor deployment 
 
 
Figure A17. Signal features for F3-lose wiring on SDG based sensor deployment 
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Figure A18. Signal features for F4-tolerance error on SDG based sensor 
deployment 
 
For the SDG based sensor deployment, the fault isolation rules are as below: 
Normal: At the normal operation the A1Z should two periodic cycles of “ON” 
and each lasts for 2 seconds; AND Gripper pressure should have one periodic cycle of 
“ON” 
R1: IF A1Z has periodic cycles on low-high signal AND XH3 is always off, 
THEN the system is in part fault. 
R2: IF A1Z has only one cycle on low-high signal change, THEN the system is in 
XH2 fault. 
R3: IF Gripper has turned “ON” AND Gripper pressure keeps always zero, 
THEN the system is lose wiring fault. 
R4: the proposed sensor diagnoser and sensor deployment cannot isolate the 
tolerance fault. 
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4) FQDG senor deployment+PN diagnoser 
Step 1: Plant model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A19. PN plant model for the dual robot arm 
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Step 2: Sensor mapping 
 
 
Table A13. Sensor mapping in PN diagnoser with FQDG sensor deployment 
Place Description Output Devices Transition Input 
events 
P1 Stopper3 {C3,PSS3,PS3} T1 Start 
P2 Feeder part ready {Part, PSS3} T2 Lower 
elbow1 
P3 Elbow1 lowered  {PSS3, Part Ready, 
A1ZH2,A1XH3} 
T3 Close 
gripper2 
P4 Part1 picked  
(close gripper1) 
{A1ZH1,A1XH3} T4 Raise 
elbow2 
P5 Elbow1 raised  {T40.TT} T5 Extend 
arm1 
P6 Arm1 extended  {PSS3, T11} T6 Lower 
elbow1 
P7 Lower elbow1 {PSS3,A1XH2,A1ZH2} T7 Open 
gripper1 
P8 Open gripper1 {T55.DN} T8 Raise 
elbow1 
P9 Raise elbow {T40.DN} T9 Retract 
arm1 
P10 Retract arm1 {A1XH2}   
Faulty Place Faulty Transition 
PF1 Part fault { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F1  
PF2 A1XH2 abnormal { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F2  
PF3 A1XH3 abnormal { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F3  
PF4 A1ZH1 abnormal { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F4  
PF5 A1ZH2 abnormal { A1ZH2, A1XH2, 
gripper} 
F5  
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Step 3: Diagnoser 
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Figure A20. Coverability tree model for the dual robot arm 
 
 
Step 4: Fuzzy fault isolation rules 
 
For the FDG based sensor deployment, the fault isolation rules are as below: 
Normal: At the normal operation the A1ZH1 should have two periodic cycles of 
“ON” and each lasts for 2 seconds; AND Gripper pressure should have one periodic 
cycle of “ON”. 
R1: IF A1ZH1 has periodic cycles on low-high signal AND XH3 is always off, 
THEN the system is in part fault. 
R2: IF A1ZH1 has only one cycle on low-high signal change, THEN the system is 
in XH2 fault. 
R3: IF A1ZH1 has the on two periodic cycles of “ON” AND Gripper pressure 
keeps always zero, THEN the system is lose wiring fault. 
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R4: the proposed sensor diagnoser and sensor deployment cannot isolate the 
tolerance fault. 
 
 
Figure A21. Signal features for normal operation on FDG based sensor deployment 
 
 
Figure A22. Signal features or F1-part error on FDG based sensor deployment 
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Figure A23. Signal features or F2-XH2 error on FDG based sensor deployment 
 
 
Figure A24. Signal features or F3-lose wiring error on FDG based sensor 
deployment 
 
 
Figure A25. Signal features or F4-tolerance error on FDG based sensor deployment 
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APPENDIX III 
 SIGNED DIRECTED GRAPH BASED SENSOR DEPLOYMENT 
 
Signed Directed Graph (SDG) [7, 8] is a graphical representation of the cause 
effect relation system that utilizes nodes and branches. When applying it to sensor 
deployment problem, the nodes correspond to the sensor that monitor process state 
variables and fault that represent malfunctions, and the branches represent the causal 
relationships between the fault nodes and sensor nodes. The branches are marked with 
signs according to the relationship between the sensor variables and fault nodes. This 
representation helps in defining a pattern of observed symptoms that the particular fault 
will influence on the process variables. We need to mention that not all the variables of a 
manufacturing process can be measured due to technical or economical infeasibilities. 
Thus the pattern defined is always partially observed as the ‘‘partial pattern’’. This 
partial pattern from these sensors helps in detecting symptoms of every fault thus 
obtaining the cause effect model on fault propagation. The arcs in the SDG represent a 
‘‘can cause’’ (be careful, not “will cause”) relationship, that is, an arc from node A to 
node B only implies that A can cause B, instead of A will cause B. The faults’ positive 
(high) or negative (low) influences on the states of the variables respectively are 
assigned ‘+’ or ‘-‘signs to the branches, and normal influences are marked with 0. A 
nonzero node sign signifies the presence of a failure in the process, and a set of nonzero 
signs in the SDG represents a pattern of fault symptoms. The SDG graph on sensor 
deployment can be generated from process graph or failure mode effect analysis. 
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When the SDG is ready, the problem of sensor allocation becomes to identify the 
fault root nodes and place the minimum number of sensors on the measurable valid 
nodes in the cause effect graph. Here, we need ensure that every fault defined for the 
process has to be observed by at least one sensor. This would ensure that no fault goes 
unobserved when a given set of sensors is located on the SDG. This is referred to as the 
‘‘observability condition’’. Such an optimization procedure is shown as below: 
  
 
 
Figure A26. Flow chart for sensor selection using greedy search in SDG based 
sensor deployment [7]
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APPENDIX IV 
 EXPERIMENT DATA ON THE COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION
  
 
2
0
8
 
 
 
In the “sensor deployment strategy” column: 1 means FDG based sensor deployment, 2 means SDG based sensor deployment. In the diagnoser column: 
1 means “FSA+SFC” diagnoser, 2 means “RTFPN” diagnoser. 
 
RUN Sensor 
deployment 
strategy 
Diagnoser Fault 
0 1  0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
dc dl dc dl dc dl dc dl dc dl dc dl dc dl dc 
d
l dc dl dc dl 
1 1 1 1 
F3  F1 9 N  N  F1 7 F1 8 F1 9 N  F1 9 F1 8 
2 1 1 2 F3, 
F2  F2 8 N  N  F2 7 F2 6 F2 6 N  F2 5 F2 6 
3 1 1 3 N  F3 7 N  N  F3 9 F3 7 F3 7 N  F3 8 F3 7 
4 1 1 4 
N  N 11 N  N  N 11 N 
1
1 N 11 N  N 11 N 11 
5 1 2 1 N  F1 7 N  N  F1 8 F1 9 F1 8 N  F1 8 F1 7 
6 1 2 2 
F3  
F2, 
F3 8 N  N  F2 5 F2 4 F2 4 N  F2 3 F2 4 
7 1 2 3 N  F3 7 N  N  F3 7 F3 6 N  N  F3 6 F3 6 
8 1 2 4 
N  N 11 N  N  N 11 N 
1
1 N 11 N  N 11 N 11 
9 2 1 1 
F3  N 11 F3  F2  N 11 N 
1
1 F2 11 F3  N 11 F2 11 
10 2 1 2 
F2  
F2, 
F3 3 F3  F3  F2 6 
F2, 
F3 6 F2 6 F3  F2  
F2, 
F3 7 
11 2 1 3 
N  F3 6 N  
F2, 
F3  
F2, 
F3 7 F3  7 N  N  N  F2 3 
12 2 1 4 
N  N 11 N  N  N 11 N 
1
1 N 11 N  N 11 N 11 
13 2 2 1 
N  
F1, 
F2 9 F3  N  F1 9 F1 7 
F1, 
F2 9 
F2, 
F3  F1 9 F1 8 
14 2 2 2 F2, 
F3  
F2, 
F3 2 N  N  F2 4 
F2, 
F3 3 F2 3 
F2,
F3  N  F2 3 
15 2 2 3 
N  N  F2  N  
F2,F
3 7 F3 7 N  N  F3 6 
F2, 
F3 6 
16 2 2 4 
N  N 11 N  N  N 11 N 
1
1 N 11 N  N 11 N 11 
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